Megan McArdle

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September 2008 Archives

September 30, 2008

Yes, Andrew, Sarah Palin is a disaster

Contra Julian, I think it's fair to blame her handlers on the extent of her disaster on Katie Couric; she would have done better answering the questions off the cuff and admitting genuine ignorance.  Instead they tried to cram her with answers to everything, and got . . . what usually happens in oral exams when a student tries to learn an entire semester's work five minutes before go time.  She looked like an idiot studying to be a moron, and not studying very hard, either.

Nor do I think it's quite right to compare it to college debate.  No one in a college debate tournament tapes your answers and airs them to several million hostile viewers looking for errors.  It's a lot easier to bluff, because the odds are that mistakes won't be caught.  The deer in the headlights look was someone who knew that almost anything she said might be wrong, and would show up on the television news on continuous loop the next day.

But the fundamental fact is that Sarah Palin needs to cram because she doesn't know anything.  For all I know, she's a genuine expert on the main issues facing Alaska.  But the main issues facing Alaska aren't all that similar to the main issues facing people in other states, and they're very much not like the main issues of foreign policy.  She is just not ready for this role.  Maybe she would have been in eight years, but I think that door is closed.

Andrew wants to know why I'm more freaked out by the bailout package than by Sarah Palin.  There are several answers to this.  The first is that I did freak out--just ask Peter Suderman, who obligingly listened to me rant about her for forty-five minutes after her convention speech.  The second is that, for all this, with the McCain campaign flaming out so spectacularly, I don't find her that worrisome.  The third is that even if she gets into office, there's a better than even chance she won't end up as president.  And the fourth is that while the last thing I said about her was hardly complementary, I haven't had as much time as I might have liked to devote to Sarah Palin.  Andrew may not have heard, but there have been a few interesting developments in the financial markets over the last few weeks.  As an economics blogger, I was regretfully forced to forgo full time devotion to the vice presidential race and turn to more trivial matters.

What am I so afraid of?

Tyler Cowen lays it out:

The best case scenario: The bad banks continue to be bought up, there is no run on hedge funds next Tuesday, only mid-sized European banks fail, money market funds keep on buying commercial paper, and the Fed and Treasury continue to operate on a case-by-case basis.  Since Congress doesn't have to vote for something called "a bailout," it can give Paulson and Bernanke more operational freedom than they would have otherwise had.  The American economy is in recession for two years and unemployment does not rise above eight or nine percent.

The worst case scenario: Credit markets freeze up within the next week and many businesses cannot meet their payrolls.  Margin calls cannot be met and the NYSE shuts down for a week.  Hardly anyone can get a mortgage so most home prices end up undefined rather than low.  There is an emergency de facto nationalization of banks to keep the payments system moving.  The Paulson plan is seen as a lost paradise.  There is no one to buy up the busted hedge funds, so government and the taxpayer end up holding the bag.  The quasi-nationalized banks are asked to serve political ends and it proves hard to recapitalize them in private hands.  In the very worst case scenario, the Chinese bubble bursts too.

Tyler notes "I still think some version of the best case scenario is more plausible, but I wish I could tell you I am sure."

I'm not sure I have a good p-value on the worst case scenario.  More importantly, I'm not sure how to weight risks with small probabilities but catastrophic consequences--an issue we've been struggling with in assessing climate change action, among other economic policy questions of the day.  If there's a 5% chance of the above scenario, how much should we be willing to pay to avoid that risk?

It is worth noting, in answer to the libertarians who are wary of government intervention in the economy, that if there is a serious crash, we will get even more government intervention in the economy--and intervention that is much less to our liking.  That cost has to be weighed in your assessment.  On the other side, to those who are averse to bailing out Wall Street rather than Main Street, it's worth noting that Main Street will suffer worse than Wall Street.  Because of the way that their compensation is structured, Wall Street bankers tend to do things like buy their houses for cash.

Raising Arizona

There is a rumor, which you may have heard, that John McCain's famous return to Washington actually scuttled a deal last week, plunging us into the weekend's negotiations which resulted in . . . no deal.  The nastiest interpretation is that he wanted to position the Republicans as against the bailout so he could run on that "principle".  But the thing is unprovable, and so I haven't blogged it.

Now, however, I find it somewhat suggestive that the entire Arizona delegation voted no, whether their seats were safe or not.  But perhaps there is some more benign explanation.  Even the New York delegation--which overwhelmingly supported it--split a little.

Open thread on alternate plans

A bunch of people are asking me what I think about alternate plans, but I want to make sure I've got them all so I can do one omnibus post.  So if you want to ask "What do you think of X's plan", do it here.

September 29, 2008

Please, enough with the metaphors

Metaphors, comparative situations, are useful when you have a firm grasp of the underlying principles which make the important features of what you are discuss fundemantally akin to the important principles of whatever metaphor you wish to employ.

There are a lot of commentators on the bailout with very little grasp of finance who are confidently opining on the bailout based on one of two broad principals:

1)  Markets good, government bad
2)  Markets bad, government good
They then proceed to construct a metaphor which illustrates why we [shouldn't do anything/should do something different/should do exactly what their political leadership wants].  The bailout is like the Titanic:  the ship would have been better hitting the crisis head on than trying to turn when it's too late.  The bailout is like the Iraq war:  the Bush administration is trying to ram through plan without proper deliberation.  The bailout is like a game of chicken:  we need to rip off the steering wheel and throw it out the window to show the bankers we are serious.  The bailout is like the Treaty of Westphalia.  The bailout is like learning to needlepoint.  The bailout is like this really cool cloud I saw the other day that totally looked exactly like Marylin Manson wearing a zoot suit.

One can construct any sort of metaphor (okay, right, or simile) to demonstrate why whatever you oppose is folly.  But, as you'll notice whenever you read an op-ed on any subject you actually know something about, 95% of those metaphors are glib hogwash.

If you cannot explain in clear English exactly what all the salient questions and facts are about the bailout, then please do not attempt to convince others that it is best understood in terms of Dirty Harry movies or the time your Aunt Mavis lost her car keys in the garbage disposal.  It is possible to have principled and intelligent support for today's vote.  But such support cannot be arrived at solely  through studying auto accident statistics and the collective writings of Norman Vincent Peale.

The politics of the bill

There is no glory to go around here.  Assume, arguendo, that most people in the House believed both that the bill would be passed, and that anyone who voted for it would suffer politically, except maybe in New York.

Pelosi screwed up royally.  She is the Democratic Tom DeLay.  Newt Gingrich was an ideologue, but Tom DeLay was simply a partisan, most keenly interested in maximizing his party's political power.  Pelosi cut a deal in which, as far as I can tell, every single Republican in a safe seat had to vote yes so that the Democrats could maximize their no votes.  Given that the Republican caucus is pretty much in open revolt, this was beyond moronic.  She then spent a week openly and repeatedly blaming the Republicans and the Bush administration for the current crisis.  The way she set things up, it was "Heads I win, tails you lose":  vote for the deal and I'll paint you as heartless reactionaries bailing out your fat cat friends.  If you're going to do that, you'd better make sure you have some goddamn margin for error in your own party.  She didn't.  Then she got up and delivered yet another speech blaming the Republicans for the bailout deal she was about to pass.

Being in power means that you get to give your party special favors on many occasions--but it also means that you, yes you, have the ultimate responsibility for getting things done.  She didn't particularly try to bring her party in line, and so of course as soon as a few Republicans defected, hers stampeded.  The ultimate blame for this failure has to be laid at her feet.

That doesn't excuse the Republicans; I've already expressed my opinion of their conduct.  If they do not understand that there are some things more important than reelection, they do not deserve to be in Congress.  I'm not sure they deserve to be let loose in society.  But Pelosi is the one who was vested with the ultimate responsibility for shaping the legislative process in the House.  She not only dropped the ball; she picked it up and drop kicked it through her own goal.

Prisoner's dilemma

Dan Drezner has a great post:

There have been two problems from the beginning with the proposed rescue plan.  First, it was labeled a bailout, which is a really, really bad public opinion frame
(Let me add that neither presidential candidate has helped.  McCain's
interventions seem to have bolstered the House Republicans who said no;
Obama's frame of Wall Street vs. Main Street made it easy for voters to
believe that a financial meltdown would not affect them in the
slightest. 

Second, the idea of the package was to prevent a financial
mewltdown.  But here's the thing -- no one gets credit for stopping a
meltdown if it doesn't happen.  To use a security analogy,
think about what would have happened if either the Bush or Clinton
administrations had killed the leadership of Al Qaeda and the Taliban
prior to June of 2001.  Even if they had claimed that they were foiling
a terrorist plot against the United States, no one would have known
about it, and it would have been pretty easy to attack either
administration for belligerent unilateralism.  In other words, it was
only after 9/11 that the American public was ready to take the actions
that would have prevented 9/11. 

I'm wondering if ther same thing will happen now.  If the public, or
House members, sees how Wall Street is reacting to what they are doing,
they might have time to change their mind (I'm not sure how long the
vote will stay open).  Will the evidence of a meltdown be sufficient
cover for politicians to do what they have to do?  Or will the meltdown
be sufficiently melt-y to make government intervention futile by that
point? 

You might see several members who were opposed to the bailout financial rescue before they were in favor of it.

I think Aesop described the problem rather well:

Once upon a time all the Mice met together in Council, and discussed the best means of securing themselves against the attacks of the cat. After several suggestions had been debated, a Mouse of some standing and experience got up and said, "I think I have hit upon a plan which will ensure our safety in the future, provided you approve and carry it out. It is that we should fasten a bell round the neck of our enemy the cat, which will by its tinkling warn us of her approach." This proposal was warmly applauded, and it had been already decided to adopt it, when an old Mouse got upon his feet and said, "I agree with you all that the plan before us is an admirable one: but may I ask who is going to bell the cat?"

Or as Grandma used to say, "Everyone wants to go to heaven, but nobody wants to die."  12 congressmen need to switch their votes.  But whoever does will suffer mightily not merely for voting for the hated bill, but for having flip-flopped.  If the bill passes, and nothing bad happens, people will blame those congresscritters even worse than their fellows.  And from what I understand, the people who voted no tend to be people facing competitive races in November.

Diogenes spent a lifetime searching for one honest man.  Where are we supposed to find 12?

Why not nationalize, like Sweden?

Because we're not Sweden. 

Tyler Cowen runs through the major objections here.  My thoughts are less specific:  what works in the banking system of a small economy does not necessarily work in a large one.  For starters, no offense to the Swedes, but very few other countries are affected by what happens in their economy.  One family, the Wallenbergs, indirectly controls something like 30-40% of Sweden's GDP.  Even now, the Swedish financial system is considerably less broad and complex than that in the US; it's not a world financial center.  And in 1992, everyon's financial system was a whole lot less complicated than they are now.  The FDIC was an excellent solution for commercial banking (and yes, to all those wondering what happened to the "real libertarian" Megan, I've been saying this for years.)  But its model is not applicable to a world of credit derivatives and broken broker-dealers.

Possibly the biggest problem with this plan, among many, is that Sweden is essentially able to command the labor of its bankers; they have relatively few alternatives without starting over in a new country and a new language.  American government has no such leverage.  Yes, the folks in the mortgage departments royally screwed the pooch, but running a major bank is not something you can hand over to a GS-17.  Nor is it a job for academic economists. 

And, of course, the political ramifications in the United States are very disturbing.  A small homogenous country with a parliamentary system and a lot of social capital invested in the government is going to do better at nationalizations than we will.  The fractious structure of the American legislative system means--as we've just seen--that huge amounts of political maneuvering and log-rolling will go into the running of any national banking system.  Imagine the banking system run by the Department of the Interior.

One readers asks if I'm not, by endorsing the modified Paulson plan, endorsing the failed Japanese model over the Swedish system.  Rather the reverse.  The problem with the Japanese system (or at least, one major problem) is that for political, social, and career reasons, banks kept pouring money into zombie firms, trying to salvage the bad loans of a decade ago.  Is a nationalized banking system less or more likely to do this than a private one, in America?  I imagine any banking head, appointed or career civil service, would get a lot of calls from Senators and congressmen demanding that the bank prevent companies in their districts from going under.

The devil made me do it!

Of all the saddest claims about the failed bailout is the Republicans saying that they had to do so because Nancy Pelosi delivered such a horrid, partisan speech.

I completely agree that Pelosi's speech was one of the saddest pieces of half-hearted garbage I have heard from any politician.  But I expect Republican legislators to pay more attention to the economic fate of the nation than to whether the speaker of the house is hurting their exquisitely delicate feelings.   As a friend notes, "I expect more maturity from my daughter and her fourth-grade classmates".

So what happens now?

As a friend notes, the longer they wait, the busier the FDIC gets.  This, I must point out, also costs the US taxpayer money, and there's no chance we'll get any of it back, either.

A journalist friend who spends way more time on politics than I do suggests that if the Democrats cave and include a capital gains tax, it will probably pass--but puts the odds of the Democrats caving at slim to none, since they can now blame any resulting crash on the Republicans.

I didn't think it was possible to be more disgusted with politicians than I usually am, but I find it impossible to express the seething contempt that I feel at this kind of opportunism.  I don't mind when they screw with the normal operation of the economy for venal personal gain.  But risking a recession in order to get a cut in the capital gains tax?  Letting it tank because you can always blame it on the Republicans? 

I am grimly reminded of H.L. Mencken's famous observation that Democracy is the theory that the common people know what they want, and deserve to get it good and hard.

The public doesn't quite grasp what's at stake, and there's no reason they should.  But the representatives do.  The true believers--well, I forgive them their zealotry, and hope that they're right and I'm wrong.  But anyone who tanks a bank bailout they think might be needed, in order to get a cut in the capital gains tax, deserves to be tried for treason.

Meanwhile, back in the Old Country . . .

Financial firms are turning to their governments for a bailout.  Perhaps this will cause a slight pause in the screams that this is entirely the fault of the Bush administration gutting the SEC--whatever Fortis' problems, it's hard to attribute them to a lax SEC.  We clearly need better regulations.  But bank runs are complicated creatures.  There is no single cause of this, and there will not be a single solution, either.

House votes down the bailout

I've been watching the debate on CSPAN, and as of now, HR 3997 looks like it's just failed, unless this is some weird procedural vote I don't understand.  Nays won 228 to 205, with 1 vote still uncounted.  The markets just plunged, with the NASDAQ and the S&P both down more than 6%.

Democrats voted for it pretty narrowly -- 140 to 95.  The Republicans shot it down 65 to 133.  I find it hard to believe that they're voting their conscience; they're voting their electoral interest in November.  I hope their constituencies enjoy the bank panic.

Actually, what I hope is that I'm wrong, we don't need a bailout, and after a period of liquidation, everything will settle down.  If so, I will happily confess my error.  But I'm very much afraid that I am not wrong, and things are about to get pretty grim.


You are entering . . . the twilight zone

Weirdest moment of the vote:  a Texas Republican asks when the bill would be considered if he moves to reconsider.  Chair says immediately.  Then he withdraws and leaves reconsideration moment tabled.  It is impossible to overstate the inscrutable tedium of congressional parliamentary procedure.

September 26, 2008

Okay . . .

Obama's position on Georgia is that . . . we should give them $1 billion to rebuild their economy.  My position on global warming:  a federal program to make sure everyone has an adequate supply of little umbrellas for their tropical drinks!

Negative, ghost rider, pattern is full

One thing that CNN's persuadables clearly don't like is when John McCain attacks Obama.  They're considerably more tolerant of Obama attacks McCain, in part, I suspect, because Obama doesn't keep repeating "what Senator McCain doesn't understand is . . . ", and in part because I suspect that some of them are closet Obamatons.

Nonetheless, this gives me hope. Negative opinons about negative campaigns?  Dare I hope that we may soon see a day when every other political ad concentrates on how the candidates opponent kills puppies, and also, invented scurvy?

Sorry, I must have been daydreaming.  Where were we?

Le mot juste

Barack Obama just stated that meeting with crazy authoritarian leaders without preconditions "doesn't mean you invite them over for tea."  Coffee, perhaps.  An afternoon lemonade.  But no tea for Ahmadinejad until he stops with the nuclear weapons nonsense!

It's time to bomb Iran . . .

CNN has a running poll of "persuadable" voters which shows up as a sort of red, green and blue ekg on the bottom of the screen--though only, I'm told, for those who are viewing in HD.  It's completely mesmerizing.  So far I've learned:  McCain talking about Iraq is not popular (though mostly that's "persuadable" Democrats dragging down the average).  But McCain bashing Iran is like one of those third world dictators who win with 99.4% of the vote.

Conclusion:  "persuadable" voters are crazy people who don't like the war we have, but want to start another one just in case that one's more fun.

Update:  Now the Dems are dinging him for struggling to pronounce Ahmadinejad.  Actually, I thought it was rather charming, since his facial expression indicated that he found the struggle humorous.  And this is petty.  I'm willing to bet that none of the people panning his pronounciation could, themselves, pronounce it better than he did.

Administrative costs

Now I protest one of McCain's ridiculous falsehoods: that he is going to pay for tax cuts by cutting spending in agencies you don't care about and never heard of.  Those agencies don't cost us enough money to pay for rebating that strange federal telephone tax.  If you actually want to cut taxes, you have to address entitlement spending.  And McCain is so far just as cowardly as the rest of them about actually taking an axe--or at least a means test--to Social Security or Medicare.  I mean, fine, if you say you want those programs and are therefore willing to have marginal tax rates hit fifty percent.  (Well, not fine.  But I admire your consistency).  But if you aren't willing to touch those programs, you cannot, with a shred of intellectual honesty, claim that you're going to meaningfully cut government spending.

Senior moments

Okay, Barack Obama forgetting John McCain's name did not make him look particularly clever--one ought to be able to remember the name of the fellow one's been campaigning against for month.  Who's having senior moments again?

Nor is McCain coming off as particularly bright when he repeats his line about how he "wasn't elected Miss Congeniality" in the senate approximately seventy four times.  And no one should ever, ever refer to themselves as a maverick unless they are currently James Garner.

Mid-debate mood check

I feel like McCain is doing surprisingly well:  he's on message and radiates conviction.    His sound bytes are well executed.  Aside from an apparent slight difficulty remembering his sound bytes, I feel like he's so far the more compelling debater.

On the ohter hand, that may be because my expectations for him were so low that I'd think he was winning unless he actually sat there and drooled onto the stage.

Yay nuclear!

McCain stands up for nuclear energy.  This puts a spring in my step and a song in my heart.  I have to give him credit; when he has a bee in his bonnet, he is often willing to stand up for things, like free trade and immigration, that freak voters out.

Morally bankrupt

I cannot address all the patently untrue things that McCain and Obama are saying, but I must protest when Barack Obama claims that people are going bankrupt because of health expenses.  There is no evidence to suggest that this is a widespread phenomenon.  The Eliabeth Warren study purporting to show that amazing numbers of bankruptcies were caused by medical problems was, to put it politely, garbage; she broadened the definition of a "medical bankruptcy" far beyond that used by the bankrupts themselves, including things like gambling problems.  The overwhelming causes of bankruptcy are divorce and job loss; even the medical bankruptcies are, the experts say, a problem of income loss rather than medical bills.  Hospitals and doctors hate to sue people for large bills, because it always seems to end up on local television.

