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The real and the ideal

22 Aug 2007 11:09 am

John Quiggin demands of Daniel Drezner:


Unless “vital national interest” is construed so narrowly as to be equivalent to “self-defence”, this is a direct repudiation of the central founding principle of international law, prohibiting aggressive war as a crime against peace, indeed, the supreme international crime. It’s more extreme than the avowed position of any recent US Administration – even the invasion of Iraq was purportedly justified on the basis of UN resolutions, rather than US self-interest. Yet, reading this and other debates, it seems pretty clear that Drezner’s position is not only generally held in the Foreign Policy Community but is regarded, as he says, as a precondition for serious participation in foreign policy debates in the US.

Dan and I discussed this on Bloggingheads: to what extent is the Netroots enraged because the foreign policy community focuses on what states will do, rather than what they should do?

Many economists (not all) might agree that it would be lovely if we lived in an Edenic utopia in which everyone did the best for society without thought of themselves. But almost all economists recognize that self-interest is a powerful force that must be dealt with, and therefore that economic policy must be designed on the assumption that people will try to maximise their own good, rather than society's. Similarly, foreign policy assumes that states will act in their own interest, and try to design a foreign policy that works within that constraint. The netroots (and many libertarians), who have a more idealistic theoretical model, are outraged. They are particularly outraged because they see that in certain cases, such as Iraq, their prescription would have produced a better outcome.

But of course, that doesn't mean that it necessarily works as a system--that Bill Gates gave billions to charity is not a vindication of communism. Having gotten it so dreadfully wrong on Iraq, I am seduced by the easy by-the-numbers approach posed by a non-interventionist foreign policy. But I wonder what I am not seeing--the wars that don't happen in the Middle East1, or Central Europe, because all the participants know that it would be a foolhardy invitation to US intervention. I take this to be the foriegn policy defense of their position; and it's a pretty compelling one. For the same reason that it's only a good idea to be a pacifist in a nation with a strong police force, it may only be possible to be an idealist when realists are running the show.

1 Yes, Israel is certainly a sore point, and our support of Israel makes Arab nations sorer. But Israel is not the only country in the Middle East. If Israel weren't there, the Middle East would still have plenty of conflict . . . Iraq didn't invade Iran, or Kuwait, to protest America's position on Palestine.

Comments (33)

Similarly, foreign policy assumes that states will act in their own interest, and try to design a foreign policy that works within that constraint.

I think even this idea is not enough of a guiding principle. Many on the right (and the left, for that matter) think that dictatorial states act only in the interest of the dictator and thus create problems that extend beyond their borders - refugee crises, civil wars and the like.

And lately on the right, there is talk that Iran, as a dictatorial state, doesn't act in the interest of its citizens and that the average person there will welcome a bombing as a blow against the oppressor. That line of thinking never has unintended consequences, does it?

It's probably true that American power curbs other states, but only the USA has shown a repeated willingness to project its forces all over the world. Why is that? China has no interest in invading Central America, and they don't have spy planes roaming off the coast of Florida like we do at Hainan Island. Is that really the best allocation of our forces?

This whole question of who should be able to talk is so academic--literally! I've never seen a group of people (outside of high school) so fixated on critiquing questions rather than answering them as academics and their ilk within the larger media culture. Don't like a question? Proclaim it illegitimate on its face--or those supporting it, liars, damn liars, and nothing but liars! Nothing else need be said!

Anyway, call me obstinate, obdurate, even a fool, but the fact that things in Iraq have not gone at all the way anyone would have hoped does not impugn the validity of one's initial and continuing support for the endeavor. (Obviously, I have to give on this point.) That the Spanish civil war did not end as progressives would have liked does not mean that the idealists who went to fight against fascism didn't have a moral reason for doing so. That they were killed while living out this ideal in no way invalidates their zeal.

All I can say is, this is the first time in my 54-year life that I can remember the United States government (mostly) being on the right side in the Middle East. And I guess it just doesn't surprise me that changing sides has led to this much turmoil.

Oh, man.

that Bill Gates gave billions to charity is not a vindication of communism.

Wh...????? If everybody gave lots of money to charity, that would be like communism...because how? State/proletarian ownership of the means of production...? Or are you talking about pre-Marxist Fabian socialism, in which case the similarity is that...everybody living and working in one big commune and sharing the profits is like Microsoft...or...?

