I flew to Florida this weekend. When I was in Vietnam, I had the same experience as Matt: I took my shoes off, dropped them in the bin, and started to remove my belt, only to have a horrified security scanner ask me what the heck I thought I was doing. I can only presume she thought the rest of my clothes were quickly to follow.
After going through American security again, my main thought is: the terrorists have already won. It's not clear that any of these measures make us safer, as Bruce Schneier points out:
I think we should ratchet passenger screening down to pre-9/11 levels. I like seeing positive bag matching. That’s something that was done in Europe for decades. The U.S. airlines screamed and screamed and refused to do it, and now they are.Really, I would take all the extra money for airport security and have well-trained guards, both uniformed and plainclothes, walking through the airports looking for suspicious people. That’s what I would do. And I would just give back the rest of the money. If we secure our airport and the terrorists go bomb shopping malls, we’ve wasted our money. I dislike security measures that require us to guess the plot correctly because if you guess wrong, it’s a waste of money. And it’s not even a fair game. It’s not like we pick our security, they pick their plot, we see who wins. The game is we pick our security, they look at our security, and then they pick their plot. The way to spend money on security – airport security, and security in general — is intelligence investigation and emergency response. These are the things that will be effective regardless of what the terrorists are planning.
What it does do is waste time, turn us into sheep--and give the world the impression that the government is "doing something". It's a perfect illustration of Bryan Caplan's favorite logical fallacy:
- Something must be done
- This is something
- Therefore, this must be done
I will say that the ladies in Fort Walton who searched my knapsack four times in order to discover the errant bottle of nailpolish that had wedged itself in the bottom of the laptop compartment were the nicest airport security people I've ever encountered. It's a pity they can't have more productive jobs.
When I flew in/out of Ft. Walton Beach in January 2003 I also noticed the friendliness of those who searched my luggage, as well as the rest of the airport employees I dealt with. Since that's the behavior that typifies the Redneck Riviera, I far prefer it to Atlantic-coast Florida.
I hope you had/will have the chance to visit Seaside while you're in the area. It's the town where The Truman Show was filmed and it's really picturesque.
Mr Schneier's comment: "Really, I would take all the extra money for airport security and have well-trained guards, both uniformed and plainclothes, walking through the airports looking for suspicious people. That’s what I would do."
This presupposes that the above is not already being done, which is an incorrect supposition. There are many forms of security in an airport, the baggage and personal screening that is so obvious and obviously full of holes is just one of them. Do people really thing that the TSA security checkpoints that we see are the reason that there hasn't been any major incidents in the air in the last 6+ years?
Schneier may have tempered his view on this, somewhat. In a recent keynote at linux.conf.au, he talks about security in light of "behavioral economics, the psychology of decision making, [and] evolutionary biology". "Security theater" may not be totally pointless after all.
http://linux.conf.au/programme/keynotes
He also references an interview he did with Kip Hawley, the head of the TSA, that's very interesting. Makes me feel somewhat more sympathetic to the TSA, even though their security procedures invariably put me in a foul mood.
http://www.schneier.com/interview-hawley.html
You haven't experienced airport security until you've taken a toddler, a car seat, a stroller, a laptop, and all the required accouterments through the check point alone. "Why you take my shoes off, Daddy?"
I've actually done it successfully with a sleeping toddler.
I think they should just issue everyone a police baton when we get on board. Anybody wanting to start trouble has to face 200 pissed-off people with sticks.
To face any threat effectively, it must be faced rationally and dispassionately. And a large part of facing the threat to America from terrorism is acknowledging that the physical threat to the average American is very remote, perhaps negligible. Treating a real but minor security threat as an existential threat, as though it threatens our way of life, is the easiest way to increase the damage from that threat.
Freddie,
Altough it may be minor, and although I'm more likely to die in a car crash than terrorist attack, the fact remains that terrorists have said they intend to blow us up in airplanes.
Killing 200 people on a plane may be "minor" in terms of the number of people who die on a daily basis. But it causes very serious issues. If people don't feel comfortable flying there are major issues at stake for the economy.
Not to mention it's not very nice to let those 200 people die occaisionly simply because it's "minor" in the grand scheme of things.
That being said I think its crazy I didn't take off my shoes overseas and when I transferred in Washington from one plane to the next I had to remove my shoes. I was already inside the "secure zone"...