Blown budget

I'm at Reason magazine's headquarters, watching the debate.  Sudden switch to the economy, not surprisingly. My first thought is that I don't understand why the moderator is letting McCain and Obama talk about their budget proposal as if there is a snowball's chance in hell that they will be enacting any of these plans.  They won't.  The current crisis has blown any chance of big spending plans or tax cuts.  Even without the bailout package, America's tax revenues are going to look pretty anemic next year.  As goes Wall Street, so go income taxes.

I say that not in the "what is good for GM is good for America sense"; it's just an empirical observation.  The Clinton surpluses were entirely capital-gains based. Bush's happy surprises were buoyed by stock options and executive bonus packages, almost all of which is in stock.  So if the stock market is down next year, hello massive deficit. 

If we add another $250 billion for bank bailouts, we're talking about cutting spending and raising taxes, not merely standing pat.  And right now, that seems like the most likely future to me.

Whoda thunkit?

The Republicans seem to be the major opposition to the bailout bill.  Seems they don't want to go home to their constituents and tell them that they helped the Bush administration ram through a $700 billion bailout package.  The package isn't as bad as it sounds--but anything more complicated than "I'm giving you money" is hard to explain from the stump.

Of course, we don't actually know exactly what's in the package, except that the Democrats seem to have put Paulson on an installment plan.  So it's hard to know exactly what they're turning down. 

By walking out, they get to hang the responsibility for the package on the Democrats--it probably won't be much more popular with their constituents.  But without the Republicans, the plans costs are certain to go up considerably, including, probably, giving bankruptcy judges the power to rewrite mortgages.  This sounds wonderful--until you realize that this means mortgage rates will go up for everyone, probably quite a bit.  And that this will further strain an already weak industry.  Why use jinglemail, or struggle to meet your payments, if you can pay a lawyer $1,000 and magically transform your mortgage into a prime loan?

Micromanagement

We've got a pretty big scoop with some serious allegations about George Bush:

In March 2004, White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales made a now-famous late-night visit to the hospital room of Attorney General John Ashcroft, seeking to get Ashcroft to sign a certification stating that the Bush administration's warrantless wiretapping program was legal. According to people familiar with statements recently made by Gonzales to federal investigators, Gonzales is now saying that George Bush personally directed him to make that hospital visit.

The hospital visit is already central to many contemporaneous historical accounts of the Bush presidency. At the time of the visit, Ashcroft had been in intensive care for six days, was heavily medicated, and was recovering from emergency surgery to remove his gall bladder. Deputy Attorney General James B. Comey has said that he believes that Gonzales and White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card, who accompanied Gonzales to Ashcroft's hospital room, were trying to take advantage of Ashcroft's grievously ill state--pressing him to sign the certification possibly without even comprehending what he was doing--and in the process authorize a government surveillance program which both Ashcroft and the Justice Department had concluded was of questionable legality.


The Large Hadron Collider is shut down until spring

The universe protecting itself against destruction?  Or simply Murphy's Law?  Or is Murphy's Law the way the universe protects itself from destruction?  Deep thoughts for a Friday afternoon . . . 

September 25, 2008

Suspended animation

The Yankees lean into the strike zone and take one for the team:

The Yankees announced yesterday that they were suspending their campaign for the American League pennant due to the dire state of the economy. "This is not the time for partisan attempts to win baseball games," said Hank Steinbrenner. "I have called Commissioner Selig and suggested that the World Series be postponed or cancelled altogether until we have come up with a solution that unequivocally fixes everything."

When it was pointed out to Mr. Steinbrenner that the Yankees had already been eliminated from pennant consideration, he replied, "Yeah, so?"

Asked for a comment, team captain Derek Jeter said, "Huh?"




How much is the bailout going to cost?

Again, no one knows.  Not $700 billion--that's the amount we're paying for distressed assets, some of which will yield profits.  The entire portfolio of fire sale securities may lose money, but it's unlikely to be anything close to the entire amount.

In some sense, the reason to do the bailout is that we don't know.  I don't want to give money to GM because I have a pretty good notion of the scale of a GM collapse.  Some people will lose their jobs and get new ones, the steel industry will take a hit, and a lot of managers will be looking for another line of work than pushing ugly, underperforming cars.  On the other hand, I have no idea how far a bank collapse might spread.  And I'm really not eager to find out.

How do we know something bad is going to happen?

We don't.  There are no guarantees in this world.  Based on what I'm hearing from Wall Street, I'm pretty sure that something bad will happen if we let a whole bunch of banks fail.  But I can't promise that everything won't be fine without a bailout.  Anyone who promises you that he knows exactly what will happen--whether he is screaming that everything will be fine without a bailout, or that we'll end up back in the 12th century--is both smugly ignorant, and probably trying to sell you something.  A distressing number of people commenting on these events seem to believe that we are living in a novel, where the events will unfold with the certainty of a plot contrived by a writer over a long, boozy lunch.  The real world is messy.  No system that can be outlined in a moderately long book ever works entirely as expected.

We also don't know the bailout will work.  We could end up back in the Great Depression anyway.  Frankly, we have two data points on massive financial crises that afflict large developed countries which borrow in their own currencies:  the Euro-American depression of hte 1930s, and Japan in the 1990s.  A lot of what we thought we had learned about dealing with these kinds of crises from the Great Depression failed to stop Japan's decline.  What we think we've learned from Japan may turn out not to work on our economy--though, knock wood, hopefully we won't find out.  The only surefire way we know of ending such a depression is World War II.

My basic reasoning is this:  given just how badly the Great Depression sucked, I'm willing to gamble on stopping it, even if that gamble fails, even if it is not necessary (a question that, if we actually go through with it, will be much argued and never answered).  I'm not willing to gamble for the bankers; the worst thing that will happen to them is that they retire on a pittance, or take a boring job somewhere.  I'm worried about the 40 million or so people who might end up out of work, and with nowhere to go.  I'm willing to do quite a bit to stop that from happening, even let the bankers off scott free.  I don't think it's actually necessary to do that, but if I have to choose between helping the 40 million, or expressing my moral outrage--well, there's always skywriting.

To help or punish?

Politically, the bailout seems to be wildly unpopular.  The bailout gets to a critical question at the heart of a lot of political philosophy:  do we help others who have screwed up, or punish them at cost to ourselves?

It might be easier to think of in a context other than the current bailout.  So here's another program that I reluctantly approved of (yes, I know, I'm not a real libertarian.  Having a workable political philosophy is actually more important to me than hewing rigidly to my label, thanks.):

Culhane then put together a database--the first of its kind--to track who was coming in and out of the shelter system. What he discovered profoundly changed the way homelessness is understood. Homelessness doesn't have a normal distribution, it turned out. It has a power-law distribution. "We found that eighty per cent of the homeless were in and out really quickly," he said. "In Philadelphia, the most common length of time that someone is homeless is one day. And the second most common length is two days. And they never come back. Anyone who ever has to stay in a shelter involuntarily knows that all you think about is how to make sure you never come back."

The next ten per cent were what Culhane calls episodic users. They would come for three weeks at a time, and return periodically, particularly in the winter. They were quite young, and they were often heavy drug users. It was the last ten per cent--the group at the farthest edge of the curve--that interested Culhane the most. They were the chronically homeless, who lived in the shelters, sometimes for years at a time. They were older. Many were mentally ill or physically disabled, and when we think about homelessness as a social problem--the people sleeping on the sidewalk, aggressively panhandling, lying drunk in doorways, huddled on subway grates and under bridges--it's this group that we have in mind. In the early nineteen-nineties, Culhane's database suggested that New York City had a quarter of a million people who were homeless at some point in the previous half decade --which was a surprisingly high number. But only about twenty-five hundred were chronically homeless.

It turns out, furthermore, that this group costs the health-care and social-services systems far more than anyone had ever anticipated. Culhane estimates that in New York at least sixty-two million dollars was being spent annually to shelter just those twenty-five hundred hard-core homeless. "It costs twenty-four thousand dollars a year for one of these shelter beds," Culhane said. "We're talking about a cot eighteen inches away from the next cot." Boston Health Care for the Homeless Program, a leading service group for the homeless in Boston, recently tracked the medical expenses of a hundred and nineteen chronically homeless people. In the course of five years, thirty-three people died and seven more were sent to nursing homes, and the group still accounted for 18,834 emergency-room visits--at a minimum cost of a thousand dollars a visit. The University of California, San Diego Medical Center followed fifteen chronically homeless inebriates and found that over eighteen months those fifteen people were treated at the hospital's emergency room four hundred and seventeen times, and ran up bills that averaged a hundred thousand dollars each. One person--San Diego's counterpart to Murray Barr--came to the emergency room eighty-seven times.

"If it's a medical admission, it's likely to be the guys with the really complex pneumonia," James Dunford, the city of San Diego's emergency medical director and the author of the observational study, said. "They are drunk and they aspirate and get vomit in their lungs and develop a lung abscess, and they get hypothermia on top of that, because they're out in the rain. They end up in the intensive-care unit with these very complicated medical infections. These are the guys who typically get hit by cars and buses and trucks. They often have a neurosurgical catastrophe as well. So they are very prone to just falling down and cracking their head and getting a subdural hematoma, which, if not drained, could kill them, and it's the guy who falls down and hits his head who ends up costing you at least fifty thousand dollars. Meanwhile, they are going through alcoholic withdrawal and have devastating liver disease that only adds to their inability to fight infections. There is no end to the issues. We do this huge drill. We run up big lab fees, and the nurses want to quit, because they see the same guys come in over and over, and all we're doing is making them capable of walking down the block."

The homelessness problem is like the L.A.P.D.'s bad-cop problem. It's a matter of a few hard cases, and that's good news, because when a problem is that concentrated you can wrap your arms around it and think about solving it. The bad news is that those few hard cases are hard. They are falling-down drunks with liver disease and complex infections and mental illness. They need time and attention and lots of money. But enormous sums of money are already being spent on the chronically homeless, and Culhane saw that the kind of money it would take to solve the homeless problem could well be less than the kind of money it took to ignore it. Murray Barr used more health-care dollars, after all, than almost anyone in the state of Nevada. It would probably have been cheaper to give him a full-time nurse and his own apartment.

The leading exponent for the power-law theory of homelessness is Philip Mangano, who, since he was appointed by President Bush in 2002, has been the executive director of the U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness, a group that oversees the programs of twenty federal agencies. Mangano is a slender man, with a mane of white hair and a magnetic presence, who got his start as an advocate for the homeless in Massachusetts. In the past two years, he has crisscrossed the United States, educating local mayors and city councils about the real shape of the homelessness curve. Simply running soup kitchens and shelters, he argues, allows the chronically homeless to remain chronically homeless. You build a shelter and a soup kitchen if you think that homelessness is a problem with a broad and unmanageable middle. But if it's a problem at the fringe it can be solved. So far, Mangano has convinced more than two hundred cities to radically reëvaluate their policy for dealing with the homeless.

"I was in St. Louis recently," Mangano said, back in June, when he dropped by New York on his way to Boise, Idaho. "I spoke with people doing services there. They had a very difficult group of people they couldn't reach no matter what they offered. So I said, Take some of your money and rent some apartments and go out to those people, and literally go out there with the key and say to them, 'This is the key to an apartment. If you come with me right now I am going to give it to you, and you are going to have that apartment.' And so they did. And one by one those people were coming in. Our intent is to take homeless policy from the old idea of funding programs that serve homeless people endlessly and invest in results that actually end homelessness."

Believe it or not, the Bush administration was putting a fair amount of juice into this strategy before they got distracted by the war, and I was in favor of it.

The chronically homeless are not, as fable would have it, people who have had some hard luck.  They are people who have repeatedly made bad decisions--mentally ill people who stop taking their medicine, drug addicts and drunks.  Those who have merely had a spell of bad luck get in and out of the shelter system pretty quickly.  The people on the street are people who can't stay in the shelter system because their behavior is so extreme.

For many people (including me) giving someone an apartment as a reward for refusing to deal with their drug addiction violates our inherent sense of fairness.  And for many bleeding hearts (including me) simply giving someone an apartment without forcing them to get help for their underlying conditions violates our inherent sense of mercy.  We don't want them to just have a roof over their heads; we want them to stop drinking themselves to death and/or hearing voices.

But people on the street are people who have refused help, or can't, for whatever dark psychological reason, use it.  And they are people who cost a phenomenal amount of money when they get one of the many diseases inherent in sleeping on the street.  How much money are we willing to pay to maintain our sense of fairness?

(Yes, I know, the hardcore libertarians are protesting that we shouldn't pay for their medical care.  Leaving aside the morality of this, we are going to pay for their medical care, because a majority of Americans are horrified by the idea of letting someone die outside the hospital door.  Assuming this is so, what should we then do?)

Some people are willing to pay quite a lot.  Psychologists call them "altruistic punishers".  We all have a little bit of this in us, as illustrated by a common experiment.  You take a pair of people, and give one of them twenty dollars.  You then tell them they can give any amount of that $20 to the other person.  But if the other person rejects their offer, both gets nothing.

The perfectly rational amount to offer is $1; after all, it's better than nothing.  But experiments repeatedly show that if the offer goes much below 30-40% of the original amount, the other party will almost invariably reject the offer, leaving them both with nothing.

This is a pretty wise evolutionary strategy in small groups; it enforces sharing and reciprocity.  But the homeless are already people with extreme disregard of social norms and also, personal suffering.  Unless we're actually willing to let them die, and I hope we aren't, we don't have any leverage.

In large groups, I'm not sure these norms work so well.  Should we punish stupid bankers by plunging the entire country into recession?  Most of the stupidest ones have already been punished; as I understand it, Dick Fuld lost about $100 million in the Lehman collapse, while the head of Bear lost $1 billion.  The mortgage bankers have already been fired.  We're sending a message to a largely empty room.

But even if there were some people there to send that message to, it wouldn't be a good idea.  The people protesting and flooding their representatives with phone calls almost certainly do not grasp what a financial collapse implies. But policymakers should.  I don't know, however, if they can ignore our altruistic, punishing genes.  Since those genes will probably vote them out of office in November if they do.

Reverse auctions

A number of readers have asked why I described the Paulson plan as "a plan to have a plan" when Bernanke says they want to use a reverse auction to price the securities.

A couple of reasons.  First, because there are a lot of issues with reverse auctions.  Bonds aren't stocks; there are a lot more of them, and they're much more idiosyncratic.  The securities that the government is proposing to buy are even more complicated than ordinary bonds. 

This means there's a gigantic asymmetrical information problem:  the owners of these securities know much more about them than the Fed.  And there isn't (obviously) a large liquid market for the Fed to check against.  So the Fed is likely to overpay, because there won't be a lot of bidders in any one auction.

Second, because there are so many different securities, auctions will take a lot of time.  The whole argument in favor of this bailout is that we don't really have a lot of time.

Third, the reverse auction arguably solves one problem--what are these securities worth?--by adding another:  the aid isn't targeted to the institutions that necessarily need it, or can use it the best.  It's targeted towards those who will bid the lowest.  Maybe that will be institutions in distress.  Or maybe it will be solvent firms looking to clean up their balance sheet.

Relatedly, using a price discovery mechanism means that the bailout may not give distressed firms enough capital.  There's no point in buying distressed securities if the banks go bust anyway.

Thus, while reverse auctions may feature in the final plan, they're unsatisfactory, and probably will not be the primary vehicle for recapitalizing banks.  So I still want to know:  what's the plan?

September 24, 2008

Thought for the day

Isn't it marvelous how the financial crisis has been caused entirely by things that you were opposed to before the crisis happened?

McCain asks for a time out

Allow me to point out the obvious about John McCain's grandstanding declaration that he is suspending campaigning to deal with the financial crisis, and asking Barack Obama to cancel Friday's debate:

  1. It is dumb.  The world is not crying out for John McCain's exquisite financial acumen to help shepherd us through this.
  2. It is politically brilliant.  John McCain gets to polish his somewhat tarnished "above politics" image.
  3. Democrats who are mad are mad because it is politically brilliant, not because it is dumb.  There is, as far as I can see, no actual harm in postponing campaigning, or the debates; we can just as easily learn McCain's terrifying plans for the country next week.
It certainly doesn't make me like John McCain any better.  But I don't really see how he's endangering the Republic either.

The pigs line up at the trough

When I said a bailout should hurt the bailees, this is exactly the sort of thing I hoped we could prevent:

With Congress preoccupied with the massive, $700 billion bailout plan for the financial industry, General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler have finally secured Part One of their own federal rescue plan. A bill set to be passed by Congress and signed by President Bush as early as this weekend--separate from the controversial Wall Street bailout plan--includes $25 billion in loans for the beleaguered Detroit automakers and several of their suppliers. "It seemed like a lot when we first started pushing this," says Democratic Sen. Debbie Stabenow of Michigan, one of the bill's sponsors. "Suddenly, it seems so small."

But please don't call it a "bailout"--Detroit is too proud for that. Exact details will come later, but the loans would probably amount to at least $5 billion for each of the Detroit 3, plus smaller amounts for suppliers. That would allow them to borrow money at interest rates as low as 4 percent--a steep discount compared with the double-digit rates they're paying now. Over several years, the automakers could save hundreds of millions in financing costs. Plus, they'll have five years before they have to start repaying the loans.

It might seem like a stealth rescue, but the plan has been in the works for at least 18 months. Approval for the loans was first included in last year's Energy Independence Act. Earlier this year, the automakers sought a first installment of loans totaling about $6 billion. But the nationwide credit crunch severely crimped their ability to borrow, and besides, next to bailouts like $200 billion for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, a mere $6 billion started to seem unduly modest. So Detroit raised the ante to $25 billion, the most allowed under current law.

Shame on the Bush administration for considering this.  And shame on Debbie Stabenow, though I know she's just pulling as much pork as possible for her constituents.

Yes, I favor intervention when it looks like there's a risk of a really severe recession.  But there is no such rationale here, not even arguably.  It's pure pork, with a soupcon of economic nationalism thrown in.  If the Big Three can't make autos people want to buy, then they should liquidate and open up the market to those who can.


Further signs of the apocalypse

Another email:

The country's largest Chevrolet dealer just closed up.  14 locations, mostly Mid-South/Texas, Bill Heard Chevy sold TWENTY-FIVE PERCENT of all new Chevy's sold in the USA last year.

Great minds think alike

It occurred to me, while I was listening to the congressional hearings, that the government could stop most of this by just seizing houses in default and continuing to make the mortgage payments.  It turns out someone else is thinking the same way:

True just sending money is not incentive compatible. But there is no reason to bail out homeowners. Just intervene in any mortgage default. Seize the property and continue making the mortgage payments. In the short run rent the property back to the homeowner.

This is what I have been advocating to my colleagues. I don't know why it is not under discussion. Before going with the arbitrary implememtation that Paulson is proposing now there should be some convincing argument that it's more efficient than this alternative. It is clearly the most direct approach and therefore should be the default (so to speak.)

There are inherent issues here:  at what rate do we rent to the current occupants?  How do we make the banks pay for their folly? Also, the government is not a notoriously effective landlord.  On the other hand, it punishes the homeowners without putting them on the street, and eventually the houses will be worth something.


And it spreads . . .

Another reader emails:

American Honda (the finance arm of the car company) just issued 5 and 10 year bonds similar to Catapiller.  They are rated AA, and the offering went off at 400 over.  Things are getting ridiculous.

Translation:  Honda's finance arm just had to pay an extra 4 cents on every dollar it borrows.  That's going to pass straight through to anyone who wants them to finance a car.