Having gotten it so dreadfully wrong on Iraq, I am seduced by the easy by-the-numbers approach posed by a non-interventionist foreign policy. But I wonder what I am not seeing--the wars that don't happen in the Middle East1, or Central Europe, because all the participants know that it would be a foolhardy invitation to US intervention.

I am starting to realize how much of the interventionism in American thinking results from a bizarre conviction that everything in the world depends on America. The reasons why there are so few interstate conflicts in the modern world have almost nothing to do with the prospect of American intervention. They have to do with the fact that interstate conflicts in the modern world are shatteringly expensive and offer very little opportunity for profit. Only states in regions that make money largely off of natural resources have an interest in capturing territory, and such states are mainly too poor and unstable to wage war effectively. The Gulf War was the exception that proves the rule, in the proper sense of the phrase: the territory captured promised immense wealth (oil reserves); the invader was a stable totalitarian state that had tremendous armed force available.

There's only one place in the world where the US military deterrent matters right now: Taiwan. (Israel can defend itself.) Elsewhere, the only justification for US military intervention is to stop internecine slaughter, civil war or genocide, or to intervene against terrorist or other criminal organizations. The latter type of intervention has been shown to be completely ineffective where it is not multilateral and is not backed by regional states, and where it does not involve a long-term nation-building program to stabilize anarchic areas. The invasion of Iraq has proven that pre-emptive war does not enhance American security; it damages it, by creating more failed states. People who contemplate pre-emptive military action are not "realists"; they are idealists, comic-book enthusiasts and lunatics. Non-interventionism and multilateralists are "realists".

Yes, Israel is certainly a sore point, and our support of Israel makes Arab nations sorer. But Israel is not the only country in the Middle East. If Israel weren't there, the Middle East would still have plenty of conflict . . . Iraq didn't invade Iran, or Kuwait, to protest America's position on Palestine.

That's the kind of incredible insight that I've come to expect around here.

Many economists (not all) might agree that it would be lovely if we lived in an Edenic utopia in which everyone did the best for society without thought of themselves.

Zzzzzzzzzzzzzzz.

If Israel weren't there, the Middle East would still have plenty of conflict . . . Iraq didn't invade Iran, or Kuwait, to protest America's position on Palestine

Megan,
But, the American public's affinity for Israel in the early Cold War DID push the US to side with Isarel in the Israeli-Arab conflict, thus alienating Arab states and hindering the US's ability to implement their foreign policy goals. This led to, among other things, the US supporting conservative, Islamist, and repressive Middle Eastern regimes (viz., Saudi Arabia). Much of the conflict in the Middle East, and amongst the Middle East, is largely the result of these oppressive, conservative, and Islamist regimes. To argue, nay, aver that the only way that the special relationship between Israel and the US affects US-Arab relations is that Arabs protest against America's support for Israel, is, quite frankly, stupid.

Welcome Megan. I don't know how many additonal wars there would be. For one thing, the US hasn't got unlimited personnel, weapons, or will; how many large-scale interventions could we undertake, even if we were so inclined, at one time? We are now tied up in Iraq, for instance, which is one reason (among others) we apparently can't even consider doing much in, say, Darfur, although many would prefer action. So there's plenty of room for belligence in far-flung hot spots even with President Bush at the helm.

Dan and I discussed this on Bloggingheads: to what extent is the Netroots enraged because the foreign policy community focuses on what states will do, rather than what they should do?

This makes no sense in the context of Iraq which has got the Netroots worked up. The invasion of Iraq weakened US hard and soft power and harmed our interests. The realpolitik position would be to not invade Iraq.

Megan,

The end of your post reminded me of Orwell's take on pacifism:

Pacifism is objectively pro-Fascist. This is elementary common sense. If you hamper the war effort of one side you automatically help that of the other. Nor is there any real way of remaining outside such a war as the present one. In practice, ‘he that is not with me is against me’. The idea that you can somehow remain aloof from and superior to the struggle, while living on food which British sailors have to risk their lives to bring you, is a bourgeois illusion bred of money and security. Mr Savage remarks that ‘according to this type of reasoning, a German or Japanese pacifist would be “objectively pro-British”.’ But of course he would be! That is why pacifist activities are not permitted in those countries (in both of them the penalty is, or can be, beheading) while both the Germans and the Japanese do all they can to encourage the spread of pacifism in British and American territories. The Germans even run a spurious ‘freedom’ station which serves out pacifist propaganda indistinguishable from that of the P.P.U. They would stimulate pacifism in Russia as well if they could, but in that case they have tougher babies to deal with. In so far as it takes effect at all, pacifist propaganda can only be effective against those countries where a certain amount of freedom of speech is still permitted; in other words it is helpful to totalitarianism.