Bryan Caplan misses the impact of racial politics on the TSA:
1) The TSA is, to a large extent, a jobs program for blacks. Fly into Newark sometime and you'll see what I mean.
2) Because Norm Mineta's grandparents were interned in FDR's camps, our airport security can't do any racial profiling. In practice, that means they can't do any profiling, since it risks a slippery slope to racial profiling.
Freddiew wrote: To face any threat effectively, it must be faced rationally and dispassionately. And a large part of facing the threat to America from terrorism is acknowledging that the physical threat to the average American is very remote, perhaps negligible.
True, but we are presently talking about airline security. A person maneuvering through an airport and boarding an airplane has now entered a theater where the specific threat is less remote and non-negligible, since terrorists throughout aviation history have repeatedly shown a preference for this particular target. Nor is it hard to see why: Depending on the terrorists' particular goals, once they hijack or bomb an airplane, they variously have international transportation, a highly visible symbolic target, a captive group of victims with no plausible escape route, and a guided missile.
Freddie continued: Treating a real but minor security threat as an existential threat, as though it threatens our way of life, is the easiest way to increase the damage from that threat.
True, but trite.
'What it does do is waste time, turn us into sheep--and give the world the impression that the government is "doing something". '
I think Chris alluded to it above - what the shoe inspectors are giving us is not security, but a different product entirely. They are giving us the feeling that our government is responding. I think we've had our fill of this product, but like any unwanted product, it will take a while for it to go away. Remember how long it took before Paulie Shore movies stopped happening.
My favorite security peeve is the checkpoint. Sometimes these are warranted, but often they do more harm than good. They are used to weed out threats where people will be particularly crowded or vulnerable - like major sporting events. They are usually implemented in such a way as to cause much more intensive crowding just outside the checkpoint than there would be inside. They wind up creating a better target for terrorism than the venue itself.
In addition to plositive bag screening, two parts of improved security after 9/11 do some good:
- stronger cockpit doors
- armed Air Marshals on some flights
All the rest is just time-wasting and irritating for passengers. It is intrusive like that, I suspect, so people will be reminded that the government "did something" -- but useless as security.
If we dropped it we could put all those new Federal employees in TSA (who, obviously, cannot be laid off when they are no longer required) to work on port security, or processing applications for passports and visas, or something else useful.
There are many forms of security in an airport, the baggage and personal screening that is so obvious and obviously full of holes is just one of them. Do people really thing that the TSA security checkpoints that we see are the reason that there hasn't been any major incidents in the air in the last 6+ years?
As there have been no known thwarted plots against airlines in the last 6+ years any planned incidents must have been called off by the would-be perpetrators themselves. In fact, all of the known non-aviation plots by Islamic extremists have been delusions of grandeur with little or no connection to reality, for instance the pizza delivery boys who fantasized about attacking Fort Dix.
Juan wrote: The TSA is, to a large extent, a jobs program for blacks. Fly into Newark sometime and you'll see what I mean.
The same could be said of the airport food court in some cities, but I'm not sure what this proves, other than your unusually strong sensitivity to melanin.
Do you ever fly up to Rochester to visit folks? Rochester is, I swear, a TSA training institution. Hateful. Free wireless in the concourse barely makes up for it if you're travelling alone while male.
Freddie,
To face any threat effectively, it must be faced rationally and dispassionately. And a large part of facing the threat to America from terrorism is acknowledging that the physical threat to the average American is very remote, perhaps negligible. Treating a real but minor security threat as an existential threat, as though it threatens our way of life, is the easiest way to increase the damage from that threat.
The primary harm from terrorism is not physical injury to the immediate victims of an attack, but the psychological and indirect harm to the nation as a whole. A few more 9/11-style attacks could do enormous damage to our economy and freedoms even if the number of direct physical casualties from the attacks was relatively low. So this "your chances of dying in a terrorist attack are very low" observation isn't terribly relevant, because it ignores the real threat.
As there have been no known thwarted plots against airlines in the last 6+ years any planned incidents must have been called off by the would-be perpetrators themselves. In fact, all of the known non-aviation plots by Islamic extremists have been delusions of grandeur with little or no connection to reality, for instance the pizza delivery boys who fantasized about attacking Fort Dix.
Mass casualty attacks in London, Madrid, Bali, quite a few suicide bombings in Israel and Kashmir, assassinations in Lebanon and Pakistan...
As there have been no known thwarted plots against airlines
Hmmm...