The bad news continues to spread

An email from a reader:

Just wanted to say that you've been doing an excellent job describing the happenings over the last few days.  In regards to the credit crunch here's another piece of evidence of how the credit markets are starting to freeze up.


There is a new issue corporate bond today from Caterpillar (CAT) and the pricing of that issue is troublesome - quite troublesome, and reflective of the dire straits of the credit market and the dysfunction which has engulfed the corporate market.

Caterpillar announced a 5 year and a 10 year this morning. The size has yet to be determined, but it is likely to be around $500 million for each tranche

In early August Caterpillar brought a 5 year bond to market, the 4.90 of August 2013. That bond priced 175 basis points cheap to the benchmark 5 year Treasury note. With the turmoil in the credit markets the last several weeks, the issue has widened on spread and this morning it was quoted 225/ 210.

The talk on the new issue is T + 325 basis points. That is fully 100 basis points cheap to the outstanding issue and 150 basis points above where the same maturity was priced six weeks ago

This is very disturbing because Caterpillar is an industrial company, unsullied by association with the credit crunch. If it takes that much concession to sell a solid stable industrial, what might the outcome be when a large financial seeks to tap the market

Rest assured that the result will be gory.


What I think about the bailout plans

The Paulson plan is not a plan.  It's a plan to maybe have a plan at some unspecified point in the future.  The basic idea seems to be that we give the Fed a big pot of money, which it hands over to banks in exchange for illiquid securities.  Essentially, we're recapitalizing the banks with federal money.

Missing are key details like:  at what price will these securities be purchased?  Why $700 billion?  What is the procedure for deciding how to allocate this gigantic pot of money?  Does it go to the weakest banks, or the strongest?  How do we avoid the massive moral hazard that no-strings-attached bailouts suggest?  This is not a side issue:  the Treasury's refusal to communicate is central to the proposal, which is why it explicitly denies courts or agencies any review powers.

Now, I do understand why Paulson thinks he needs broad powers and freedom from normal review constraints.  The essence of this whole bailout is not to pick up the pieces, but to stop this mess from crashing the whole credit system.  Hence, the Treasury wants to be able to intervene quickly.  Having Congress, several regulatory agencies, and about a zillion judges sitting on your neck demanding a say is the enemy of speedy action.  Nor has Congress proved exactly adept at handling the financial markets in the past.  Still, for my extremely large contribution I'd like to have a little more confidence that there is some well-thought-out procedure for acquiring these securities.  Arnold Kling is a must-read on this topic:

I am sure that Henry Paulson, Ben Bernanke, and Eugene Ludwig know more than I do about the current health of the banking system, the state of credit markets, and the potential risks to the economy. Note, however, that the news hour transcript also includes comments by Allan Meltzer, a historian of central banking, who argues that the financial crisis is not as bad as it is being portrayed.

But an issue about which they know less than I do is mortgage credit risk. To them, the problem of pricing mortgage assets is a detail to be worked out later, as when Ludwig sniffs that he is sure that "the plumbing can be taken care of." Well, I'm a plumber, and I don't think so. Based on my knowledge of pricing mortgage credit risk, I believe that the bailout proposal is far riskier than other alternatives.

How did we get into this mess in the first place? We got here because financial executives took on mortgage credit risk without understanding what they were doing. Some of them were new to the business, like the high-flying Wall Street firms who entered the industry during the boom. Some of them thought they were insulated from risk, because of new derivative hedging instruments. Some of the executives never belonged in the business in the first place, including Dick Syron at Freddie Mac, who in 2003 took over a firm where there was lots of knowledge of mortgage credit risk and proceeded to flout the warnings of experienced middle managers and the Chief Risk Officer about the firm's plunge into subprime lending. Congressional and Administration meddling in support of "affordable housing" played a role, and those folks are still around working on the latest legislation.

I am wearing two hats in opposition to the bailout idea. One hat is my libertarian hat, which does not like the power grab. The other hat is the applied financial economics hat, which was my career in the late 1980's and early 1990's. Speaking from the latter point of view, I have to warn that nobody involved in the bailout proposal has sufficient knowledge of mortgage credit risk. They are like Dick Syron--in over their heads without realizing it. The last thing we need in the mortgage market is another large, inexperienced player.

You can say that after the bill is enacted, the big boys will hire technical economists to deal with the plumbing. But that will be too late. Technical economists will not be able to fix a concept that has such poor risk-reward trade-offs built into it.


I would also very much like to know that the bankers do not get to waltz away from the mess they created without so much as a "You boys behave yourselves!" from Uncle Sam.  I find it extraordinarily easy to sympathize with the bankers who genuinely believed that they had gotten better at pricing credit risk.  I also find it extraordinarily easy to sympathize with people who dropped out of college to start a band.  In neither case, however, do I wish to reward this behavior with large stacks of unearned money.

The Dodd plan has better oversight, but no better outline for how this money is to be spent, which is the core problem with the Paulson plan.  This morning I listened to Pete Domenici, who is on both the budget and appropriations committees, explain to his colleagues, in tones of wonder, that Ben Bernanke had done his academic work on the Great Depression.  These are the people who were in charge of approving Bernanke's appointment to the Federal Reserve chair, mind you, a task to which they seemingly gave less attention than they do to applying their television makeup. 

At that, he's a massive improvement over the Democrats; as I write this I am enjoying the site of Byron Dorgan simultaneously illustrating that he knows nothing about financial history, and also lecturing us on how we should regulate the industry.  At least the other things Pete Domenici said were factually accurate and logically coherent, even if that logic cohered around a not-very-well-thought-out endorsement of the Paulson plan.

This does not exactly fill me with soaring confidence in Congress's ability to allocate the money.  I'd rather trust Paulson.

Half of the Republicans seem to have turned over their consciences to Hank Paulson in the name of party solidarity.  Meanwhile, many Democrats seem to be more interested in discussing Wall Street bonuses and struggling homeowners than what to, y'know, do about the banking system.   

I feel bad for the homeowners, and outraged that so many people got gigantic sums of money for screwing up the financial system.  But that money's gone.  The mortgage bankers have already mostly lost their jobs, because their market (and often their firm) collapsed.  Much of the outrageous compensation was in now worthless (or nearly worthless) company stock.  And even if we dun, say, the top executives at Bear, Lehman, and AIG (I'm not opposed to doing so if it's legal), we will get only a trivial fraction of the money lost in these markets.  You know who made most of the money on the subprime bubble?  Anyone who bought a house in the last ten years.  Yes, that's right, you, with your low fixed interest rate on a reasonably sized house.  You're the profiteer who laughed all the way to the bank.

Taking whatever money we can from the executives is worth doing pour encourager les autres.  But the bigger concern is institutional.  Any bailout plan needs to walk a very, very fine line.  It must let straightened financial institutions sell the debt that is dragging down their portfolios.  But it must do so in a way that does not convince future bankers that excessive risk taking can be nearly painless.  That means paying just enough for the securities to keep the banks from failing, not enough to let them avoid painful losses.  One way to do this is to make the deal less attractive, which the Dodd plan proposes to do by requiring equity warrants in exchange for funds.

But it also has to make buying overvalued homes unattractive.  People were gambling on the housing market--nice, middle class people who would never carry a gigantic credit card balance or declare bankruptcy.  In the face of the housing bubble, they took out ARMs they knew they couldn't afford to pay when the teaser reset, in the hope that rising home equity would let them refinance. (A fair number of them got away with it, too.)  When pressed on this behavior, they claimed they had to because otherwise they couldn't afford a house--as if renting were a physical or moral impossibility.

Borrowers were not brought down by predatory lending.  The terms that are causing trouble were clearly laid out in their loan term sheets, right on the top of their mortgage package.  Borrowers were brought down by a willingness to gamble on rising home prices--exactly the same thing that knocked out Lehman Brothers.  At least Lehman Brothers had the excuse that ten years of rising prices had completely screwed up their default models.

Bailing out home gamblers by freezing their mortgage rates, extending their loan terms, or otherwise forcing the banks to give them free money, will teach them the same thing we are trying hard not to teach Wall Street:  if you gamble big enough, Uncle Sam will pick up your losses.  Moreover, it's not exactly the cleverest idea to levy a huge regulatory taking on an industry that's already really shaky, and threatening to take the rest of us down with it in the event of a collapse. 

Any bailout should not aim to help either homeowners or lenders for their own sake--we are helping them because if we don't, the rest of us will suffer more than the cost of the bailout.  The health of the Fort Meyer housing market is not the proper province of the federal government, no matter how distressing the locals may find it.

So what do I think we should do?  I'm not sure, exactly, except for a couple of broad principles:  we should prevent banks from failing, but we should not prevent them from taking heavy losses, and managers and shareholders who require bailing out should have to pay heavily for the privilege.  I find both the Paulson and the Dodd plan dissatisfyingly vague as to how we are to achieve this happy feat.

September 23, 2008

Why isn't our politicianz edukated?

Joe Biden thinks our leaders need to regain our trust by explaining what's going on:

"Part of what being a leader does is to instill confidence is to demonstrate what he or she knows what they are talking about and to communicating to people ... this is how we can fix this," Biden said. "When the stock market crashed, Franklin Roosevelt got on the television and didn't just talk about the princes of greed. He said, 'look, here's what happened.'"

I certainly feel better knowing that come next November, I might have a savvy politician like Joe Biden explaining complex financial matters to me.  And also, how the governor of New York managed to get his own financial show ten years before the first regularly scheduled television broadcast.

Hat tip Jesse Walker -- and Stuart Buck, who wonders why Senator Biden didn't mention Abraham Lincoln's inspiring dispatches from the front lines at Valley Forge.


Reverse payday

I'm still gathering my thoughts on bailout and regulatory solutions, hopefully for an omnibus post tomorrow morning.  Here's a question:  a lot of Democrats seem to want the Wall Street executives to disgorge things like their retirement packages and bonuses before cutting any deal.  Can Congress do this, legally?  I mean, yes, they make the law.  But my understanding is that while you can grandfather in benefits, you can't retroactively punish people for behavior that was legal when committed.  Can Congress reach in and retroactively void a private contract?  I'm not asking for commentary on the wisdom or morality of such a move, just whether it would withstand a court challenge.

The FBI investigating major financial houses

For what, I have no idea.  Is stupidity a federal offense?  And if so, when do they investigate congress?

In defense of borrowing short and lending long

Maturity mismatch is taking something of a beating in the comments, including from smart people like former co-blogger Winterspeak.  They urge the end of fractional reserve banking and its replacement with maturity matched investments--someone who wants to borrow for two years has to find someone who wants to lend for the same period of time.  That's much less unstable, they say, than a fractional reserve system.

That's true, it is.  It has the appeal of perfect simplicity.  But I am not a huge fan of perfect simplicity.  A wheelbarrow is simpler than a car.  It is less likely to break, and less expensive to fix when it does break.  But I would still rather have a car to do my shopping.

So what are the reasons to favor fractional reserve banking?  Threefold:

1)  Stopping it would require a huge regulator to keep people from doing what they naturally want to do, which is lend short and borrow long.  As long as a big fractional reserve banking system exists, it will require periodic government interventions.  You cannot credibly commit to not intervening when a failure to do so risks a double-digit GDP contraction.

So keeping people from doing this will require constant watching.  You will have to aggressively invade company books to ensure that all of their borrowing is duration-matched.  Remember, money market funds were very close to maturity matched--they borrowed in weeks and months, and lent in same. 

2)  Fractional reserve banking vastly increases the supply of savings available for investment.  I don't know about you, but I can't afford to lock up a chunk of my savings for six months to two years.  The money in my savings and money market accounts is there for a reason--I don't know when I'll need it.  I have longer term savings in stock funds, but that's superfluous money.

Hedge funds and private equity can demand long lockups because they are using surplus money that their investors don't expect to need--really need--any time soon.  The less affluent have to have a reasonably large cushion they can get their hands on in case of emergency, such as car repairs or a really good deal on a jet ski.  Without fractional reserve banking, that would be dead money, sitting in a vault somewhere.  Indeed, they'd probably end up paying someone to guard it for them.

Maturity-matched lending also has enormous transaction costs.  Most companies don't want to borrow in $2,000 increments.  The search costs of finding someone who wants to loan the amount you want at the time period you want, or a pool of same, is huge.  There's a reason that private equity has big minimum buy-ins, and tends not to disburse amounts in the size of an auto loan.  Trying to maturity match loans would essentially kill the market for both borrowing and lending in small amounts.

Fractional reserve banking puts that money to work.  It gives us periodic crises.  But by putting all that extra money to work in productive investments, it also gives us the wherewithal to pay for the periodic crises.

3)  The financial market can still have big crises.  AIG went down on credit default swaps--aka insurance (or, if you prefer, gambling)--not short paper.  Huge defaults on duration-matched securities can take down institutions in a domino-like fashion (remember Latin America?  Russia?)  Borrowing and lending money are risky endeavors.  They are unfortunately necessary in a society where the people with the good ideas aren't always the people with the money.

Maybe I should add

4)  It's a political nonstarter.  Maybe in some mad moment you could prohibit fractional reserve banking.  Right up to the point where people find out that instead of getting interest on their checking account they have to pay the bank to guard their money, and can't prepay their mortgage.  I doubt even my credit hawk commenters would like to find that, like companies, they might be stuck with paying 10% for all thirty years of their loan if they happened to borrow in a bad year.

Dollar obsessions

One answer to my question "what do you mean by worse" is that the value of the dollar will fall.  I'm not sure why I'm supposed to be so excited by this.  Yes, I love my Panasonic television.  But with 90% of our production bought and sold domestically, the value of the dollar is of limited relevance to the fate of the economy, or the living standards of most Americans.  And some of our biggest trading partners seem pretty determined to stop the dollar from falling against their currency By Any Means Necessary.  I am sad that I will not be able to vacation cheaply in Europe.  But this does not seem like a good reason to urge a double-digit contraction in output.

Of course, a falling dollar also may make it harder to borrow abroad.  On the other hand, even the treasury doesn't, mostly.  Besides, the people who are intensely concerned with the dollar's exchange rate don't want us to borrow abroad, so I'm not sure why this is supposed to be more important than preventing the next Great Depression.

Currency crises are huge problems in countries where foreigners are the main source of capital, and profligate governments are forced to borrow in their own currencies.  But we are not one of those countries.

What am I missing?

Schadenfreude

Why Washington (especially the media) hates Wall Street.  A friend writes to ask if I've "gone native".   Exquisitely attuned as I am to the effect that severe recessions have on advertising revenue, and the balance sheets of people who fund money-losing magazines--well, no, I certainly haven't.  I'd rather let Wall Street off scott free than sacrifice my job to "teach them a lesson".

Act now before supplies run out!

Some of my hawkier commenters, as well as other people on the web, express the belief that we need to let things come crashing down now without intervention, because if we go on, it will be even worse.

I'm not sure what they're imagining when they say "even worse".  Say GDP contracts by a third and unemployment hits 25% or so--a not unreasonable supposition if we'd let the money market be destroyed and pushed all the institutions that regularly borrow there into liquidation.    Short of aerial bombing, there is no "even worse"; that's what a country looks like when its financial system collapses.

I suspect there's an awful lot of anthropomorphizing the economy going on here.  What happens to an economy when its credit system implodes is not that it cancels the cable subscription and takes a second job waiting tables on weekends.  What happens is that everyone stops making so much stuff, because no one else wants to buy their stuff.    Everyone's living standard falls, especially those who are shoved into the double-digit unemployment figures caused by the dislocation.

Let the lawsuits begin!

Reserve Prime, the money market fund that broke the buck last week, gets hit with a lawsuit for tipping off big investors in advance.

Even the easy answers aren't easy

I am in favor of some form of government bailout, and I am also in favor of some major changes in the way that we regulate the banks.  But even simple, seemingly obvious changes are trickier than they look. 

Mark-to-market accounting, for example, was mandated by Sarbanes-Oxley.  The idea was that we wanted to keep companies from playing games with the securities they owned by forcing them to update the balance sheet at the end of the day with the new values. 

Seems obvious and good.  But mark-to-market was a major factor in the bank collapses.  When markets for various securities froze up, the book value of those securities was basically zero, even though many of those securities would eventually pay off.  That collapsed the value of balance sheets.  This not only panicked investors, but also threatened their credit rating.  For a bank, a credit downgrade is death.  They borrow a lot of money short term to smooth their cash flows.  Also, a lot of regulated entities have strict rules about the credit rating of the institutions they're allowed to lend to.  The result is a drying up of capital all out of proportion to the underlying financial condition of the institution.

Or take capital requirements.  I'm in favor of higher ones.  But a high capital requirement, perversely, hurts companies in a downturn.  This sounds bizarre.  But say you have a broker-dealer that is only allowed to leverage itself 5 to 1--a very, very safe capital ratio.  (12-to-1 is, IIRC, about standard). 

Now say that the bank suffers a major setback, like a bunch of totally illiquid mortgage backed security whose nominal value has dropped to near zero.  Having a lot of capital protects the creditors in bankruptcy, who now get 20 cents on the dollar instead of six.  But the firm still goes into bankruptcy, because they can't dip into their other capital to make good the debts.  Indeed, the higher their capital requirements, the more they have to deleverage in a crisis, because they need to unwind more positions to shore up the bad ones they can't sell.  That deleveraging dries up capital in other markets, decreases the value of whatever securities they're dumping, and thus threatens other institutions.

This is not a brief for doing nothing.  Only a caution that even things that sound simple and obvious are neither.

Explaining AIG

Tim Carney lays it all out for you.  In case you were wondering.

Why we need a bailout, even if not this bailout

Having (hopefully) scared you appropriately with the previous post, I now point out that the money markets were only one part of the picture.  Let's not forget that we still have the mortgage market and the insurance markets freezing up quite apart from the money market disasters.  Every crisis gets compared to the Great Depression.  This very nearly was.

There are strains on the left and the right that are kind of okay with this idea. 

The right wing version says "Let them fail! Fractional reserve banking is inherently unstable, and we've been living on borrowed money.  We need to cut back to our natural, credit-free level of output and consumption."

The left wing version says "Let them fail!  Capitalism is inherently unstable; greed is no way to run an economy.  We need to force banks to stop doing all of these dangerous things and regulate them so heavily they can't make a mistake.  Also, as a general rule, rich people should suffer for their mistakes, and ordinary people shouldn't.  This is a great opportunity to repeat FDR's awesome victories!"

These are two ways of being dangerously silly.  Whatever your ideal looks like, there are two rules of financial system change:

1)  Very rapid change is very bad
2)  See above.

The Great Depression took place in an economy much less dependent on liquid credit markets than today's system.  In three years, from 1929 to 1932, GNP fell by about 30%.  Unemployment hit almost 25%, and stayed within spitting distance of 10-15% for most of the rest of the decade.  This was not selective, picking out only the bad people who had bought radios on time, invested in Florida real estate, or taken a flyer on an investment trust.  People lost their jobs not because they were bad, but because their company could not sell enough stuff to cover expenses.

In an earlier thread, someone said, roughly, "I don't buy on credit and my company invests on retained earnings.  I can sit this out for a couple of months."  The problem is, the effects of really rapid contractions don't last a couple of months.  They last years.  Can your company withstand the bankruptcy of some major clients with large outstanding accounts?  How many people will it have to fire if its order book drops 40%?  Can it cover its fixed expenses even on half staff?