I love that passage, even more so because it more or less calls western pacifists "bourgeois," a particularly nasty insult.

Having gotten it so dreadfully wrong on Iraq...

Megan,

This capsulizes my complaint with your changing attitude on Iraq: Is Iraq a closed book where we can total all the accounts and come up with a net figure -- either positive or negative -- from the experience? Is Iraq so irretrievably a lost cause that nothing -- no eventual outcome no matter how remote the probability -- might cause you to reaccess your view (again)?

People are still fighting and dying in Iraq. Democrats visiting Iraq are (grudgingly) reporting the surge is showing signs of progress. Yes, there is still much work that needs to be done. Much of that work will be hard and ultimate success is far from certain, but you seem to have thrown in the towel in the third round of a scheduled 12 round bout -- while your guy is still standing and it's the other guy who's taken most of the punishment.

Lot's of people thought Lincoln had lost the Civil War after Gettysburg. I'm glad Lincoln did not accept that view.

Lincoln was fighting for a side. The US is fighting for nothing that makes any sense. The last time NPR asked Gen. Petraeus to explain who we're fighting in Iraq, he said we were fighting "extremists". All the extremists. Sunni Al-Qaeda extremists, Sunni tribal extremists, Shiite SCIRI extremists, Shiite Al-Sadr extremists... At the end of a civil war, a side wins. The US is not on a side. No matter who wins, we lose.

"Many economists (not all) might agree that it would be lovely if we lived in an Edenic utopia in which everyone did the best for society without thought of themselves."

Is this true? If everybody tried to act for society's benefit, how would they know what to do? Without prices to guide them, it would be like buying Christmas presents for strangers. Even Christmas presents for families aren't necessarily a pretty sight.

Lincoln was fighting for a side. The US is fighting for nothing that makes any sense. ... At the end of a civil war, a side wins. The US is not on a side. No matter who wins, we lose.

It's one thing to deny that the US' goal in Iraq (to establish a free and democratic Iraq) is worthwhile or that the goal is possible to achieve. It's quite another thing to deny that we have no objective at all for being in Iraq. It's possible to engage in reasoned debate about whether stated goals are worthwhile or achievable. It's far more difficult to have such a debate with someone who denies the existence of such goals -- despite the repeated declarations of war aims over the past 5 years.

Your claim that, "No matter who wins, we lose" seems to fall into category of denying the US has any objective for being in Iraq. (If that were true, we should leave post-haste.) It also seems like telling the feds to give up on gangland Chicago -- after all, if Capone it taken out he'll only be replaced by someone else.

Having followed a bit of the whole Foreign Policy Community v. the Netroot/Drezner v. Greenwald battles over the last few weeks, a couple of observations:

- Megan's post misses the point of the criticism; in fact, it inverts the point. The FPC is not simply speculating on what nations "will" do. They offer very direct options and ideas. Drezner's original point was that the U.S. has the RIGHT to intervene militarily whenever its "national interests" are threatened. The question is how does that differ from a imperial attitude. That is not debated in the FPC and their advice, recommendations and proposals are taken seriously. Some parts of the Netroots (since they are a number of bloggers, academics and writers with different ideas) want to at the very least discuss that idea, or move away from that kind of logic. Iraq is the proof. Military intervention there was not only the sole course available to protect our (the U.S.'s) interests, it was considered by many to be the worst option. Those people were ignored in favor of the "hawks", both liberal and conservative. And in the face of the debacle that is Iraq now, those same non-interventionists continue to be ignored.

- To David Walser, the outcome that we want in Iraq, a stable, more peaceful country is impossible, precisely because of the military presence. No one is arguing about the goals (see the previous point); we're arguing vociferously that the military path is the least likely to produce those results.
-

I do want to say one other, slightly off-topic thing here. I don't have a lot of respect for Ms. McArdle. She strikes me as a kneejerk, sophomoric "libertarian" without a lot of information on her side. I'm pretty disappointed in the Atlantic that, out of the many, many bloggers of all political stripes and styles, she's the one they've chosen to add to their roster.