But granted, TSA wouldn't have had anything to do with that one.
Njorl,
That hurts! That really, really hurts!
Rob: I haven't found anything with expertise in explosives that believes they had any chance of mixing liquid explosives on the airplane and accomplishing anything but killing themselves and messing up the lavatory.
markm,
I don't know anyone with expertise in explosives, but suffice to say that it does appear to be an example of a thwarted plot against airlines which was not called off by the perpetrators. And I'm not so ready to ignore the possibility that someone could do more damage than you describe, as by, for instance, setting passengers and upholstery on fire with a napalm-like substance.
None of which is to defend the TSA or its foot fetish.
Mixner: That means that most of the damage isn't due to terrorism, but to our reaction to terrorism. Any individual's chance of being killed by terrorists is miniscule, but we can do a lot more damage to our society by overreacting to the threat. To paraphrase FDR, there is little to fear but fear itself.
Probably many people have seen this before but this is the best summary of what is screwed up about the tradeoffs involved:
http://wondermark.com/d/220.html
On 9/10, the idea that a building would be destroyed by an airliner was just Tom Clancy's fictional story.
Nobody I know was killed. I didn't lose my job. People died. Other people lost jobs. Eventually, the economy recovered. I'd hate to see a repeat.
AQ is patient. Plenty of years passed between the WTC bombing and 9/11. Yes, I'm probably more likely to be killed by some domestic wacko at the mall or at work than I am by a terrorist. But I don't fly much, and putting up with the hassles is not a big deal. The economic impact on my 401K was a big deal. It probably extended my working career by several years. I am OK with the trade-off.
markm wrote: That means that most of the damage isn't due to terrorism, but to our reaction to terrorism.
No. It doesn't. What mixner said means that most of the damage would be due to the fact that people would stop flying on airplanes if one of them blew up every 6 months. This despite the fact that your statistical chances of dying on one of those targeted planes would still be quite small.
We probably can do a lot of damage to our society by overreacting to the threat. But we can do even more damage by underreacting to the threat. In fact, the prudent thing to do is to overreact because its unlikely we could hit on the exact level of security required to eliminate attacks with over doing it in any fashion. This is sort of like the winner's curse, and in something like counter-terrorism, its pretty important that we win.
"AQ is patient. Plenty of years passed between the WTC bombing and 9/11."
Just how do you think AQ will hi-jack a plane and do this again? There is no way they can repeat what they did with planes, the people on the planes won't let them. We could also insure the planes against this by sufficiently reinforcing pilot doors against entry. The worse that would happen in this case is a plane would be blown up. However, we do have a lot of screening in place to prevent bombs of sufficient size from getting on the plane.
I'm just saying the risk from liquids and box cutters is near zero. Focusing on these trivial items, instead of the real threats is counterproductive.
"It probably extended my working career by several years. I am OK with the trade-off."
I doubt your stock portfolio was impacted so much that you lost several years worth of wages. Maybe in the very short term, but we've more than recovered from that time.
JordanT:
You seem to be implying that because you cannot think of a way for AQ to hi-jack a plane, that its not possible. Isn't this the kind of thinking that led to such a failure on 9/11?
You're also implying that there is a focus on box cutters and liquids. There isn't. But it would clearly be foolish to ignore known methods of attack. Read the Kip Hawley interview that Chris linked to above, or, for a more concise explanation:
We are involved in risk management. The question to me is: "What do you have to do to make a successful attack so complex that an intelligent enemy would recognize that the odds of success are too low?"
and
"we use layers of security. ...I and senior leaders at TSA work every day with the intelligence and law enforcement communities world-wide to get insights in how to make our security better... Also, we reduce risk by a) adding behavior detection capability, K-9 teams, surge teams and document checking out front; and b) by undercover presence throughout the area behind the checkpoint, as well as better screening of the supply chain of items in the sterile area after the checkpoint.
both quotes are from Kip Hawley.
Mixner: That means that most of the damage isn't due to terrorism, but to our reaction to terrorism.
The psychological effects of terrorism are one of its distinguishing characteristics. Terrorism is designed and intended to instill fear ("terror") in the targeted population. So it doesn't really make sense to talk about "terrorism" and "our reaction to terrorism" as if they are clearly distinguishable things.
Any individual's chance of being killed by terrorists is miniscule, but we can do a lot more damage to our society by overreacting to the threat.