Liberals hoping that this will bring on a second new deal, however, should think again.  What FDR did was a one-trick pony.  For one thing, he was operating in an environment with vastly more scope for action than the current government has.  Since then, the Federal government has hemmed itself in with a combination of laws, regulations, and legal decisions that make federal projects of any scale take decades.  There will be no second WPA or TVA.

More importantly, FDR was working with a financial blank slate.  In 1928, income tax receipts were about $1 billion on GNP of roughly $100 billion.  State and local taxes were also low.  Now the effective federal tax rate for Arnold Schwarzenegger is more than a quarter of his income.  The Federal government's share of national income peaked at roughly 50% (IIRC) in World War II, and has averaged about 20% since then.  We can't add another 20% so easily.  When federal, state, and local governments are taking more than half peoples' incomes, they get awful feisty.  Plus, if we take more money, what are you going to do when the bills for Social Security and Medicare come due?

There is no benefit from a "tough love" strategy for anyone that even begins to approach the catastrophic consequences, for everyone, of a massive and rapid contraction.

Living on borrowed prosperity

A substantial minority of libertarians, and fellow-travelers on the right, view this crisis as just desserts.  America has borrowed prosperity from the future, and now the bill has come due.  We need to "work the rot out of the system" (an idea that originated with Andrew Mellon, the US treasury secretary whose dealt so ably with the onset of the Great Depression by sailing off to Europe to negotiate over the debts we were owed from World War I).

This does not, to me, make much sense.  Sure, monetary expansion can cause the economy to produce above its natural level of output temporarily.  As the supply of money (i.e. bank credit) rises, firms expand.  They bid up the price of labor.  More labor is lured into the labor market by this money.  But of course, it takes labor some time to produce more goods, and some of those goods are probably combination flashlight/nose trimmers that no one wants to buy.  Workers lured in by higher wages bid up the price of existing goods.  That means that the money wasn't worth nearly as much as they thought it would be, a monetary phenomenon you can observe at will by finding someone who is about to transfer from the Oklahoma City office to New York. 

Disappointed, some of the marginal workers who were lured into the labor force cut back on their hours, or leave the labor force, or at least spend more time playing computer solitaire because who wants this lousy job anyway?  The ultimate result is higher prices and about the same level of output.  That process of boom and mean reversion takes about eighteen months to work its way through the system.

But I don't see how it is possible, over the long term, to have a bubble that consists of "borrowing from our future".  We can't get money from the future--their financial system isn't integrated with ours.  We can commit some people in the future to give others money, and in that sense our current political happiness with various old-age entitlements might be said to be borrowed from the future.  But we cannot, ourselves, spend the actual cash that rightfully belongs to them.

Well, actually we can.  We can borrow from foreigners.  But America borrows in her own currency, and at pretty low interest rates.  Our current account deficit is certainly worrisome, but not "the economy needs to contract by 1/3 to fix it" worrisome.  Moreover, we still do most of our borrowing from good old US citizens.

Credit markets don't expand our wealth by borrowing from the future's precious prosperity reserves.  They increase production by vastly increasing the efficiency of individual savings, funneling them into long term investments that require larger sums than most individuals can amass.  They do so both by aggregating investments, and by transforming the duration of the investments--allowing people who want to lend for six months or seven years, to lend money to people who want to borrow for fifteen or thirty.  This increases the supply of savings, and hence the supply of investment.  But at the end of the day, the size of the economy is, to a first approximation, the amount of goods that a society can produce with the available supply of capital and labor.  The composition of these two factors is always changing, of course, but thanks to the magic of prices, and the law of large numbers, those changes mostly smooth out in the big picture.

The future being uncertain, that aggregation can result in some spectacular misallocation of resources between productive sectors.  But even those misallocations aren't that big in the grand scheme of things.  Most of the houses in America, even the new ones, are being lived in.  Maybe their owners would rather have had a new Mercedes, a rototiller, and a week in Maui.  But the utility loss just isn't that big.  

September 22, 2008

How close was the financial system to melting down?

I do not work for the Treasury, the Fed, or an investment house, so take this for what it's worth.  But my understanding is really, frighteningly close.  Remember the monster that lived under your bed when you were five?  Actually, mine lived in the closet.  But that's not the point.  The point is, that monster was loose on the financial markets last week.

Last week I explained what a money market fund is.  This week, I explain what they invest in. The money market is the market for short-term debt, which companies use to smooth out mismatches in their cash flows:

  • Commercial paper:  unsecured debt issued by corporations, with a duration of under 270 days, which avoids certain kinds of SEC paperwork. 
  • Repos:  aka Repurchase agreements.  Basically, the holder of a security sells that security to someone with an agreement to buy it back at a later date, usually measured in days rather than months.
  • Banker's agreements:  basically, a short-term financial instrument created by a non-financial firm, but guaranteed by a bank.
  • CD's:  You know what these are; you probably have one.  CD's are what paleolibertarians would like the entire banking system to look like:  you loan money at a guaranteed interest rate for a set period of time.
  • Treasury bills:  Government securities.
Money market funds are heavily regulated as to what sort of securities they can buy.  These kind of short term debts were widely believed to be as safe as . . . er . . . something other than buying a house.

What happened last week is that one money market firm advertised its entire portfolio, including a large chunk of Lehman paper worth slightly less than 2% of the total fund assets.  Spooked investors, who did not want to lose out if the fund "broke the buck" started withdrawing as fast as their little fingers could punch the buttons on their phones.  Now, this money market fund had tens of billions worth of assets; if it started dumping them on the market, it would drive the price down, leaving them even less money to hand back to their shareholders.  But there's a reason investors herd in a bank run:  the first people out get all their money back. The rest get trampled in the stampede.  The fund--incidentally, the same company that founded the money market industry--"broke the buck"; that is, its shares became worth less than a dollar.  It's as if the value of your bank account suddenly dropped below the amount you'd put in.

This, by the way, is probably not the only fund this happened to, but it was the only fund that a) advertised its holdings and b) was not attached to an institution large enough to easily make good the loss.

Thus was touched off a general run on money market funds that held money for institutions--the kind that require buy ins of a couple million or more.  Institutional managers have a strong incentive to do stupid, destructive things, as long as everyone else is doing them.  It's the same reason that IT managers used to buy IBM--not because it was necessarily the best solution, but because as long as you did it, no one could blame you when things went south.  "I bought IBM!" troubled CTOs would say when the server crashed.  "The whole market is down!" cry money managers when the financial system crashes.

Investors were particularly worried about any exposure to financial paper.  So, frankly, were the managers of money market funds.  From Lehman, the worries spread to Wachovia, Washington Mutual, and beyond.   Suddenly, said one source, no one could sell two-week Wachovia paper at 30% yield-to-maturity--which in layman's terms means they were offering a hell of a discount on a loan that was pretty likelyt o pay off.  Some funds bragged they didn't have Wachovia, which only made the others seem ominously silent in comparison.  The fund runs started to hit money markets that had no obvious problems (Putnam, BKNY/Mellon, American Beacon) causing them to shut down or redeem the shares in kind. Investors began worrying State Street's massive short-term investment fund complex was holding Lehman, which whipsawed its stock price 50% in one day.

Money market funds are generally designed to be the functional equivalent of a bank account:  short-term vehicles where you park cash you aren't using at the moment.  Investors are supposed to be able to pull their money out at any time.  That meant that all the funds, sound or not, were vulnerable to a run.  And virtually any fund that experienced a run would "break the buck" because while these funds are perfectly safe and liquid in normal circumstances, no one could dump a billion dollars worth of securities on the market without seeing the price of those securities plummet.  Since funds definitionally try to hold their asset base near a dollar a share, and distribute the yield, there was no gigantic cushion to pad the sales.

The runs meant that all the money market funds were in the same boat:  everyone wanted to sell and hoard cash in case of a run.  No one wanted to buy.  Once busted funds had gotten rid of their very short paper, they were stuck with the weeks/months maturities, which were virtually unsaleable.  Unless the parent institutions make your investors whole the only thing you can do in that situation is distribute the assets in kind, to investors who can't sell them any more than you could.

Ultimately, despite last week's bailouts, no one wanted to hold financial company paper.  Unfortunately, as I understand it that paper made up the bulk of the money markets, which is hardly surprising given the volume of trades they do (did) every day. 

Banks have tens of billions of debt maturities to refinance in the coming months.  The overwhelming majority of it will be good even under distressed circumstances--unless they can't roll any of it over.  At that point, they experience the same problems you would if your credit card company pulled your credit line and demanded you pay back everything you owe them. 

No doubt some of my readers are rubbing their hands and saying "Exactly what should happen to people who carry credit card balances!"  And I'm sure that among you there are people who pay cash on the barrel for everything, having never taken out any loan for a house, an automobile, an education, a personal financial crisis.  These people never even use an American Express Card, which is, of course, a short-term loan.  They also do not work for companies that borrow money to buy capital equipment or finance expansion, and their firms do not experience any mismatch between their payables and their receivables.  Those people should stop reading now, because I'm pretty sure the Amish aren't supposed to use the internet.

The rest of us live in a world that is created and run by institutions that amass capital from millions of people and concentrate it in areas where it (usually) makes people better off.  I'm particularly confused by conservatives who claim to hate fractional reserve banking, duration mismatches in the financial system, and easy credit/bankruptcy.  If you think more deeply about it, there are three reasons why this opposition is silly:

1)  Outlawing it would require massive market interventions.  The vast majority of people want to borrow long and lend short.  Keeping them from doing so would mean not only outlawing the current banking industry, but giving the government sweeping powers and budget to make sure that no one synthetically recreates a duration mismatched position.  Human ingenuity on this front is endless--witness the acrobatic contortions of Islamic finance to get around the bans on, yes, lending money with interest.

2)  Credit and easy bankruptcy serve as a substitute for government intervention.  In a developed society that will not (however you personally may feel) stand by and watch its members starve, income fluctuations have to be dealt with somehow.  If people can't borrow money to smooth their consumption, they'll demand that the government provide that service instead.

3)  No country in the world, except Britain, has managed to industrially develop on retained earnings.  Which is why it took them twice as long as the rest of us.

Lefties overjoyed at the prospect of banks running out of cash should note that money markets also hold federal and local government securities.  What happens when Maryland doesn't have the cash in its coffers to make payroll, and the money market no longer exists?  What happens is they send the employees home and tell them to come back when they get more cash.  To the extent that you think a large and well paid civil service is a good thing, this should distress you. 

And if they simply carried big cash cushions to cover tax flow problems, that would mean either less spending, or more taxes.  Conservatives and liberals alike can reflect on the likelihood of getting whichever of those options you don't want.

If the FDIC hadn't stepped in to backstop the runs on the money market funds, it's not crazy to think that we might have seen a massive liquidation of huge portions of the banking system at fire sale prices.  That magnitude--one person I talked to before the bailout gave a wild-sounding estimate of $1 trillion worth of money market fund redemptions in the immediate offing.  With the money market essentially destroyed, the resulting bank liquidations would have been even worse, beyond even the ability of the US Government's borrowing power to pull back.  That would have touched the bank accounts, the investments, and the firms of even the hawkiest of credit hawks--unless you've actually got it buried in your back yard in tin cans, you'd lose something, and even then, who would buy whatever it is you sell to make a living?

Consider that the Great Depression came upon a society much less dependent on unsecured credit than we are.  Then count your lucky stars that our financial officials are moderately competent.

How likely was this doomsday scenario?  No way to know.  But it was possible.  That's quite scary enough.

Paul Krugman learns rule #1 of making a case

Never ask a question you don't know the answer to.

Insiders save themselves

I used to think the brain was my most important organ. But then I thought: Wait a minute, who's telling me that?  ~Emo Philips.

Every time I ponder this bailout, I come back to that quote.  Wall Street is telling us that Wall Street needs to be bailed out.  A Goldman man has run the Treasury for six of the last thirteen years.  I am sure that they think what they are doing is necessary.  But anyone who works long in any industry comes to view it as having an outsized importance in the world.  If you doubt this, spend a few moments listening to journalists prate about the sacred privileges of the press.

The problem is that they're sort of right.  There is no industry in America that does not depend upon Wall Street.  If credit seizes up and the banks fail, everyone will suffer deeply as businesses cut back for lack of capital, mortgage capital dries up, credit card rates rise and car loans become hard to get.

But that doesn't mean one has to support the current bailout--you can add me to the list of libertarians standing athwart history shouting "stop!!!"  I don't think we can punish risk taking managers and the shareholders who enabled them as thoroughly as we might like without possibly taking the rest of us down with them.  But allowing banks to selectively offload their crap on the government without so much as a rap on the knuckles for having bought the crap in the first place is taking things too far.

Of course, I'm not Hank Paulson and Ben Bernanke, and I'm not privy to their information about the markets.  What information I do have from various insiders suggests that the financial system was perilously close to simply ceasing to function on Thursday night.  So I'm loathe to opine too certainly about the necessity of bailouts.  But I'm pretty sure that we don't need to hand the bankers hundreds of billions worth of treasuries as a reward for a job well done.

September 19, 2008

Brave new world

Conor Friedersdorf looks into the future.

Demon short-selling

Every time there's a financial crisis, demagogues start criticising the short-sellers.  The government has now temporarily banned shorting financial stocks, as has Britain.   Short-selling, for curious readers, is the practice of selling a security you don't own, in the hopes that the price will drop and you can buy it back before you have to deliver the actual security.  Thus can large profits be made. 

Short-selling is extremely dangerous, compared to going "long" (buying a security in the hopes it will go up).  If you buy a security, the most you can lose is all the money you've invested.  On the other hand, if you sell a security short, your loss is theoretically potentially unlimited--if the price soars, you're on the hook for the difference between the current price, and whatever you sold it at.  I knew a guy who made a killing shorting the market in 2000.  But not before he almost went bankrupt doing the same in 1999.  As traders like to say, "the markets can stay foolish longer than you can stay solvent". 

Nonetheless, there's been a great deal of short-selling activity, especially, understandably, in financial stocks.  First Bear, then Lehman, and now Morgan Stanley have blamed their woes on the short-sellers.  Arnold Kling thinks this is ludicrous:

How can short-selling destroy a good company?

The simple answer is that it can't.

First of all, short-selling can't force down your share price. Short-selling only forces down your share price if buyers don't emerge to defend your share price.

Banning short-selling cannot protect a bad stock. If nobody is willing to buy XYZ at a price higher than $.02 a share, then the price at which XYZ will trade will be $.02 a share (or lower). It doesn't matter whether you have short-sellers or not.

What drives stock prices down is the lack of people willing to buy them at the higher price. If the company has sufficient value, there will be sufficient buyers.

I think this is a tad strong.  If short-sellers flood a market, they can overwhelm the buyers, especially when you have a massive credit contraction in the markets.  Also, short-sellers are not historically known to be above spreading untrue rumors in order to drive prices down further.  Felix Salmon speculates that institutions with deep pockets and long time horizons are probably going to do very well out of the market's current problems. 

Nonetheless, the short-selling ban is stupid, and McCain is both a dolt and a demagogue for helping push Chris Cox into it.  Successful shorts, like George Soros' spectacular attack on the British pound, usually work because there is a real underlying issue (in that case, the British pound's unsustainable peg to other EU currencies).  If there's no problem there, the shorts take a big bath.  As Tyler Cowen points out, if there is an underlying issue, the price pressures will prevail anyway:

If you read the above excerpt, you will see that the selling of some traders becomes a substitute for the short selling of others.  This is a very general mechanism in financial theory, namely the ability to recreate a desired net position in a synthetic manner through other markets.

Perhaps most importantly, while short selling is a problem for Morgan Stanley, and his shareholders, it is not the primary problem in this crisis.  The problem is in the debt markets, not the equity markets:  financial firms are finding it very, very difficult to roll over their paper.  (More on this later).  The ban on short-selling does nothing to combat this problem, and indeed, by shaking public confidence in the stock price, might push investors into being more conservative on the debt than they otherwise would be.

Clear as Glass (Steagall)

Off all the most bizarre statements running around about this crisis, the most bizarre is the shockingly common belief on the left that this can somehow be traced back to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley act, which "repealed" Glass-Steagall. (The equivalent, not-quite-as-loony belief on the right is that if we hadn't had such tough redlining laws, or such deep government interest in expanding homeownership, this wouldn't have happened).  This is wrong in so many ways that one hardly knows where to start.

Let's start with the history:  there were actually two Glass-Steagall acts, but what we're generally referring to is the second one, passed in 1933, which did a number of things. 

  • It regulated interest rates, including setting a rate of zero on demand deposits.  This was rolled back decades ago, which is why you now get interest on your checking account, and banks strive to offer you an attractive interest rate rather than a free toaster when you open an account with them.
  • It established the FDIC to insure bank deposits.  Last time I looked, the FDIC was still there, keeping my $7.67 safe from harm.
  • It separated investment banking and commercial banking, which is why Morgan Stanley and JP Morgan are two different institutions.  This was effectively dead letter when Traveler's bought Citigroup in 1998, but Gramm-Leach-Bliley officially repealed this provision in 1999.
The argument is that this was a bad idea because Glass-Steagall wisely prevented commercial banks from mad speculation.   This is what you might call "Folk Economics"--wrapped in the lurid lore of the New Deal and very superficially appealling, it is close to an axiom of faith for many on the left.  Sadly, it is simply wrong, as Alex Tabarrok ably explains:

Given a history like this people wonder how repealing the law could have been a good thing.  But a significant academic literature has investigated these claims and rejected them.  Eugene White, for example, found that national banks with security affiliates were much less likely to fail than banks without affiliates.  Randall Kroszner (now at the Fed.) and Raghuram Rajan found that (jstor) securities issued by unified banks were (ex-post) of higher quality that those issued by investment banks.  A powerful book by George Benston went through the entire Pecora hearings which supposedly revealed the problems with unified banking and found them to be a complete sham.  My colleague, Carlos Ramirez later showed that the separation of commercial and investment banking increased the cost of external finance (jstor).  Finally, my own work (pdf) unearthed the real reasons for the separation in a titanic battle between the Morgans and Rockefellers.

Yet this meme keeps coming back and back, in my comments and elsewherePaul Krugman and Daniel Gross are too chicken to outright claim that the "repeal" caused this mess, but they sure do strenuously imply it.

They can't say it more directly because it's moronic.  Even if you ignore the economic history indicating that Glass-Steagall didn't help the crisis it was meant to solve--even if you assume, arguendo, that the repeal was a bad idea--there's simply no logical reason to believe it had anything to do with the current mess.

Securitization was not introduced in the 1990s; it was invented in the 1970s and became popular in the 1980s, as chronicled in Liar's Poker.   (As an aside, if you haven't read it, you really must.  Especially now). 

GLB had nothing to do with either lending standards at commercial banks, or leverage ratios at broker-dealers, the two most plausible candidates for regulatory failure here.

Most importantly, commercial banks are not the main problems.  If Glass-Steagall's repeal had meaningfully contributed to this crisis, we should see the failures concentrated among megabanks where speculation put deposits at risk.  Instead we see the exact opposite:  the failures are among either commercial banks with no significant investment arm (Washington Mutual, Countrywide), or standalone investment banks.  It is the diversified financial institutions that are riding to the rescue.

Is McCain suffering from Alzheimers?

The only explanation I can think of for this is that McCain somehow confused Spanish prime minister Jose Zapatero with Emiliano Zapata, the Mexican revolutionary.  Since Zapata died in 1919, this is not a very easy mistake to make.

September 18, 2008

What the hell just happened?