That said, having read through the comments here on the last couple of posts, I've been really impressed and engaged by the commenters, again, on both sides of the issues. They've been uniformly more informed, more inspired and certainly more eloquent than Ms. McArdle. If it takes scrolling through the dreck she publishes to read these comments, it's pretty much worth it.

It's one thing to deny that the US' goal in Iraq (to establish a free and democratic Iraq) is worthwhile or that the goal is possible to achieve. It's quite another thing to deny that we have no objective at all for being in Iraq.

It's not that we have no objective. It's that it long ago became apparent that the objective we defined doesn't match up with anything that exists in Iraq. We're no more likely to end up with a stable, democratic, secular Iraq than we are with an Iraq of pagans who swear fealty to the Roman Empire. Our objectives are meaningless to Iraqi political forces. They are waging a no-holds-barred struggle for political control and security in the interests of the various factions they represent. The only people who want them to compromise and set up a federal democratic system are...us. And - guess what? - we're not Iraqis. We have the military force and fiscal power to compel the factions to sit down in a building in the Green Zone and pretend to form a government. But that's it. The "government" is a charade.

This is why Gen. Petraeus is unable to explain who we are fighting in Iraq. We're fighting everybody. Except the Kurds. And if we ever try to force them to give up their desire for independence, we'll be fighting them too. Our vision for Iraq does not align with the visions of any of Iraq's powerful political players for their own country or their own group. As the US soldiers who wrote that extremely incisive op-ed in the NYT on Sunday explained, the only reason US forces are not being pummeled by Shiite insurgents at the moment is that we are unwittingly aiding and supplying the Shiite militias -- by funding and training an "Iraqi Army" that is a thin cover for Shiite militias.

Our "objectives" in Iraq are described in terms that do not have any real meaning in Iraq. Iraq is in the middle of a civil war. That civil war will be won by Shiite theocrats over Sunni Baathist and tribal elements, with Kurds spinning off into their own mini-state. There will be no stability in Iraq until the Shiites win and the US leaves. There may be democratic elections after we leave, but we have little power to influence that. Nothing we are doing right now, militarily, really has any meaning at all. It's like CORDS and "clear and hold" in Vietnam in 1969. Ten years from now, Iraqi political forces will have swept it all away.


I was going to make Alan Gunn's point but he beat me to it.

"Many economists (not all) might agree that it would be lovely if we lived in an Edenic utopia in which everyone did the best for society without thought of themselves."

is true only if you have a definition of trying to do what is the best for society that includes a deep recognition that we can't normally know what is in other people's interests nearly as well as we know what is best for ourselves, and that if people stop acting in self interested ways we will have even less ability to tell what they want and need.

brooksfoe - The side we are on in Iraq is the elected government of Iraq, and more generally those who have supported us and our aims in Iraq.

The side we are on in Iraq is the elected government of Iraq, and more generally those who have supported us and our aims in Iraq.

Ah, willful obtuseness rides again. "The elected government of Iraq" consists of one side that is boycotting the whole charade (the Sunnis -- their ministers have left); another side composed of an Iranian-dominated Shiite faction and an explicitly violently anti-American Shiite theocratic faction; and a Kurdish faction. None of these factions "support us and our aims in Iraq". Neither do they share any other common goals.

Might as well say the side we are on in Iraq is the national soccer team. It has as much power and ability to control territory as the government does.

I would like a few decades of self-flagellating contrition from the worthless pundits and idealogues that inflicted this on us before you get to have a say in these things again.

Having gotten it so dreadfully wrong on Iraq, I am seduced by the easy by-the-numbers approach posed by a non-interventionist foreign policy.

So in other words, you reject a perfectly sound policy because it is too good? Too easy to implement, and too much superior in prescription than the ideas that led you to support the war of aggression in Iraq?

That's nuts.

As for the hypothetical wars you hypothesize may break out all over the place due to America not keeping its thumb on the world... so what? What business are these imaginary wars of ours, even assuming they do happen? You're aware, I am sure, that there have been plenty of wars the USA has not been involved in? (Yet the world did not end! Strange but true!) And that we have not suffered at all from this non-involvement?

the outcome that we want in Iraq, a stable, more peaceful country is impossible, precisely because of the military presence. No one is arguing about the goals (see the previous point); we're arguing vociferously that the military path is the least likely to produce those results.