We can also do a lot more damage by underreacting to the threat. Ignoring or underestimating the harm likely to arise from the psychological effects of terrorism on the population obviously also compounds the damage. The mass fear of flying that arose in the wake of 9/11 almost bankrupted some of our airlines, and probably had a serious adverse effect on our economy. Obviously, future terrorist acts may have a similar or larger effect. Even a relatively modest series of attacks could have a crippling effect on our transportation systems for months or years.
JordanT,
Just how do you think AQ will hi-jack a plane and do this again? There is no way they can repeat what they did with planes, the people on the planes won't let them. We could also insure the planes against this by sufficiently reinforcing pilot doors against entry. The worse that would happen in this case is a plane would be blown up. However, we do have a lot of screening in place to prevent bombs of sufficient size from getting on the plane.
They wouldn't need to hijack the plane. They could just blow it up instead, with explosives smuggled on board by a passenger, or in checked baggage, or in a freight container, or placed aboard the aircraft by an airport worker, or by a small missile fired at the plane as it takes off or lands, or in any other number of ways. Or they could plants bombs in airport terminals or parking areas. And so on. I seriously doubt you have thought of all the myriad ways in which terrorists could seriously harm our air transportation system.
I'm just saying the risk from liquids and box cutters is near zero.
Do please explain how you have made this determination. Richard Reid almost managed to ignite an explosive concealed in his shoe. In 1994, an Al Quaeda member left a fabricated bomb on Philippine airlines plane, where it exploded four hours later, killing a passenger. Your confidence in our ability to prevent this kind of act from happening again is seriously misplaced.
JordanT wrote: Just how do you think AQ will hi-jack a plane and do this again? There is no way they can repeat what they did with planes, the people on the planes won't let them.
Line-item, no. There would be a dogpile, just like with Richard Reid. That doesn't mean there aren't plenty of other options.
We could also insure the planes against this by sufficiently reinforcing pilot doors against entry. The worse that would happen in this case is a plane would be blown up.
After which the constituent pieces float gently to the ground like feathers, no doubt.
However, we do have a lot of screening in place to prevent bombs of sufficient size from getting on the plane.
"Sufficient size" is a function of how well someone is able to judge the plane's layout and place the bomb. To vaporize the whole thing and leave nothing behind but confetti, you're obviously going to need several pounds of C4 or a number of sticks of dynamite, either of which is very hard to get through security (somewhat less difficult to finagle through the backdoor via two or three 'inside men' in the baggage handling or services, however). Even then you're still going to have flaming, 3-5000 pound chunks of engine dropping to the ground like rocks.
To just send the whole or mostly-whole plane spiraling randomly down into the city center like a V2 blitz, however, merely requires major damage to any of the hydraulics, the tail section, or a wing. Inducing multiple engine failures during take-off would also guarantee disaster.
We're still trying to figure out the best way to deal with Lithium Ion batteries, a small box of which (think in terms of three or four larger, expertly-modified and re-packed laptops shipped via checked baggage in a packing box) could easily pass baggage screening and generate a hull-breeching explosion. And then there's the possibility of some psycho taking a modified light aircraft and using it either to fire a modified SAM-type device, or ramming a jet during take-off or final descent.
I can guarantee you that high-level people are discussing scenarios like these and far zanier, because as someone else noted, prior to 9/11 the 9/11 scenario itself was primarily a fiction plot device. Because of 9/11, the wierd and the spectacularly unusual are now on the radar, but that doesn't mean we have solutions for preventing or dealing with them if someone actually manages to slip through the right ingredients.
I would like to see the Mythbusters test Airplane Terrorism Myths. In one segment, they could try to create a liquid explosive that would cause significant damage in low enough quantities to be brought on board (under the old rules, not the three ounce limits.) In the other segment, they would attempt to create shoe bombs that would pass through security (again, under the old rules) and rupture the hull of a passenger jet.
And I think the TSA should assist them, in order to prove that current regulations are reasonable. If the myths are confirmed, the show would of course leave out certain details to make it harder to copy. If the myths are busted, then the TSA regulations are too restrictive and should be modified or rolled back.
The only thing this plan is missing is an excuse to show Kari in a bikini.
The only thing this plan is missing is an excuse to show Kari in a bikini.
What about a strip search?
(Always on the lookout to help show Kari in a bikini).