Professors at my alma mater explain.

Sure glad I got that MBA

I graduated from business school in 2001, straight into the teeth of the last recession. This article sure brings back some painful memories.  If you're a newly minted MBA, I offer the following, not very helpful advice:

  • Cast a wide net.  I did both journalism and technology consulting after my management consulting firm blew up; I figured one of them would hit.  I was right.
  • Try to get a job that's going somewhere.  It's better to be flexible on pay and hours than to take a job that doesn't lead anywhere you want to go.  The first job out of business school is important.
  • Reassess your goals.  Did you really want to be a management consultant?  Or were you bored with your job and hoping business school would let you find your bliss?  Now's a good time to figure out if you really wanted to go into investment banking, or just couldn't think of anything better to do.
  • Network like hell.  I sent out about 1400 resumes blind after my firm failed.  I got not one response.  All the jobs I interviewed for came from personal contacts.
  • Look back to your old firm or industry.  Unless you really hated it, they'll be more willing than most to take you in.
  • Cut expenses now.  Right after you lose a job is the last time you want to give up your fun--you feel entitled.  But you will regret it if you run through your savings before you find a job and have to move in with Mom and Dad.  Allow yourself exactly one feel-good treat of under $150, such as a spa day or a really epic night of drinking.  Then promise yourself something really good after you find a job.
  • Find other people in the same boat.  Being unemployed in America often feels like being invisible.  Other people are made uncomfortable by it, and if it drags on, they may start to get irritated with you, as if it must be your fault. That's their own psychological protection:  they need to believe it couldn't happen to them.  Protect yourself by finding people who know what its like.  Also, those people will be amenable to hanging out on a tight budget.  PBR:  it's not just for hipsters any more.
  • Find some way to make money.  You can't job search all the time, and it's easy to sit in your apartment getting depressed.  Even if you're walking dogs, as one friend did, it both smooths your budget and gives your life some structure.
  • Don't panic.  Everyone I went to school with is gainfully employed, except for those who have chosen to stay home with children.  No one is living on cat food.  It's hard to believe it, but you will come through this, even if it takes you, as it did me, eighteen months to get back on your feet.  Believe it or not, losing that job was the best thing that ever happened to me.  More than a few of my classmates say the same.

Watch the budget

Whatever your opinion of the Bush tax cuts, it is indisputable that they made our tax base more progressive:  the rich and very rich now pay a higher percentage of the total tax take than they did before Bush took office.  That has dire implications for the budget for the next few years.

Especially in recent years, the income of the wealthy has become more volatile than the income of the middle class and below.  In good years, their earnings soar, and Uncle Sam reaps more revenue than expected.  In bad years--particularly bad years on Wall Street, since most of that money comes in the form of some sort of security, rather than cash--tax revenues nosedive.  Incidentally, the more we focus on taxing the rich, the worse this problem will get.

The Bush administration is already projecting record deficits next year.  And unlike with their previous dire predictions, we're highly unlikely to get a happy surprise come the mid-year budget review.  If I had to guess, I'd bet on revenues being even lower than currently projected.

Meanwhile, of course, the bailout is going to cost us.  How much?  No idea.  Not, as some economically illiterate commentators are saying, the full amount of the loans--most of that money will probably be paid back.  It's not unlikely that the Fed will actually make money in the long run.  In the short run, however, we'll probably need to put more money into fixing this mess, particularly at Fannie and Freddie.

And though the rush of investors currently seeking a safe haven for their money has temporarily driven the interest on treasury debt down to practically nothing, I wouldn't bet that this will last.  Depending on how spooked investors, particularly foreign investors, get about the future of the US economy, we may be paying more for our debt in the near future than we have in the past.

What does that mean for the grand plans of our two presidential candidates?

  • McCain will probably not be able to make the Bush tax cuts permanent.  It's possible that tax revenues will recover by 2010, though frankly I think the magnitude of the cuts on Wall Street will take years for the tax base to digest.  But we won't know that until early 2011, after the tax cuts have already expired. He'll likely have to push this through with the grim memory of a plummeting 2009 revenue line fresh on everyone's minds.  But Democrats shouldn't smile too much, because this also means
  • Barack Obama will not get his middle class tax cut.  Raising taxes on the rich will not raise all that much revenue in the next year or so.  He'll need the stable middle-class base just to sort of cover current expenses.  Plus,
  • Barack Obama will probably have to radically trim back his spending plans.  Unlike John McCain, he can't just wait a year or so and see if Wall Street bonuses rebound.  He needs the political momentum that he will presumably derive from election to get a big package like his health care plan through. Given the budget problems, unless he's willing to spend money like  a drunken sailor, those programs will come attached to a hefty tax increase that will need to fall, at least in part, on middle-class voters.  Otherwise,
  • The Democrats will have to abandon Paygo.  It's not clear how much good this will do them, however.  The price of money after the fallout settles may make this pretty unattractive--if not to Democrats, then to their constituents.

Money market fund or money market deposit account? The difference matters.

If you do have cash in a money market, you should know which kind you have.  The New York Times does a good job of explaining the difference:

A money market deposit account, on the other hand, is entirely different. It is an interest-bearing bank account that is insured -- up to $100,000 per account and up to $250,000 for some retirement accounts -- by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Joint accounts are insured for $100,000 per account holder.


Putnam closes a money market fund: how worried should you be?

Putnam is closing down one of its money market funds and distributing the assets:

The Board of Trustees of the Putnam Funds announced today that it has voted to close the institutional Putnam Prime Money Market Fund, effective as of 5:00 p.m. on September 17, 2008, and distribute all fund assets. Putnam Prime Money Market Fund is offered to institutional clients with a minimum initial investment of $10 million. The Trustees' action was not related to the portfolio's credit quality, but was instead a reaction to marketwide liquidity issues. The fund, like Putnam's other money market funds, has no exposure to securities of Lehman Brothers, Washington Mutual or AIG at the parent-company level. The fund's net asset value calculated on September 16, 2008 was $1.00 per share. On September 17, the fund experienced significant redemption pressure. Serious constraints on liquidity in money market instruments created the risk that in order to process redemptions, the fund would realize losses in selling its portfolio securities. In the face of these challenges, the Trustees determined to close the fund to ensure equitable treatment of all fund shareholders.

I've had several people ask me if their money market funds are safe.  This might be a good time for a brief primer on what a money market fund does (though of course, a better time would have been before we all plowed our money into them).

For consumers, money market funds generally function as a cross between a mutual fund and a bank account.  The idea is, you buy shares at a dollar a share.  The plan will invest those shares into low-risk* securities, like commercial paper and treasury notes.  However, unlike a mutual fund, a money market fund strives to keep its per-share Net Asset Value (NAV) at exactly $1 per share.  The idea is that, just like a bank account, every one dollar you put in entitles you to draw exactly one dollar out.  Any interest or appreciation on the fund's assets are distributed as income to the shareholders.  This is the yield that you see quoted on your bank's prospectus--typically higher than a bank account, but not that much higher.

"Breaking the buck" is what happens when a firms assets are no longer adequate to cover that $1 per-share value.  At that point, the fund has to close up and distribute what it has left.

If you have a money market deposit account through your bank, my pet expert assures me that it is insured.  However, if you have a money market fund in your brokerage account, those losses are not covered by the SIPC.  The Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) has been described as the brokerage equivalent of the FDIC, which insures your bank account up to $100,000 in the event of a collapse.  This is not quite accurate. 

When a bank goes down, if you had $10,585 in a checking account, you're supposed to get $10,585 back with the help of the FDIC.  When a brokerage folds up, it's supposed to return all your securities and cash to you.  Basically, the SIPC makes accounts good if the brokerage runs out of money to pay off its clients.  But it doesn't insure you against losses--all it guarantees
is that you'll get back the assets (cash and securities) that you had in your account.  If AT&T has dropped from $100 to $6, that is not the SIPC's problem.  All they guarantee is that they will give you either $6 or a share of AT&T. 

The SIPC will make investors whole up to $500,000 worth--but only by replacing assets at current market value, not the original asset value.  Nor will they, as far as I can tell, compensate you if your broker's failure leaves you unable to sell a plummeting asset until it is too late.

Thus with a money market fund, the job is to make sure that you get however many shares of the fund you are entitled to.  But if your 10,000 shares are now only worth $3,500, it will not give you back the $6,500 you lost.

If your fund is with a big house like Vanguard or Fidelity, this shouldn't worry you too much; even if they've got a lot of Lehman paper, their pockets are deep enough to write a check to cover the loss.  And they almost certainly will, because allowing investors to lose money on their money market funds would do terrible damage to the company's reputation.  However, if you've got a mutual fund with a smaller house, they might not be able to stump up the money.

That's why spooked investors are rushing to redeem shares in smaller funds, mostly the kind that institutions park their excess cash in (the fund Putnam is closing up had a minimum investment of $10 million).  Most money market funds are only required to disclose their holdings once per quarter--and at that, the information is 60 days old by the time its filed. God knows what kind of toxic waste they've accumulated in the meantime.  I'm told that a number of institutions have been topping up their mutual funds for months rather than let them break the buck and put the firm in line for investor lawsuits.  The fund that failed the other day was apparently one of the unfortunate few that clued in its investors more often.

The problem is not that most of these funds are insolvent--they can't all have bought huge chunks of Lehman paper.  The problem is that they're illiquid.  If a large number of investors all try to sell out at once, they have to dump large blocs of assets at fire sale prices.  That all by itself will make the fund break the buck, even though they were perfectly solvent before everyone asked to have their money back.  Putnam suffered just such a bank run; I expect the institution will be kicking in some cash to make investors whole.

This happened even though Putnam owns no Lehman or AIG paper at all.  Institutions just became fearful of holding money market shares.  I would expect to see more failures/closures over the next few days.

But for most ordinary investors, who bought their funds through a bank or a large brokerage, I would be very surprised if they take a loss on their money market funds.  Especially if you've got the money in a fund that invests only in treasuries, as some do.  Of course, at the interest rates treasuries are paying right now, you might as well take your money out and tuck it under the floorboards.

It's not impossible, of course, and the first people in line in a bank run are the ones who get all their money back.  So you'll have to decide whether you want to risk losing some money, or contributing to an escalating financial crisis.

* Normally

Update:  commenter James Shearer, and a friend, point out that technically money market funds don't have to close up when they break the buck.  Practically, however, it's been assumed that they would have to because investors would hasten to get their money out, causing the fund to collapse.  (We don't know, really, because up until now it's been so rare)

Mr Shearer also notes, of my statement that investors in big funds like Fidelity and Vanguard would probably be all right:

This is dubious as regards Vanguard which is a nonprofit owned by the funds it manages. The only way they could bail out one of their funds would be by assessing the remaining funds and I doubt they would do that.

Though even at its low rates, Vanguard's advisory entity probably has some cash, so it's hard to be sure.

Further update:  Vanguard's public relations department emails to say "
you're correct, Vanguard's mutual structure does not preclude us from maintaining the stability of our money market funds."


Why did the Fed bail out Bear?

I've gotten that question a lot over the last few days.  What, my questioners want to know, made Bear more worthy (or needful) of a bailout than Lehman.

Answer:  nothing but timing.  The Fed gambled that by supporting Bear into a quick sale, it could stop the liquidity crisis and prevent the contagion from bringing down the broader market.  By the time Lehman fell, it was clear that this hadn't worked.  Moreover, the bailout had introduced a serious moral hazard problem into the market:  AIG (and allegedly also Lehman) turned down private offers that were too paltry in the belief that the Federal Reserve wouldn't let them be forced into liquidation.  Other bankers required an object lesson.

Too, by that point, the various institutions involved had had some time to work out contingency plans for such a collapse.  They weren't complete, but they were adequate.  With Bear, on the other hand, it would have been utter chaos.

In my humble opinion, Ben Bernanke did the right thing both times.  Given the cost of a collapse (which we're now seeing), it was worth gambling $30 billion on the chance that it might be averted.  That gamble didn't pan out, but getting a bad outcome doesn't mean you made a bad decision.  Bernanke played a bad hand well, but ultimately it just wasn't enough to take the pot.

Don't cry for me, America

Financial crisis has sort of supplanted dollar anxiety, but for a long time there were dire predictions from the moderately economically literate (and Nouriel Roubini) that the dollar was going to plunge and leave us in the same position as Argentina ca. 2001.

That's about the only prediction of armageddon that hasn't come true:

One of the most extraordinary features of the past month is the extent to which the dollar has remained immune to a once-in-a-lifetime financial crisis. If the US were an emerging market country, its exchange rate would be plummeting and interest rates on government debt would be soaring. Instead, the dollar has actually strengthened modestly, while interest rates on three- month US Treasury Bills have now reached 54-year lows. It is almost as if the more the US messes up, the more the world loves it.

Ken Rogoff is the former chief economist of the IMF; when he talks about financial crisis, you should listen.  And he's worried about how what will happen if the world loses confidence in us.

One thing is for sure:  we won't end up like emerging markets, which don't borrow in their own currency.  I don't mean that the Fed can inflate its way out of the debt--it won't, not at the level that emerging markets would try to if they could.  4% inflation instead of 2% is not going to get us out of the pain of paying back the money we've borrowed.  But when a country's currency is really on the skids, its interest rates shoot up just as the ability of its currency to purchase the dollars to repay the loan drops; the resulting combination generally leads to default, and sharp economic contraction.

What we could see is higher interest rates on our debt just at the time when we need to put taxpayer money into the financial system to restructure it.  Given that neither of our two presidential candidates has any notable plans to close the current deficit, this would put a serious crimp in America's lifestyle.

That about sums it up

Noah Millman on the candidate's response:

Obama: We're in this mess because the fundamentals are bad, and the fundamentals are bad because the Republicans have been ignoring ordinary working people and their needs. Most of what I think we should do is not particularly germane, and what is germane I don't want to explain in too much detail because I'm worried I might get it wrong. I'm sticking to my platform.

McCain: We're in this mess because a bunch of Wall Street hot shots got us into it, but they won't dare to pull that stuff when I'm in the White House, because I survived five years in a POW camp. Do I look like the kind of guy who hangs around with a bunch of Wall Street sissies who buy their shirts at Thomas Pink? Not on your tintype girlie-girl.


Shocking statistic

I knew that rent controls have frozen a great deal of New York's housing stock, but I had no idea how much.  From the WSJ:

Today, there are 43,317 apartments where tenants (or their heirs) pay rents first frozen in 1947. There are another 1,043,677 units covered by rent stabilization. All told, about 70% of the city's rental apartments are either rent controlled or rent stabilized.

Every new entrant into the New York rental market is competing for just 30% of the available housing stock.  This explains a lot about New York's rental culture.  Also why so much rental housing is being converted into condos or co-ops.

September 17, 2008

Morgan Stanley and Wachovia

Rumor is they're merging.  I haven't seen such a natural match since Lisa Marie wed Michael Jackson. 

The real question is, who's left for Goldman?  If Morgan Stanley goes, I don't see how Goldman can survive.  But they're kind of running out of commercial banks to woo.  Couldn't Wal-Mart use an investment banking arm?

Open thread on the financial crisis

A reader asks me to let my resident experts discuss the situation, and my resident learners to ask questions.  So here you go:  talk away.

A fool and his money . . .

This is why I don't give investment advice.

Gallows humor

Eddy Elfenbein:

At one point today, the yield on the three-month Treasury bill (^IRX) hit 0.01%!!

One Freakin Bip!!

This means that the risk-free rate is now in direct competition with the underside of your mattress.

Palindrones

Why is Sarah Palin lying about having gone off teleprompter?  People I trust have spoken to people who were there, and if she went off teleprompter, she somehow nonetheless managed to deliver exactly the remarks that she handed out to the press beforehand.

What I don't get about this lie is the pointlessness.  I expect politicians to lie.  But I expect them to tell the standard sort of lies about how they will give us all $5 solar cars by 2010, and never, ever sleep with their staff.  This seems like some sort of bizarre compulsive disorder.

It puts me in mind of a famous quote by a UN chief:  "You Americans never make simple stupid moves.  Only complicated stupid moves that make the rest of us think we might be missing something."

What am I missing?

Honestly, the other guy is the worst candidate ever!

There comes a time in each election cycle when even well-meaning partisans start believing their own press releases.  The campaigns and the grassroots start looking for long past or far-off whiffs of corruption that might somehow be attached to the opposition candidate, policy positions that can be twisted into something that sounds bad, tenuous connections to controversial figures, and slips of the tongue that can be taken out of context and magnified into endorsements of rape, incest, and genocide.  If the candidate is already in office, they aver that a failure to psychically foresee some issue and act upon it were the same thing as gross malfeasance.  They claim to believe that the lies their candidate tells are true, or at least an understandable concession to an easily swayed electorate, while the lies the opposition tells clearly render him unfit for that office.  What's worse, I think they really do believe this.

We have clearly reached that point in this campaign.



I am not prepared to indict people for doing this, as it seems like a nearly universal human instinct.  But neither am I prepared to participate in it.  And I find it irritating when people who are harping on flaws in the opposition candidate that they would easily overlook in their own side demand that I join them in their fantasy world.

Tim Burke chides me for failing to understand that the scandal at the Mineral Management Service raises deep and serious questions about John McCain's qualifications for office. 

Now, as scandals go, this is actually pretty weak tea.  Regulators dating regulatees, employees accepting valuable considerations from firms up to and including Toby Keith tickets, one supervisor who may have sexually harassed two subordinates.  Some of the employees used drugs, which given my ideological bent just makes me applaud them for their rascally courage in flouting an unjust law.  It's not exactly Watergate.  It's not even on the Bush administration's Top Ten.

Nonetheless, I am more than prepared to believe that the Bush administration dropped the ball, and clearly the agency needs to be cleaned up.  Where I draw the line is when people try to claim that because John McCain sits on the Commerce Committee, he could and should have stopped this:

Wow--just the sort of thing that would have called for vigorous Senate oversight during this time. If, say, the chair of one of the committees with jurisdiction over all this didn't uncover it, then you might say that such a person would be unfit for national office. You certainly wouldn't call him a candidate for change. If he was also getting millions from energy companies, you might suspect that any claim to be a change candidate might stink like fish in a newspaper--or even look like lipstick on a pig.

And who was the chair of the Senate Commerce Committee during most of this time, which has jurisdiction over (among other things) pipelines, interstate commerce, and coastal zone management?

You peeked, didn't you?

PS Commerce obviously isn't the only committee with jurisdiction, but the MMS sells oil and gas on the open market. That's an interstate commerce issue if there ever was one. And last I checked, oil goes through pipelines.

This is nonsense on stilts.  The Mineral Management Service was, last time I looked, overseen by the Energy and Natural Resources committee.  Sure, John McCain could have, using his commerce authority, called for an investigation.  So could Barack Obama, as a member of Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.  And why didn't Joe Biden notice?  After all, he's on the drug caucus.

Timothy Burke concedes in the comments to his post that okay, so maybe McCain doesn't actually have anything to do with the Mineral Management Service, but still, it matters, because . . . er . . . he's a Republican:

Is he taking any interest whatsoever in describing an administrative philosophy that will comprehensively break with the previous administration's policies and conduct, which WERE responsible for this scandal? No, he's not. It's not partisan bullshit to say that McCain at present gives every indication that he will govern JUST AS the people responsible for the scandal have. His vice-presidential candidate has governed in exactly that way in her limited time as an executive, using loyalty and sycophancy as her primary standards for selection of administration officials. McCain is the leader of a party that has massive numbers of these kinds of scandals to its name to show for eight years in office. It is anything but routine, banal partisanship to demand that the burden is on him to speak concretely, specifically, and clearly how he will thoroughly break with those practices on every possible level. He needs to describe how he will govern, what kinds of consultative practices he will employ, what his standards for appointment to high office are, and how or if he intends to make thorough executive oversight a part of his expectations for appointees in his administration.