That makes no sense. With only two exceptions, I can't think of a nation on earth from time immemorial where broadly peaceable ends were achieved without a prequel of militarism, either of a sort that caused so much strife that the survivors fled from it (e.g. the EU), or of a sort that rooted out the elements who were violently opposed to the pending changes in structural order.

The exceptions, of course, are nations that formed in sparsely populated or uninhabited areas, and nations of such small size or military weakness that they readily joined up with a larger protector when opportunity afforded it.

Peace is an ends, not a means.

brooksfoe is exactly on spot.

But of course, that doesn't mean that it necessarily works as a system--that Bill Gates gave billions to charity is not a vindication of communism.

My giving someone my hard-earned belt does not vindicate communism either.

But I wonder what I am not seeing--the wars that don't happen in the Middle East, or Central Europe, because all the participants know that it would be a foolhardy invitation to US intervention.

I don't see wars that don't happen because participants fear my belt either, but that does not lead me to draw an invalid conclusions about the impact of my aggressive belt posture.

"It's probably true that American power curbs other states, but only the USA has shown a repeated willingness to project its forces all over the world. Why is that? China has no interest in invading Central America, and they don't have spy planes roaming off the coast of Florida like we do at Hainan Island."

Er, that's really quite simple. Because China has only a limited capacity to project power. China's first military priorities have to be Russia, India, and Vietnam, and Taiwan; it has fought all four since the 1960s. What power it has left over for projection, it's deployed to Sudan to secure Sudanese oil for China.

Similarly, since the fall of the USSR, Russia has limited military power, and much of that power has been focused on Chechnya. This doesn't stop them from conducting assassinations in London and flying strategic bombers over Guam, though.

France, of course, regularly projects power, mostly in Africa (see the Ivory Coast). Britain, too, regularly projects power, usually in association with the United States. Australia was in Iraq, the Solomon Islands, East Timor . . . and so on.

It is a generally-applicable rule of thumb that every country on Earth regularly projects its power just as much as its capabilities allow it; the major exceptions are the defeated Axis powers (Germany, Italy, and Japan). The US only looks special because of a combination of observer bias (Americans know American force projection better than they know other countries') and ability to project force (with world's most powerful military and no rivals bordering its homeland, the US has a lot more power it can project).

Yeah,

I can see how easy it was for you to be totally wrong on Iraq. If this is the kind of tortured logic you applied to that decision, its no wonder you were wrong.

Moe Berg wrote: brooksfoe is exactly on spot.

I'll grant Brooksfoe's writing appears well-researched and well-reasoned, but with just one small problem: the conclusions s/he draws are not consistent with the fact that ever since Rumsfeld resigned, Petraeus was instated, and the Surge tactics were implemented, the US and coalition forces have been doing a demonstrably effective job of cooberating with the Iraqis on information gathering and rooting out violent elements, region by region.

It could still fall apart of course, or it could succeed beyond expectations (and prominent Democrats seem to be hedging their bets in the event of the latter, which is something notable). But in any case, the fact that present reality is contrasting with Brooksfoe's claims, suggest that for all the facts s/he has introduced so far, some critical datapoints are missing.

dmekat620 wrote: I can see how easy it was for you to be totally wrong on Iraq. If this is the kind of tortured logic you applied to that decision, its no wonder you were wrong.

Read: Adult levels of grayscale logic frighten and confuse me. Return to pre-teen black and white at once!

anony-mouse:

Perhaps I was unclear.

I'll clarify: When I say "on spot" and then proceed to "spot" two points, I will not just assume that others realize this is the extent of my concurrence.

My criticism was that which I spotted. If you feel that these critiques are unfounded and that these are logically valid arguments, my belt would love to hear it.

Two points:

1) I don't think Greenwald/Quiggan's point prevents the US from INTERVENING in a war - I bet they both have interesting views on the Sudan, and probably feel Clinton did not act quickly ENOUGH in Rwanda.

2) As far as a non-war humanitarian crisis, I would venture they disagree with the US intervening. I think I'd disagree - I think the US should have a policy of preventing massive deaths regardless of cause, when military force is reasonably likely to solve the crisis (without causing new ones) and other responses are not reasonably likely - but I think there's a valid area for dispute on this issue.