Re: The TSA is, to a large extent, a jobs program for blacks. Fly into Newark sometime and you'll see what I mean.
I have flown quite a bit and I have never noticed a preferrence for Blacks among TSA employees. Not even here in S Florida where they are a large fraction of the population. (Nor in Detroit or Cleveland for that matter, two other cities with large Black populations).
Re: Because Norm Mineta's grandparents were interned in FDR's camps, our airport security can't do any racial profiling.
Do you really think they don't profile? Of course they do-- they just don't do it publicly where they'd have CAIR and other groups all over them.
Re: The economic impact on my 401K was a big deal.
???
The stock market tanked well before 9-11. I took a hit too, and I recall bitching about it when there was still snow on the ground that year.
I worked briefly for one of those government intelligence agencies that one generally isn't allowed to name. For those who support the TSA policies, I've got some news: It's not possible to stop terror attacks.
Assume planes are 100% secure inside the US. If the goal is to kill a hundred or two hundred people, just pick a line (at the mall, the church, the security at an airport, etc.) and detonate a bomb made from parts that can be bought at Home Depot. There is a reason 9/11 is a once-in-a-lifetime magnitude event; it requires the combination of a large number of incredibly cruel, patient and intelligent plotters who manage to conceal a significant plan for years. Note that no US planes were hijacked in 30 years under the old security system, and reinforced cockpits added after 9/11 surely make the probability of such an attack even lower. Even today, board a plane in Singapore or Switzerland and note how "behind the scenes" their security is compared to the feel-good theatre we use.
The only way to stop terrorist attacks (say, a bomb in a mall or a plane detonation) is
a) to have knowledge of them before they happen
or b) to convince those responsible not to undertake an attack.
Anything else is whack-a-mole. The current TSA and Customs regulations have massive effects on the US economy already. I for one would prefer not giving up my individual freedoms to play along.
so many posts, and not a single reference, yet, to Robert Higgs?
no wonder FY2009 = U$D ~3.1 Trillion...
http://www.independent.org/aboutus/person_detail.asp?id=489
I think Chris alluded to it above - what the shoe inspectors are giving us is not security, but a different product entirely.
"I can't believe it's not security!"
OT, what were you doing in Ft Walton? If you've got a reason to go back, try in September or October, after the crowds depart. The weather's still warm and lovely, the water's not too hot, and the beach is still unsurpassed.
I've got some news: It's not possible to stop terror attacks.
True, but you can be the second best target. I think that is what the airline industry would like to accomplish. There are already psychological factors that can have disproportionate affects on their business. A hijacking that kills 200 people is worse for the airlines than an attack on a movie house that kills 200 is for the cineplex business.
There is a reason 9/11 is a once-in-a-lifetime magnitude event; it requires the combination of a large number of incredibly cruel, patient and intelligent plotters who manage to conceal a significant plan for years.
Help wanted: Violent sociopath. Must be physically fit and discreet. Must have knowledge of electronics, chemistry or security. Must work well with others.
It's that last one that probably is the sticking point.
I read an article online that caused me to really think. The last line read.....9/11 happened due to a unsecured, unfortified cockpit door. Just as simple as that. No 9/11, no Afhganistan or Iraq war.On Dec 24, 1994 at Houari Boumedienne airport, Air France flight 8969 was hyjacked by 4 men that revealed their selves as members of "The Armed Islamic Group".Intelligence reports showed the intension of the hyjackers were to fly the airplane into the Eiffel Tower in Paris, or blow it up over the city. The maximum fuel load would make the airbus into a flying bomb. Since this incident happened before take off a cockpit door was not a issue, but what it did do was to make it known who they were (a Islamic Group) and what they intended to do. Sound familiar? In 1996 Ethopian Airlines flight 961 was hyjacked by 3 Ethopians seeking political asylum. This plane crashed in the ocean and only 50 of the 175 passengers and crew survived. Upon investigation it came up that a secured, fortified cockpit door would have stopped this horrible crash. It was not until 9/11 happened were American commercial aircraft installed with secured, fortified doors. This is not a "in hind sight" reasoning. Airplanes have been being hyjacked since the 1960's. The 1994 hyjacking told us that middle eastern men tried to accomplish turning a airplane into a flying bomb and that they were prepared to die. The 1996 hyjacking told us that a secured and fortified cockpit door can stop a hyjacking. Why did it take a 9/11 for the airlines to make their airplanes safe? Sherrie Malik