Are you saying, in terms of your last point, that this specific scandal in no way reflects on the leadership of the Department of the Interior, and is in no way similar to other scandals among the Congressional Republicans or elsewhere in the Administration during the past eight years? If so, why do you think this scandal is specifically different? That is a quite specific claim that calls for specific evidence, not a generic wave-off that sometimes corruption isn't the fault of the leadership. To me, this particular scandal very much looks like a lot of the indifference to oversight practices that the present Administration has practically made an official policy commitment.

I don't even understand what most of this is supposed to mean--it reminds me of the startups I used to work for, when every time the company took another big blow, we'd be asked to sit around in a circle and brainstorm mission statements.  

He's running for president, not department chair, and I am not sure what his "consultative practices" are supposed to be, or how he should describe them.  Nor what, specifically, would constitute breaking with prior practices "on every level".  Moreover, I don't think that most people believe that the problem with the Bush administration is too little executive control of the bureaucracy.

John McCain has said, thoroughly and repeatedly, that he thinks Washington is corrupt and run by insiders, and that he wants to change that; he has made it clear that he wants to roll back many of the Bush administration's most odious practices, like its tacit support of torture.  You may not believe him when he says these things, but he has said them.  It is not reasonable to expect him to stand up and deliver a three hour address on how he plans to ensure that the employees of the Mineral Management Service do not use cocaine--other than perhaps cutting their salaries so they can't afford it.

Has Barack Obama issued a statement on how he plans to pick his advisors?  Or shake up the excessive coziness that the Democrats are already eagerly developing with the lobbying apparatus? And if he did, what would we learn from it?  It's like those questions in interviews about what your biggest weakness is--you can expect something anodyne and thoroughly, monotonously typical.

But here's the challenge that I issue to Burke, Jonathan Zasloff, the defenders of John McCain's sex-ed ad, and other partisans who purport to be thoroughly and honestly outraged by the behavior they are discussing.

As we go through the rest of this campaign, every time one of these pseudoscandals comes up, I will note the particulars.  From now on, I will watch the news cycle for the inevitable misstatements, scandals, and lies.  And you will agree that if anything similar happens on your candidate's watch, you will repudiate him.  So if there is, say, a scandal at the Department of the Interior under President Obama*, you will not only promise to vote Republican, but urge your readers in good faith to do the same.  Similarly, if John McCain calls his wife more names in public, Republicans will vote Democratic, because after all, that's what they expect voters to do over Sarah Palin and the lipstick comment.

Of course, pseudoscandals are rarely exactly equivalent, so I will put close calls up to Julian Sanchez and Jim Henley, who I think Democrats and Republicans can both agree are not on their side.

Perhaps you will say that one scandal is not enough; it is the weight of the evidence.  Fine.  We'll set up a point total of all the pseudoscandals currently outstanding; when your candidate passes that, you vote for the other side.  That is no more than you are asking swing voters do to right now.  Hell, we can double the point total, to allow for your sheer hatred of the other candidate.

If you aren't willing to take this deal, then I have a hard time taking your protestations seriously.  I don't fault partisans for doing this, because it works.  But it doesn't work on me.


Megan's sixth law of politics:  there is always a scandal at the Department of the Interior

What does it all mean?

Last night after my AIG posts I ducked out to a Reason Happy Hour.  Naturally, everyone wanted to know what this would mean for the markets.  With my crack talent for prognostication, I said, "Well, they will go up.  Or they will go down.  Though it's possible they might stay the same."

Is the Fed's move reassuring, because AIG is not going to wind its $100 zillion worth of trades?  Or frightening, because what the hell kind of shape is the financial system in if the Fed is taking over insurance companies?

Damned if I know.  But the markets seem a little unsettled . . . down 140 points as of this writing.  Not catastrophic.  But certainly not good.

September 16, 2008

Dealbreaker has the latest on AIG

Here:

Part of the deal requires that existing management be fired, according to CNBC. They'll be replaced by the Turnaround Team of Chuck Prince, Stan O'Neal, and Jimmy Cayne, who are all currently living together and can thus use the carpool lane.

Here's a brain buster for you, that I'm mostly asking of the AIG inner sanctum members joining us this evening but anyone can feel free to answer-- when they were sitting around making the decision to say "thanks but we're good" to PE, who did they think was going to come along with a more desirable alternative to the shit that's gone down tonight? Really, who or what gave them the confidence to say "we're holding out for something better," besides a severe blow to the head?


How dare the Fed buy AIG?

A lawyer friend IMs "I would be fascinated to know on what authority the Fed is claiming the right to do this."  It's probable that they don't actually have the legal right to do anything like this.  Their authority is this:  who's going to stop them?  No one wants to take on responsibility for this mess themselves.

The Fed bails out AIG

I'm speechless.  The Fed just basically bought AIG:

In an extraordinary turn, the Federal Reserve agreed Tuesday night to take a nearly 80 percent stake in the troubled giant insurance company, the American International Group, in exchange for an $85 billion loan.

The Federal Reserve and Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan Chase had been trying to arrange a $75 billion loan for the company to stave off the financial crisis caused by complex debt securities and credit default swaps. The Federal Reserve stepped in after it became clear Tuesday afternoon that the banking consortium would not be able to complete the deal.

Without the help, A.I.G. was expected to be forced to file for bankruptcy protection.

This is the Hail Mary Pass of the end game.  The Fed can't keep jamming bad debt into its portfolio indefinitely.

On an amusing note, this gives whole new meaning to the words "social insurance".

McCain bucks for a commission

So John McCain wants a commission on what to do about the financial markets.  I'm of two minds on this.  On the one hand, John McCain is not exactly an economic genius, and I'd rather he get the opinion of some people who are.  On the other hand, in Washingtonian, "set up a commission" means "Let's ignore the problem and hope it goes away."  This one isn't going away.

Here's my modest suggestion:  John McCain could convene a commission right now.  He could get a bunch of economists and bankers together, and they could hash out the problem and present him with a plan.  Then he could tell us what it is.  Then we could decide if we liked it.  It would be almost like this election was about selecting someone who will make good policy.

Reserve Primary Money Fund "breaks the buck"

Reserve Primary Fund, the firm that basically invented the idea of a money market fund back in 1970 just saw its shares fall below $1 a share, which is about as close as money market funds get to going bust.  This is the first time this has happened to a money market fund in fifteen years.  The firm had almost $800 million in Lehman notes and commercial paper, now valued at $0.  Money market funds borrow short and lend long (relatively speaking); once investors noticed all that toxic paper, things went south rapidly.  This is only the second money market fund in US history to break the buck, which tells you just how worried you should be about the contagion of this mess.

Hindsight regulation

Andrew writes:

So no responsibility for not recognizing the problem and not doing anythng about it for almost eight years? I'm not an expert but blaming the current meltdown entirely on ... Clinton seems a stretch to me.

But I don't blame it on Clinton.  I think that the regulatory steps taken under the Clinton administration were entirely appropriate.  To put it more boldly, I don't think that this represents a failure of prospective regulation.

I hope that this will result in deep changes to our regulatory system, starting with unifying the diverse bank regulatory body, and giving them a stronger mandate to watch systemic risk like a hawk.  I hope the GSEs will be broken up, stripped of their government guarantee, and regulated like other companies that do the same thing.  I hope the central bank will pay more attention to inflation, and less to unemployment.

But that is retrospective.  What can I say that Bush, or Clinton, or anyone else, should have done, knowing what they did at the time?  I can demand that they be omniscient, but since I'm not willing to hold myself to that standard (nor, I expect, is Andrew), that hardly seems fair.

There are a couple of problems that I don't have answers to yet:

  • Should the Fed watch asset price bubbles?  It's obviously tempting to give a glib yes, but there are deep problems with this.  The Fed already has a lot on its plate; adding asset prices would vastly multiply the complexity.  And it's not clear we'd be happy with the results.  If the Fed is too conservative, it will tamp down growth prophylactically.  I'm not confident that regulators can correctly identify the moment that we enter an asset price bubble.  And asset price bubbles are really, really hard to pop.  I refer you to John Kenneth Galbraith's description of the government's attempts to shut down the 1929 boom.
  • How should the Federal Reserve have dealt with the river of money flowing into American markets from central banks and savers abroad?  This was the primary culprit in the credit expansion, not the Fed--indeed, that's why the yield curve got so funny looking at the end.
  • What standards should we use for evaluating derivatives?  Derivatives don't just create risk; they can also lower it, by allowing firms to hedge.  When Robert Shiller tells me that overall they're a good thing for the financial system, I'm inclined to listen.
  • Is mark-to-market accounting a good idea?  A lot of the problem can be traced to the practice of marking all assets to market value at the end of the day.  This has advantages, in that it gives investors a better idea of the breakup value of the firm.  But it can also touch off downward spirals--they open up balance sheet holes that create ratings downgrades and force asset sales, which further depresses the value of those assets and opens up similar holes at other firms.
Then there are things that I think would have helped, but cannot see where the political will would have come from:

  • Keep Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac out of risky mortgages, and give OFHEO some teeth. Bush and several Republicans tried, and failed, to do this.  My preferred solution, an explicit strip of the government guarantee and a supervised breakup, wouldn't even have gotten on the radar.  Fannie and Freddie were politically powerful, as were voters who wanted to buy houses.
  • Regulate mortgage brokers at the federal level.  Given the way mortgage funds now flow across state lines, this made sense.  But the state governors would have screamed bloody murder.  Moreover, no one knew about the fraud when it would have helped--i.e., before most of it happened.
  • Mandate 20% down payments.  Political suicide.  Affluent people would continue to borrow downpayments in private family loans, while the poor were shut out of the housing market.  Poor neighborhoods would have been devastated by the credit cutoff.  House prices would have dropped sharply everywhere.
  • Change regulatory standards to take more account of small-probability, devastating systemic risk.  Nassim Taleb has been talking about this for the last few years.  But I didn't hear more than academic interest in this until mid-2007.  Most people on the Street really believed that they had gotten better at assessing credit risk.
  • Unify the bank regulators, including the SEC, into one agency.  At least some of this crisis might be traced to the fact that the regional banks who originated many of the bad loans were often regulated by a different body from the investment banks who bought them.  It might have been done, I suppose.  But each of those agencies has powerful constituencies among their employees, and the firms they regulate.  Moreover, the transition process would have involved some ugly internicene warfare that probably would have eroded regulatory effectiveness in the short run.
  • Mandate contingency plans for the dissolution of large firms, and other unlikely but devastating scenarios.  If people had some certainty about the likely outcome of an insolvency, the panic selling wouldn't be so rampant, and people would be more willing to loan money, albeit at a discount.  But again, I didn't hear anyone talking about this in, say, 2006.  I certainly didn't think of it.  Is it reasonable to say that this should have been utmost on the mind of Bush or his advisors, while other big priorities, like trade deals, loomed large?
  • Make subprime loans illegal.  As long as most subprime borrowers are still making their payments, I can't endorse cutting them off to protect the fools.  Moreover, this would simply not have been possible, no matter who controlled congress or the presidency.  Cutting off subprime loans would have prevented more people from buying homes.  The politics of it are terrible.
  • Make option ARMs or negative amortization loans illegal.  Option ARMs are debateable-they're actually useful for people who have uneven income flows, like, er, a lot of journalists.  But clearly they were abused, and negative amortization loans are nuts.  However, these exotic instruments are only a fraction of the toxic subprime loans.  They appeared mostly late in the process, when lenders were scraping the bottom of the barrel to keep the boom going.
  • Change the way that these securities were accounted for.  Most risk models for ABS and MBS were focused on prepayment risk, not default risk, which was assumed to be fairly well known.  This assumes a rather stunning level of prescience on the part of regulators or legislators.
  • Force banks to keep some amount, say 10% of the loans they originated.  Spain does this, and its housing market is even more bubbleicious than ours was, believe it or not.  It might have made the banks more secure.  But there are good reasons to want banks, especially small banks, to have the flexibility to match the durations of their asset portfolios to those of their liabilities.  When interest rates skyrocketed in the early eighties, banks were stuck with long-term mortgages at low rates, but forced to offer high interest rates on savings accounts in order to keep business. The result was, ultimately, the S&L crisis.  And again, while there may have been someone proposing this somewhere, I didn't see a lot of people talking about it in 2003, when it really might have helped.
Then there are the things that people think would have helped, but which wouldn't have done anything I can see:

  • Repealing Gramm-Leach-Bliley, or at least the provisions that repealed Glass-Steagall's ban on commercial banks entering other lines of financial business.  If this were part of the problem, it would be the commercial banks, not the investment banks, that were in trouble.
  • Lowering CEO pay.  Whaaaaaa?  If Dick Fuld had been paid a dollar a year, we'd be in exactly the same mess.  Probably worse, because what kind of CEO do you get for a dollar a year?
  • Raising the Fed Funds rate  The MBS money was long money, not overnight funds.  And when a bubble is truly going, raising rates may just attract more long money, without deterring speculators who are expecting double-digit annual returns. 
  • Requiring better disclosure of loan terms  Disclosure of loan terms is already quite exhaustive, including a term sheet right on top that provides a congressionally mandated summary.  You can't make people read things, and the extra disclosure you mandate goes into the "fine print" that people claim they can't read.  Moreover, the fundamental problem for most borrowers are things that aren't hard for buyers to understand, like "I have an adjustable rate mortgage"; "Interest rates can go up"; and "My housing payment should not be two-thirds of my gross income". 
  • Changed the neo-liberal "culture"  The president and congress are not the parents of Wall Street, and believe me, bankers do not look towards Washington for moral guidance.  The "Miasma Theory" of political influence is the last refuge of partisans who know they are full of it.
There are more, but considering all this nonsense is frankly exhausting.

The point is, given what they could reasonably have known then, did regulators act unreasonably?  Did legislators ignore politically feasible policy options?  I don't see it.

But if you are looking to place regulatory blame, whatever changes you'd care to point to happened on Clinton's watch, not Bush's.  You cannot have it both ways--hailing the Clinton genius at economic management (and implying that Obama will bring back those halcyon days), and then claiming that Bush should have trailed around undoing all his work.  You most certainly cannot explicitly claim, as Obama did in his speech, that this crisis is the result of the Bush administration's deregulation of the financial markets:

The challenges facing our financial system today are more evidence that too many folks in Washington and on Wall Street weren't minding the store. Eight years of policies that have shredded consumer protections, loosened oversight and regulation, and encouraged outsized bonuses to CEOs while ignoring middle-class Americans have brought us to the most serious financial crisis since the Great Depression.

This is flat out untrue.  And I know that Barack Obama is smart, and well-informed, enough to know it.

Update:  I should note another thing regulators could have done, which is required more reserves.  It's hard to do this when banks are in trouble, since if they had a lot of cash, they wouldn't be in trouble.  But while it's now clear that we should do so going forward, I'm hard pressed to say that I could have predicted it then.  One reason debt-to-equity ratios are so high now is that toxic securities have caused balance sheets to collapse.  Moreover, while this would have let the Fed off the hook, somewhat, it's hard to see how lower debt-to-equity ratios could actually have prevented most of this.  As far as I can tell, the scale of the collapse is so epic that unless regulators were willing to really make the banks radically delever (remembering that the resulting credit contraction would have had negative economic effects--the ones we're seeing now), it still would have taken down a lot of firms.

New York, New York

This crisis is the first time that I fully realized, emotionally, that I am no longer a New Yorker.  The city of my birth is in crisis, and I am far away, surrounded by people whose company can't go out of business.

But my father was down this weekend, and over breakfast this morning he pointed out that New York City may be in big trouble.  The anchor of New York's financial community is the independent investment banks that are all headquartered there.  If their corporate center of gravity starts shifting towards Charlotte and London, will other firms begin to question whether it makes sense to pay $50 per square foot just for the privilege of being in Manhattan?

That would crush New York's renaissance like a bug.  All of New York's rebound has been paid for by the taxes on the financial industry--a few hundred thousand people in the industry pay the lion's share of the taxes for the entire city.  Take them away, and the city will rapidly lurch back towards bankruptcy.

Of course, that's not the sort of thing that happens overnight.  But the City and State of New York are remarkably business-unfriendly places; they usually end up ranked at the very bottom of the league tables in terms of the ease of doing business there.  That isn't just taxes, though that's part of it, but the massive, overgrown regulatory apparatus that can be perilous and expensive to negotiate.  New York can afford to have things like a gold-plated Medicaid program, laws that tilt negotiations overwhelming in favor of public service unions during negotiations, and an outrageously expensive workman's comp system.  The financial system just throws off so much money--and it's very good at dealing with regulators.

If the Golden Goose goes away, downstate may start looking like upstate.  Western New York is trapped in a downward economic spiral where the affluent leave, and the needy, who are now a higher percentage of the electorate, vote themselves even more programs, the burden of which chases out still more affluent people, and the businesses that employ them.

If AIG fails, what happens to my policy?

This is the question on the minds of some commenters, some emailers, and a lot of people who don't read this blog, including a friend's father.

The answer is that most of you can relax.  Your insurance policy and/or annuity will probably be fine.

The part of AIG that is insolvent is a holding company, which owns a bunch of subsidiaries--approximately one squillion at last count.  The subsidiaries issue your life insurance policy, or the annuity you purchased for retirement.  Those subsidiaries are mostly regulated by the states, which ensure that they have adequate capital to pay off their claims.  That capital can't be tapped by the parent--though the State of New York, for some reason that I cannot fathom, is apparently prepared to let AIG take out a $20 billion loan from its New York subsidiary.

Of course, with markets in the state they're in, you may be asking yourself how long that capital will remain adequate.  The good news is that each state has a guaranty company, which pays off the claims of insolvent insurance firms, at least up to a cap.  That cap varies by state, but in no state is it lower than $100,000.  Check your policy to find out what state it was issued in (I'm told it's not necessarily the state you live in, particularly if it's an annuity), and use google to find out what the guaranty cap is. 

People with insurance policies or annuities with AIG can redeem those policies for the cash value of the policy, either with the company or with the guaranty institution.  If I had my homeowner's insurance with AIG, I'd probably bite the bullet and buy a new policy elsewhere; ditto some massive asset.  But in general, unless you're insured/annuitized for a huge amount and planning to die/retire in the next few months, don't worry.  With the exception of wealthy folks who bought gigantic policies, you should be able to get at least most of your money back out.

Rethinking regulation

A couple of people have asked me to expand on what I said yesterday about the parallels between financial products and other sorts of new technologies.

America's regulatory structure is mostly the child of the Progressive Era, when well meaning, well educated protestants thought that they could save the world by putting bright technocrats from the right kind of families in charge of the messy, sprawling economy and make it clean and tidy and safe.  That sounds sarcastic, but it wasn't entirely unreasonable. The first great victory of the Progressive Era, the major revolutions in public health, did just that:  made life safer and nicer for everyone, with minimal inconvenience, by putting experts in charge of things like sanitation and quarantine and the water supply.  Before Hayek, we didn't have all that much reason to think that this feat couldn't be repeated elsewhere.