The peculiar enthusiasm for the "surge" displayed in some of the posts here might be better applied toward baldness remedies or other quack cures, since this desperate application of our remaining military manpower is unsustainable.

To believe that the (dubious) benefits of the surge will last beyond the inevitable draw-down of US troop strength to pre-surge levels is absurd. But those desperate for victory in Iraq now cling to absurdities as their last hope.

Ritual warfare is usually associated with primitive societies. For Americans to believe that demonstrably inadequate military gestures will redeem the disaster of Iraq is a regression to a state of superstitious faith in slogans and the posturing of "strong man" leaders. The surge was a bad faith exercise from the day it was planned, and it will be remembered by historians simply as one of Bush's last miscalculatons.

ever since Rumsfeld resigned, Petraeus was instated, and the Surge tactics were implemented, the US and coalition forces have been doing a demonstrably effective job of cooberating with the Iraqis on information gathering and rooting out violent elements, region by region.

This is simply not true. Iraqi civilian casualties (suicide bombings, death squads) are not down. US military casualties are experiencing their usual weather-related summer lull. Baghdad remains a terror-struck wasteland, apart from a few Shiite neighborhoods where ethnic cleansing has worked and Shiite militias (wearing government police or army uniforms) partner with US forces to keep the peace. The "surge is working" thesis is a confection of pure propaganda. The Administration manages to put together these sorts of Potemkin Village shows once every six months or so. They boost public approval for the war in polls for a period of some months, long enough to affect political decisions. Then something awful happens, the violence explodes, American "success" is revealed as a PR offensive, and the US public gets even more furious than it was the last time around.

It's exactly the same cycle as in Vietnam. Exactly the same. American power has created a mirage in Iraq which we wish were a democratic US-friendly government, and we are trying to magic our mirage into reality. Nothing we can do can make it happen.

brooksfoe, the elected government of Iraq has factions, and has all sorts of problems, but that doesn't mean that it can be just considered the list of all possible factions in Iraq. It has its own existence and it has some real impact in Iraq. The government does generally support some of our most important aims in Iraq, particularly providing security, which we are trying to do alongside the army of that government. It would be "willful obtuseness", or ignorance, or dishonesty, to suggest that the government was stable, totally pro-American, unified, or very effective, but saying that it is our ally isn't an assertion of any of those things.

brooksfoe, the elected government of Iraq has factions, and has all sorts of problems, but that doesn't mean that it can be just considered the list of all possible factions in Iraq. It has its own existence and it has some real impact in Iraq. -- Tim Fowler

NIR ROSEN: ...First of all, the Iraqi government doesn’t matter. It has no power. And it doesn’t matter who you put in there. He’s not going to have any power. Baghdad doesn’t really matter, except for Baghdad. Baghdad used to be the most important city in Iraq, and whoever controlled Baghdad controlled Iraq. These days, you have a collection of city states: Mosul, Basra, Baghdad, Kirkuk, Irbil, Sulaymaniyah. Each one is virtually independent, and they have their own warlords and their own militias. And what happens in Baghdad makes no difference. So that’s the first point.

Second of all, who can he put in instead? What does he think he’s going to put in? Allawi or some secular candidate? There was a democratic election, and the majority of Iraqis selected the sectarian Shiite group Dawa, Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution, the Sadr Movement. These are movements that are popular among the majority of Shias, who are the majority of Iraq. So it doesn’t matter who you put in there. And people in the Green Zone have never had any power. Americans, whether in the government or journalists, have been focused on the Green Zone from the beginning of the war, and it’s never really mattered. It’s been who has power on the street, the various different militias, depending on where you are -- Sunni, Shia, tribal, religious, criminal. So it just reflects the same misunderstanding of Iraqi politics. The government doesn’t do anything, doesn’t provide any services, whether security, electricity, health or otherwise. Various militias control various ministries, and they use it as their fiefdoms. Ministries attack other ministries.

-- Nir Rosen, New America Foundation fellow, author of "In the Belly of the Green Bird: The Triumph of the Martyrs in Iraq", reporter in Iraq and among Iraqi refugees since 2003


"No power" simply isn't true. So is "doesn't matter". "Weak" or "doesn't matter as much as some people think" are both reasonable statements, but Rosen takes those ideas to the extreme and to the point where it makes his statements false.