But now we have had Hayek, and the failure of the Soviet Union, and a hundred other ways to learn that in any sizeable economy, the information problem is simply too big.  Even leaving out the various incentive problems ably detailed by both Marxists and public choice economics, a well-intentioned bureaucrat cannot know enough about what's going on in the world to thoroughly manage even a static economy, much less one that has to cope with millions of constant changes, from hurricanes to new babies.

Yet our regulatory model still works on the assumption that the technocrats can figure out what is safe, and then let the public buy it, and nothing will ever go wrong.  Oh, maybe it's not working that way right now . . . but that's because the other party is in charge.  Or the regulators got corrupted.  Or the Moon was in Taurus while Saturn was in Capricorn, a constellation that will not recur for another seven thousand years.

It's perhaps easiest to see when you look at the FDA rather than the SEC.  The very early purpose of the FDA was to ensure that the label correctly described the contents of the package, a noble purpose entirely proper to any regulatory agency.  Under FDR, it took on the job of ensuring the safety of products and prevent false therapeutic claims.   Over time, this has grown into the agency we now know: the one that forces companies to go through three stages of trial for every drug.  Stage I is small-scale and mostly ensures that the substance isn't horribly toxic; Stage II looks at safety and efficacy; and Stage III are large-scale trials comparing the drug to either placebo, or the standard treatment.  After these three stages, the high priests of the FDA retreat into their sanctum and eventually emerge to give the thumbs up or thumbs down.

This is simultaneously too much and too little.  The FDA is notoriously risk averse when it comes to new drugs, a legacy of events like the Thalidomide horrors, when pointless foot-dragging on the approval accidentally protected American mothers from limbless babies.  So drugs that could help people don't reach the market, either because the testing is too expensive for small market drugs, or because the FDA erred on the side of caution.  At the very least, it delays possibly life-saving advances.

But once a drug is approved, the FDA doesn't require follow-up studies.  These are mostly done by the companies, which have incentive to bury the ones that show their product is horse puckey.

It seems to me that the FDA should put much less energy into preventing drugs from reaching the market, and vastly more energy into assessing them after they have.  Moreover, though it may sound un-libertarian, I'm not clear why the companies are in charge of the drug testing.  This seems like the sort of thing the government should do; the government is the one with the neutral incentives.

If we looked at the FDA more like a neutral broker, a source of authoritative and up-to-date information on the food and drugs out there, I think we'd be much better off.  But instead, we've turned them into the Drug Nannies.

Similarly, the SEC, indeed the entire financial regulatory apparatus, revolves around writing rules, and then making sure that companies live up to them.  Some of those rules, like financial statement filings, enhance transparency.  But many others jealously guard the perogatives of the SEC and its minions--the safe harbor provisions for the three big regulatory agencies, for example, which lets the SEC control the definition of what a good, safe security is.  From what I understand, one of the reasons that so many at the SEC opposed GLB was that merging investment banks with commercial banks meant handing over some of their regulatory power to the agencies that oversaw the commercial sector.

But among America's artificially fragmented grab-bag of agencies, a leftover from the 30's notion that bank panics would be prevented if we just kept the banks small and manageable, no one had both the authority and the apparatus to oversee systemic risk.  The Fed has stepped into this vacuum with Treasury close behind, and in my opinion they're doing a pretty good job on the fly.  But this isn't the sort of thing that should be done on the fly. 

I would much rather see America's regulators do what government is really good at:  transparency and coordination.  Providing as much detailed information about firms, securities, and markets as they can, particularly in assessing systemic risks.  Serving as a locus, with muscle if necessary, to help multifold private actors create institutions that reduce risk.  Delineating and carrying through the procedures for dealing with the inevitable failures.

That last is really, really important.  Most people don't seem to have noticed that commercial banks have been failing too.  They haven't noticed because the FDIC does an outstanding job of overseeing the disposition of insolvent banks.  They have a process, everyone knows what it is, and they are swift and efficient at carrying it out.   But we can't build that kind of process unless we're willing to admit that despite our best efforts, failures will happen.

Now that's synergy

Lehman London real estate insured by AIG.

Memewatch

Meanwhile, I'm seeing commenters claim that the housing crisis is really all about the Democrats making lenders lend money to poor people.

The data doesn't track you.  The legislative pushes to expand lending to the poor do not match very well the subprime crisis, either in time or scope.  Probably they contributed somewhat, but at best only slightly.

It would be nice if everything that went wrong in the world was a result of the scheming of our ideological opponents.  But the sad fact is, stuff goes wrong.  All the time.  And there is usually no villain behind it.

D'oh

I've been troubleshooting my internet connection, wondering why it was so slow.  I suddenly realized it's because I'm mostly doing things like going to AIG's website to check for updates.

Gallows humor

Top 5 Lehman brothers souvenirs.

What should Bush have done

There are a whole lot of Democrats in the comments to this post who know that Bush could have and should have stopped this bubble.  They don't know what he could have done, exactly; they're not tricksy bankers.  But they've read, like, one and a half whole articles on the subject, so they're sure that this is the fault of Republican ideology.

I'm so glad that I'm voting with the reality based community this time around.

I interrupt this post to note that thanks to Bill Clinton, millions of people have died of cancer in the last ten years.  It seems to me that if he cared, he could have funded research that would have cured cancer.  What research?  I don't know, I'm not a damn doctor.  All I know is, a lot of people are dying of cancer.

Now back to our regularly scheduled programming.

One of my commenters blames Bush for gutting the predatory lending laws at the state level.  A wicked pundit would note that this is a project near and dear to the heart of one Senator Joe Biden, (D-MBNA).  A less divisive voice would point out that predatory lending laws are aimed mostly at payday loans and credit cards, not housing loans.  The fraud problems in the housing market seem mostly to have been perpetuated by mortgage brokers, who are still regulated at the state level.  The worst problems are in Democratic-dominated California.

Another comment is such a treasure that I must reproduce it in its entirety:

I disagree strongly with McCardle on this one. In the run up to being admitted as an attorney, I spent one summer at the SEC's division of Market Regulation under Donaldson. I was shocked and appalled at the excessive coddling of industry that was standard operating procedure and consequently chose not to return after law school. And as disturbing as practices were then under Chairman Donaldson, an industry insider appointed by Bush, the situation deteriorated even further after he was pushed out in favor of the ham-handed Republican ex-congressman Cox. The ideology of achieving "small government" by reducing or eliminating regulatory oversight is a pandemic throughout Washington and state government. The current meltdown is a direct consequence of the lack of oversight combined with the effect of Gramm Leach Bliley stripping all remaining profitability out of the basic business of banking, leaving only leveraged speculation as a possible source of income. Much the same can be said about lack of oversight causing the run of crude from $60 to $147 under Wendy Gramm's CFTC -- a surge inexplicable in terms of supply and demand fundamentals but entirely accounted for by the combination of 1) oil traders taking control of Cushing oil storage facilities 2) the subsequent reporting of false inventories 3) profiteering from highly leveraged positions 4) a complete lack of transparency into speculation via massive swap positions with investment banks and 5) an influx of highly leveraged momentum investors.

Of course the best part of all of this is that the cash (please recall all those budget surpluses under Clinton) that might have used to bail us out of this mess has been more than entirely squandered on or embezzled via the the occupation of Iraq. But lacking the funds to manage an orderly resolution of the mess, the entire country will suffer through a prolonged and uncertain period of reduced economic growth (or recession), currency depreciation and attendant inflation, diminished foreign investment, individual anxiety arising from lack of confidence in banks and the FDIC, and depleted international prestige. These effects aren't the consequence of "the invisible hand" they are the consequence of a philosophy of government that derives from the elegant yet fictional universes crafted by the likes of Ayn Rand, Milton Friedman, Myron Scholes, and Robert Merton rather from the reality that the rest of us live in.

I infer that you're proud of your Chicago MBA, but Megan, the paper is worth more as kindling.

This is a first class example of what I like to call "Supertwaddle":  thoroughgoing nonsense wrapped up in just enough technical knowledge to be more thoroughly, amusingly wrong than the ordinary twaddle you buy at your local drugstore or neighborhood bar.  Sadly, it often sounds very convincing to people who a) have no idea what any of the jargon means and b) badly wish to believe the twaddler.

We start by asking what beefier SEC enforcement was supposed to do to portfolios and banks that were in full legal compliance with the SEC rules until the subprime market collapsed.  Aside from standing there with their superdetective tweezers and magnifying glass in hand, clicking their tongues and saying, "That looks like it might be infected.  You should get it looked at."

As an aside, we point out that the more lightly regulated hedge fund industry is weathering this storm better than the more heavily regulated banks.

Then we move on to Gramm-Leach-Bliley, bugbear of Glass-Steagall nostalgists everywhere.  We first observe that GLB passed under the Clinton Administration.  We second note that it passed in 1999, too late to have had any effect on the stock market bubble.

Then we pass into la-la-land, where we try to figure out which of the provisions of Gramm-Leach-Bliley created any of the major contributing factors to the current crisis:

  • Steadily rising prices in the housing market
  • A flood of foreign capital flowing into US debt markets
  • A conviction among ordinary Americans that housing purchases were an easy, and possibly even quick, way to get rich
  • A 20 year government committment to ever-expanding homeownership
  • A global shift towards increasingly exotic financial instruments for pricing and distributing risk
  • Resistance in the Democratic controlled Senate to the Bush administration's 2003 attempt to put some teeth in OFHEO (which regulated Fannie and Freddie)
  • Lunatic bankers who confused beta with alpha.
It didn't even do the one specific assertion he makes, which is that it made ordinary banking unprofitable; that took place earlier in the 1990s, and had to do, as far as I know, with two unrelated factors:  internet competition for trading commissions, and the rise of Regulation FD, which made it basically impossible to make money off your market research division.

Even more bizarre is his contention about oil.  Oil is a fungible commodity priced on world markets.  Local regulations have at best extraordinarily trivial effects on its price, unless your government controls a very large source of supply; the traders simply take their business to another exchange.  Even the Arab oil embargo of the United States had basically no effect on US prices.

My Chicago MBA may not have taught me everything, but somewhere along the way I did learn not to opine on legal matters based on my one summer as a paralegal.

Brooksfoe, ordinarily one of my favorite commenters, admits he doesn't know enough about finance to get specific, but he's nonetheless very sure that the Bush administration could have stopped this in his tracks.  As evidence, he points out that there have been analysts urging Bush to do just that.

Okay, let's explore this.  What those people were talking about, by and large, was the easy credit provided by the central bank, over which Bush has no direct control.  During both speculative booms, there were people who thought that the markets were in a bubble, and that Greenspan/Bernanke should have acted to shut it down.  But prior to the actual crashes, those people were in a minority.  The considered opinion of Robert Shiller, probably the greatest living expert on bubbles (and a Democrat) is that any Fed or regulatory action would have had at best marginal effect on the housing bubble--or at least so he told me when I interviewed him. 

The problem is that we think we know what to do to pop bubbles.  What we know how to do is to make it very, very difficult to borrow money. (The reason I say we think we know is that when foreign capital is involved, it gets complicated--the Fed raised interest rates on margin loans in 1929, but that just attracted more lenders).  The problem is, if you do this whenever you might be in a bubble, you will throw a lot of people out of work unnecessarily.  And if you wait until it's clear you are in a bubble, you will have to raise interest rates high enough to throw really a lot of people out of work.

At that it might not have worked; there was so much long term capital flowing into the US from abroad, eager to lend to Americans, that it might have required shutting the economy down to reverse the flood.  Arguably, our budget deficits actually helped the problem by soaking up some of that excess capital.

At the Federal level, we might have forbidden securitization, or more exotic instruments.  But this wasn't even on peoples' radar before the subprime market went sour.  The bank regulators could probably have done something to tighten lending standards, but this would have amounted to saying "Don't lend money to poor people".  A Democratic congress saying "don't lend money to poor people".  

Obviously, in hindsight we wish we had done this.  And in hindsight, I wish I'd played the winners at the track last weekend.  The things that might have worked were not among the solutions that were being proposed at the time. The only thing a Democrat could obviously have done differently, other than dial the psychic friends' network for economic advice, was appointed a more hawkish Federal Reserve Chair--one who was willing to tolerate higher unemployment in return for lower inflation.  That's exactly the opposite of normal Democratic policy direction.

Democrats seem unable, or unwilling to grasp, that to the extent that this is a regulatory problem, the seeds were laid under Clinton, not Bush.  There simply haven't been any significant financial regulatory changes over the last eight years that we can point to as the culprit; nor does "stronger enforcement" work as the solution to a crisis when the companies in trouble seem to have been in full compliance with the law.

And these are the good comments.  The rest are ordinary twaddle--and not even good twaddle.  Stale twaddle that's been sitting around on the back of the shelf for six months.




September 15, 2008

The story of life

This hilariously bad 1946 Disney film titled--I'm not making this up--"The Story of Menstruation" reminds me of my mother's description of sex-ed in the 1950s.  As she came out, she turned to the girl who had been sitting next to her and said "I understand everything except one thing.  How does the sperm get to the egg?"

Anyway, hopefully this will take your mind off your market worries.  I know it did wonders for my morale.

Obama goes for the jungular

Obama is seeking to blame the current crisis on the Bush Administration:

I certainly don't fault Senator McCain for these problems, but I do fault the economic philosophy he subscribes to. It's a philosophy we've had for the last eight years - one that says we should give more and more to those with the most and hope that prosperity trickles down to everyone else. It's a philosophy that says even common-sense regulations are unnecessary and unwise, and one that says we should just stick our heads in the sand and ignore economic problems until they spiral into crises.

Well now, instead of prosperity trickling down, the pain has trickled up - from the struggles of hardworking Americans on Main Street to the largest firms of Wall Street.

This country can't afford another four years of this failed philosophy. For years, I have consistently called for modernizing the rules of the road to suit a 21st century market - rules that would protect American investors and consumers. And I've called for policies that grow our economy and our middle-class together. That is the change I am calling for in this campaign, and that is the change I will bring as President.

This is high-test hooey.  This was not some criminal activity that the Bush administration should have been investigating more thoroughly; it was a thorough, massive, systemic mispricing of the risk attendant on lending to people with bad credit.  (These are, mind you, the same people that five years ago the Democrats wanted to help enjoy the many booms of homeownership.) Lehman, Bear, Merrill and so forth did not sneakily lend these people money in the hope of putting one over on the American taxpayer while ruining their shareholders and getting the senior executives fired.  They got it wrong.  Badly wrong.  So did everyone else.

What, specifically, should the Bush administration have done, Senator?  Don't tell me they should have beefed up SEC enforcement, since this is not a criminal problem (aside from minor lies by Bear execs after the damage was already done).   Perhaps he should not have reappointed Greenspan, or appointed Ben Bernanke?  Both moves were widely hailed at the time.  Moreover, to believe that a Democrat could have done better is to assert that a Democratic president would have found a Fed chair who would pay less attention to unemployment, or a bank regulator who would have tried harder to prevent low-income people from buying homes.  Where is this noble creature?  And why didn't Barack Obama push for him at the time?

Indeed, I ask the Senator to name one significant thing that Bush has done to create this crisis that couldn't also be laid at the feet of St. William of Little Rock.  If Democratic policy is so good at protecting the little guy from asset price bubbles, how come the stock market crashed in 2000?

This kind of foolish grandstanding is not the change we need.  It's just more of the same.

Lehman files for bankruptcy

It is done:  today, Lehman Brothers filed the largest bankruptcy petition ever with the US Bankruptcy Court.  Hank Paulson is drawing a line in the sand.  In the long run, this will be a good thing, for two reasons:  if Lehman winds up in a relatively orderly fashion, it will prove to the market that it can survive a big insolvency.  And it's a clear, strong signal to markets that they shouldn't expect the feds to protect them from counterparty risk.

In the meantime, what a mess:

Regulators and others were preparing for a hectic Monday. The New York Stock Exchange prepared contingency plans over the weekend to reassign the approximately 200 blue-chip stocks that Lehman's specialist unit trades, according to people familiar with the matter. If Lehman is forced into liquidation, the exchange will likely transfer the stocks to one or more of the remaining specialist firms, most likely using the same technology and staff that currently trade the stocks.

Dozens of Wall Street desks have trades with Lehman. As word spread that the Barclays deal was falling apart, worries that the company could be thrown into bankruptcy mounted, and traders labored to get out of those contracts.

At approximately 2:30 p.m., government officials hosted a call, and a trading session was opened to ease fears. One trader said it was agreed that other brokers would pick up contracts that trading desks have with Lehman. If Lehman does open on Monday, the deals struck on Sunday, often at a worse price, would be void. "It is utter chaos here," the trader said.

At many Wall Street firms, traders of credit-default swaps -- contracts that act as insurance against debt defaults -- were told to come to work immediately. Concerned investors were rushing to buy swaps tied to other brokerages and corporations, sending the cost of protection on investment banks such as Goldman Sachs and others sharply higher.

In a statement Sunday, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, a trade group whose members include many large dealers, said a "netting trading session" took place between 2 p.m. and 6 p.m. on Sunday. The idea was to allow firms to try to unwind their derivatives transactions with Lehman by finding other parties to step into Lehman's shoes.

"The purpose of this session is to reduce risk associated with a potential Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. bankruptcy filing," it said. It added that trades conducted during this period "are contingent on a bankruptcy filing on or before 11:59 p.m. New York time" on Sunday. If no filing takes place, the trades will be canceled, ISDA said.

As it happens, I was on a panel about new technology regulation this morning.  This crisis can be seen as a failure to adequately regulate new financial products that came out of the revolution in financial theory that took place in the late 20th century.  One of the main problems, I think, is that regulators became obsessed with certifying things as safe.  The agency was supposed to check them out, make sure they were safe, and then approve or disapprove. Thus we hoped to make life in America as safe as a whiffle ball game.

But it is not possible to make things perfectly safe, not least an enormously complicated financial system like ours.  But having declared things safe based on the verdicts of 3 government approved rating agencies, we didn't put much focus on how to wind things up if they failed.  The FDIC has a very smooth system for handling the liquidation of commercial banks, and as a result, no one panics.  We should have been thinking about something similar for investment banks.

We need to shift our focus on regulation from a fruitless search for 100% safety to accepting risk, and trying to make the markets more robust to withstand it.  The government should encourage, rather than discourage, multiple sources of information and analysis.  It should pay more attention to outlying risks.  And it should have systems in place to wind down the inevitable failures, rather than letting the outcome depend on how Hank Paulson is feeling this morning.




Heard on the street

Asked how Lazard was weathering the storm, a banker there replied that they'd probably be fine  "because we don't really have a balance sheet to put at risk".

Should the Fed start bailing out insurers?

So AIG is applying to the Federal Reserve for bridge financing to allow it to enter a restructuring deal with KKR.  AIG got itself into big trouble writing credit default swaps for the mortgage market, and is now facing massive losses on Hurricane Ike.  That the Fed is even considering the move shows just how much the lines between different types of financial firms have blurred in this brave new world of novel financial instruments and megamergers.

Ben Bernanke is in a tough place.  Opening the loan facilities to the insurance business will further strain a loan portfolio already crammed full of risk--just as the Fed has announced that it will start accepting equity as collateral.  But if AIG doesn't restructure, it may have to start dumping its massive asset portfolio.  This, of course, will further erode the value of the securities held by solvent banks, meaning that more of them will likely show up at the Fed's discount window with their beggar's bowls out.

This is where I'm supposed to end with a snappy, sure summation of what the Fed should do.  But all I know right now is that I'm sure glad I don't have Ben Bernanke's job.

All a-twitter about the crisis

From a senior who majored in English:

"Is it wrong to feel schadenfreude about my classmates who majored in Economics to get "safe" jobs at Lehman and Merrill Lynch?"

I heard about it second hand, so I'm paraphrasing, but this gave me hope for America's youth.

The personal is political

I still remember quite vividly recruiting season in my first year of business school.  The herd of MBAs, now almost ready for market, being prodded stolidly from pen to pen, where people a few years out of Chicago themselves smugly asked us to walk them through our resumes, and examined our teeth quizzed us on our knowledge about securities.  Some inexplicably contrary instinct had led me to pursue summer positions in investment banking, a job whose extreme detail orientation, relentless focus on money, and status-obsessed culture was almost, but not quite, exactly wrong for me.

Nonetheless, I moved through the system with the rest of them.  First interviews on campus.  Second interviews in hotel rooms downtown, where I tried to chat gaily about asset backed securities while pretending that I was not perched uncomfortably on a king bed with two strange men staring at me.  If we were lucky, we were flown to New York for third rounds.  The prestige banks were the independents:  Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley at top, then Merrill Lynch, then CS First Boston, Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Salomon Smith Barney.  JP Morgan after them.  Working for a commercial bank's investment banking arm was strictly the booby prize.

My worst interview was at CS First Boston, where an interviewer inexplicably asked me why I was not applying to Bear Stearns.  Flummoxed by the bizarre interest, I stammered and told the truth, which was that they had a bad reputation with women.  You may already have guessed that that interviewer had just moved to Bear Stearns from First Boston; he spent the rest of the interview grilling me about bridge (I had played, badly, in college) and asking me questions about the markets that would have been appropriate if I had been interviewing for a trading position, which I wasn't, but which weren't inside the domain of knowledge potential investment bankers were expected to know.  At one point he asked me where the long bond had closed the night before, which I happened to know from the news that morning.

"6.37*", I said.

He glared at me.  "Is that true, or did you just make that up?"

"I don't understand," I said.  "Are you asking me questions you don't know the answers to?"

Needless to say, I didn't get invited for a second round.  Late that night he called me to inform me, and as was customary, asked me if I wanted feedback.

"I don't think so," I told him.  "Do you?"

He hung up the phone.

Nonetheless, other banks liked me well enough.  I flew to New York with the other investment banking associates and now the herd was running through the canyons of Wall Street.  Lehman and Merrill Lynch both toured me through their cool, quiet offices in the World Financial Center.  I ultimately ended up at Merrill Lynch for the summer.  In the Technology Investment Banking group. In 2000.  Even without any actual work to do, it took little time to discover that I had no inner investment banker waiting to get out.

Now Bear is a fading memory, Lehman is filing for bankruptcy, and Merrill Lynch, who we barely had our eye on because we were so worried about Lehman, has sold itself to the Bank of America.  A mole at Morgan Stanley reports that half the office is working on the Lehman disaster, trying to figure out how to terminate swaps and other counterparty obligations.  The rumor mill is busy at work asking whether Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley can survive as independent institutions.  When JP Morgan was allowed to go into the investment banking business, much was made of the end of Glass-Steagall.  But this is the true end game:  investment banking houses are folding back into commercial operations in order to take advantage of the stability of their gigantic balance sheets.  In my 3 am moments, even I wonder if this is wise:  are we making the system more stable, or merely lashing the traders to ordinary depositors they can take down with them?

Remembering all this, I am struck by something a JP Morgan banker said to me when I turned down their offer in favor of Merrill Lynch.  "You know, ten years ago, no one wanted to work at Goldman," he said.  "Things change a lot in this business."  Now JP Morgan owns Bear Stearns, and Merrill Lynch is an arm of Bank of America.  I wonder if he remembers those words as well as I do.

September 14, 2008

Low blow

A number of you have asked me about the actions of Jill Greenberg in photographing McCain for our cover:

"Greenberg also crowed that she had tricked McCain into standing over a strobe light placed on the floor - turning the septuagenarian's face into a horror show of shadows.

Asking McCain to 'please come over here' for a final shot, Greenberg pretended to be using a standard modeling light.

The resulting photos depict McCain as devilish, with bulging brows and washed-out skin.

'He had no idea he was being lit from below," Greenberg said, adding that none of his entourage picked up on the light switch either. 'I guess they're not very sophisticated,' she said.

Like Jeffrey Goldberg, I'm appalled.  So is James Bennet.  But what many of our critics seem not to have noticed is that we didn't use the trick photo.    No one knew what she was planning to do, and if the magazine had known, they certainly wouldn't have hired her.  I've been staring at the photograph we did select for fifteen minutes, and darned if I can see anything wrong with it; McCain looks quite good in it, as far as I can see.

Magazines have to extend their writers and photographers a great deal of trust.  The editors can't follow people around to make sure that they don't make up quotes or stage photographs, any more than the department chair can follow around historians to ensure that they do accurate research.  Occasionally, writers like Stephen Glass or Jayson Blair, or photographers like Jill Greenberg, violate that trust.  But that isn't because the editors lack integrity, or endorse their reprehensible actions.  In cases like this, all a magazine can do is refuse to employ Ms. Greenberg again--a course that I suspect will be followed by any magazine with integrity.

September 13, 2008

Just say no to usury laws

Hilzoy reads an NYT article and waxes sarcastic:

Ohio lawmakers sought last spring to aid borrowers like Ms. Minda by capping annual interest rates for payday lenders at 28 percent, a sharp reduction from 391 percent. But lenders are fighting back in a novel way, collecting enough signatures, once certified, to force a vote in November on a ballot measure that could overturn legislation that established the rate cap.

"You can't make a payday loan cheaper than the industry does," said Steven Schlein, a spokesman for the Washington-based Community Financial Services Association of America, which represents lenders."

Yet somehow, banks and credit cards remain in business. I wonder how?

By lending to people who are better credit risks.  If you have a credit card or a bank willing to lend you money, you don't take out a payday loan (except for an economist of my acquaintance who is researching payday loans).  The people who get them are the most financially marginal members of society--i.e., the people least likely to pay them off.

Nonprofits have tried to enter the market in order to offer the loans at lower interest rates.  People without other access to credit say they need them to cover emergencies.  What those non-profits have found is that in order to cover their default risk, and the transaction costs of manking a lot of small-denomination loans, they need to charge shockingly high interest rates--291% annual, at one non-profit covered by the New York Times.

If that's the interest rate at which payday loans break even, it's pretty obvious that capping the interest rates at 28% will put an end to the industry.  Hurrah!  Say the credit nannies.  Not so fast.  If people really need the money, and don't have anywhere else to get it, you've just put them in a nasty fix.  Ban payday loans and you'll drive them to even worse alternatives:  pawnbrokers, loan sharks, or losing their job because they can't afford to fix the car.  Loan sharks didn't used to be just for gambling debts and illegal finance; they used to be staples of poor neighborhoods.  And you can't declare bankruptcy against an illegal debt.  Especially not with your kneecaps broken.


September 12, 2008

Random Friday question

When I'm stressed, I completely lose my appetite.  I don't remember to eat; I don't want to eat; and when I do eat, the food doesn't taste good, even though I can't point to any objective difference from the way it normally tastes.

A substantial minority of people I know are like this; the rest tend to want to dive into the cookie dough ice cream.  So, discuss.  Are you a stress eater or a stress anorexic?  And does anyone have any idea why the difference might have evolved?

Vegetarians and their tiny little brains

A vegetarian hating friend sends me this article showing that vegetarians are more likely to have brain shrinkage than meat eaters. 

That explains it, then.

More seriously, this article did not make me reach for a steak.  It's perfectly easy to get enough B12 by using nutritional yeast, plus if you're me, eating non-vegan food that your relatives slip you on the grounds that what you don't know won't hurt you.

You should be using nutritional yeast anyway because it has a lovely, savory flavor.  Particularly recommended in pesto to substitute for the parmesan cheese, and in your breakfast tofu scramble.

It's been a long, long time

I remember exactly the moment when I realized that the stock market was in a bubble.  It was when I overheard one of the cable guys in my firm trying to persuade another installer that he should buy Cisco on a dip.  "In the long run," he told his friend, "it always goes up."

Being something of a fan of John Kenneth Galbraith's work on financial panics, I knew that the long run could be very long indeed--the Dow was basically flat between the late 1960s and the early 1980s, which given the era's high inflation means investors actually lost money.

Well, it just occurred to me that it's been roughly ten years since I heard him make that claim.  And at the moment, the Dow is well below its January 2000 peak of 11,722.  It has gone up and down since then, but overall, we're right back where we started eight years ago. The S&P, too, is below its 2000 peak.  And the NASDAQ never even came close to regaining its former value.

If I were a certain kind of partisan, this would be a good time to blame the stock market on Bush, or the bubble on Clinton, both of which plaints have equal validity.  Which is to say, none. 

I think its more interesting to think about what this says about our financial markets.  In a world of perfect information, stock prices would never change; we'd simply discount the cash flow of a known future.  In the real world, of course, they move around all the time, often in tandem.  What information did we get--or rather, not get--over the last eight years that made the price of January 2000 such a good guess at the prices of September 2008?

One possibility is that prices are simply irrational; this is interesting, but not useful.

But perhaps the 1990s represented a real innovation:  portfolio theory, as popularized by Jeremy Siegel, made stocks genuinely less risky, and the risk premium that buyers were demanding dropped.  Though the market overshot slightly on the way down, we've basically hit a new equilibrium that has been building since the 1980s, in which prices, and P/E ratios will be permanently higher.  Something like Irving Fisher's "permanently high plateau". 

Which is not to say it won't, eventually, go up again.  It will, probably for no very good reason that anyone can pinpoint.  But that might take a very long time--it was a decade and a half the last time the market plateaued. 

This means that it's actually a very good time to be investing in your 401(k).  It won't do much for the next few years.  But when the next boom starts, all those lovely cheap assets will pop at once.

Intelligent design

Interesting post on intelligent design from Alex Tabarrok:

Thus for someone who knows, really knows, that god(s) exists (and there are many people who claim to know that god(s) exists) then some form of creationism follows as a rational deduction from the premises.  It's no point telling these people that creationism is unscientific because given the premise that god(s) exists creationism is scientific. If god(s) exists then evolution is almost certainly false, if not in every particular then surely in the grand claims of a undesigned nature.

He references this Robin Hanson post as well.  Both are channelling Thomas Nagel:

I agree with Philip Kitcher that the response of evolutionists to creation science and intelligent design should not be to rule them out as "not science." He argues that the objection should rather be that they are bad science, or dead science: scientific claims that have been decisively refuted by the evidence. ... However, the claim that ID is bad science or dead science may depend ... on the assumption that divine intervention in the natural order is not a serious possibility. ...

So far as I can see, the only way to make no assumptions of a religious nature would be to admit that the empirical evidence may suggest different conclusions depending on what religious belief one starts with, and that the evidence does not by itself settle which of those beliefs is correct, even though there are other religious beliefs, such as the literal truth of Genesis, that are easily refuted by the evidence. I do not see much hope that such an approach could be adopted, but it would combine intellectual responsibility with respect for the Establishment Clause. ...

I think the true position of those who would exclude intelligent design ... is that ... the very idea of design is as dead as Ptolemaic astronomy ... To exclude the possibility of divine intervention in the history of life is scientifically legitimate, and to assign it any antecedent positive probability at all is irrational. ... Most evolutionary scientists ... believe that there are no supernatural explanations, and that trying to show that they are incompatible with the evidence is a waste of time. ... They think, Anybody who is willing even to consider supernatural explanations is living in the past.

We cannot, however, make this a fundamental principle of public education. I understand the attitude that ID is just the latest manifestation of the fundamentalist threat, and that you have to stand and fight them here or you will end up having to fight for the right to teach evolution at all. However, I believe that both intellectually and constitutionally the line does not have to be drawn at this point, and that a noncommittal discussion of some of the issues would be preferable.

I don't know how willing I am to ratify the scientific assumption that the supernatural is never a possible explanation.  I am a radical skeptic; I think that the supernatural is generally a very unlikely explanation, but I can evince no proof that the laws of physics as generally observed operate always and everywhere.

Nor do I think that even Young Earth creationism can be ruled out by science, if you are willing to posit the possibility of a creator; God might have created the world looking old for His own inscrutable reasons.

But that's no good way to set curricula.  I also can't rule out the possibility that Brahma made the world out of a lotus flower at Lord Vishnu's command.  Or that Gaia and Uranus spontaneously generated the world out of the primordial chaos.  You can't teach the debate.  Once you open the door for supernatural explanations, there's no debate.  There are merely statements of faith.



Market movers

I've watched part of the Sarah Palin interview, and I think it's very hard to argue that she isn't woefully unprepared; she clearly had no idea what the Bush Doctrine was.  She is, to be sure, very good at tap-dancing around questions she doesn't know the answer to.   But either other people didn't pick this up, or InTrade investors don't care; McCain is still marching steadily upward.

Giggle of the day

Bank of America to buy Lehman?

This morning, the FT reports that BofA is considering a joint bid for Lehman with JC Flowers & Co. and the Chinese sovereign wealth fund. 

A forced sale of Lehman Brothers at a fire sale price appears to be the most likely option in the wake of the massive drop in Lehman's share price over the last few days, people familiar with the matter add. "The only question now is what price," says one person who has been in discussions with Lehman over possible asset sales as well as with regulators.

While the details of any proposal haven't yet been fully worked out, a bid from the BofA-led group may involve losses for holders of the debt as well as shareholders. That would be a dramatic departure from recent deals where holders of debt were saved even as shareholders suffered heavy losses.

Regulators will most probably remain on the sidelines, monitoring the situation but unwilling to offer any potential buyer the sort of guarantees that JP Morgan received in mid-March when it bought Bear Stearns.

Some thoughts:


Today could quite possibly be the most rumorlicious in Wall Street history. Goldman's buying Lehman! No it isn't! The Fed's going to cut rates between meetings! Maybe a private-equity shop can help! Interestingly, Lehman stock has not been particularly volatile today, trading in a band between $4 and $5 all day. (OK, that's volatile on a percentage basis, but not on an absolute basis.) And the credit default swaps, too, seem to be keeping some grip on reality.

The fact is that anything could happen at this point, and the situation is very much up in the air. Lehman, with the help of the Fed, will probably muddle through today and tomorrow; I suspect that it won't exist in its present form come Monday morning. But the range of possible outcomes for shareholders and bondholders is enormous, and anybody playing in Lehman securities right now is a gambler, not an investor.

If you think you know something, you're wrong. Even Dick Fuld doesn't know what's going to happen: hell, he doesn't even know if he's going to have a job come Monday morning. Speculation and rumor can be fun, but they don't really achieve anything. So go back to your day job, safe in the knowledge that the game will have played itself out within a week, tops.


  • It is best if this plays out without government intervention.  The capital markets need to convincingly demonstrate that they can handle these kinds of liquidations internally, both to shore up investor confidence, and to mitigate the moral hazard created by the Bear bailout.
  • This is the first time we're hearing talk of creditors taking a haircut.  That's a pretty big step for what used to be a rock solid investment bank with a long and storied history.  I'm of two minds on this.  On the one hand, if you've got a liquidity problem, you probably don't want to make people more afraid to lend money.  On the other hand, stockholders were hardly the only ones who made foolish choices during the bubble; I don't even think they were the greater fools.  Wiping them out, while leaving the creditors whole, takes away the just and good lesson that people should now be learning about excessively loose credit standards.  Failure is nature's way of saying:  "Don't do that!"
Update:  Yves Smith has more.

September 11, 2008

Whalin' on Palin

Katha Pollitt has some questions for Sarah Palin.  Fair enough, but I can pick out at least two that I bet, before writing this article, Katha Pollitt could not have answered to my satisfaction.  Heck, five gets you ten that neither Joe Biden nor Barack Obama can correctly describe the Fed's main activities.  And the first question seems to indicate that Ms. Pollitt is not only unable to reason clearly from some fairly simple first principles, but literally incapable of imagining anyone else doing same.  Halfway through I found myself halfway seriously wondering when Ms. Pollitt had started writing for McCain/Palin '08.

I haven't watched the interview yet, but my understanding is that, as I have been predicting (privately to friends, unfortunately, rather than in public where I could take credit), she came out looking like a moron on foreign policy.  Her lack of knowledge worries me rather less than most people, since if McCain dies in office she'll probably have had at least as long to bone up on crucial foreign policy issues as Barack Obama has had.  But I don't see how you can vote for a candidate without being able to assess their foreign policy reasoning, which is a tad difficult if they have no facts to reason from.

Update  A commenter on Marginal Revolution complains that she thought Fannie and Freddie were government entities.  I think we have to give her a pass on this, given how many of the world's central bankers made the same mistake.

In the tank for McCain, in the tank for Obama . . . what's a girl to do?

Commenter NutellaonToast continues his insistence that I am a sort of Republican fifth column, using my alleged support for Obama to secretly support McCain.  Meanwhile, my Republican commenters accuse me of being a pandering shill, supporting Obama only because it gets me in tighter with my cozy liberal coterie.

Here's the thing:  I dislike McCain on an intense, visceral level.  I don't trust him with power.  I find his personality brutish and unkind, his jokes about various women grotesque, and his political philosophy hopelessly addled.  The ad he let his campaign run about Obama's sex-ed program was, as one journalistic acquaintance puts it, "beyond tawdry".  I find National Greatness conservatism deeply troubling, and the idea that society would be better if it were more like the military alarming.  I honor the military virtues--in the military.  I do not think that America would be a better or nobler place if we were a leetle more like Sparta. 

And while I am deeply grateful, and impressed, by McCain's suffering as a POW, I do not think that this makes me obligated to like him, or to vote for him.  There's no admissions process to be a POW, and it stands to reason that some of them must have been people who weren't particularly admirable.  The more I learn about McCain, the more I think that he's one of them.  Or rather, I think of him like that kind of jerkily sexist 22-year-old of whom one thinks, "he's going to be a really good guy when he grows up".  And I wish he would.  But when he turned 70, I sort of lost hope.

Beyond that, I think the Republican Party is moribund.  Its long tenure has made it corrupt, and depleted its stock of ideas.  It has gotten too cosy with the bureaucracy and the lobbyists, and lost touch with its first principles.  I do not think that this is some feature of conservatism--indeed, it reminds me quite a bit of the House under Tip O'Neil.  But I think the party needs a time out to think about things.

I say this with the full realization that this will give the Democrats scope to enact policies I will hate.  But I think that this is a small price to pay for a Republican party I might one day be able to support again. 

At the same time, I am more in accord with most of McCain's stated domestic policy positions than Obama's.  I am not voting for him for the reasons stated above, and also because excursions like McCain-Feingold give me little reason to believe that he can be trusted to abide within the constricting confines of small government conservatism.  So when I talk policy, I'm going to end up criticizing Obama more than McCain.  I'm not voting for Obama.  I'm voting against McCain.

But most importantly, I'm not playing for the team.  I'm not trying to get one or the other of them elected; you now know my opinion of McCain, and I don't think I need to repeat it ad nauseum.  Nor to drum up evidence to convince you that you, too, should vote for one or the other.  I give you my opinion on policy, which frankly is quite outrageous enough without trying to manufacture ridiculous scandals out of whole cloth.

How dare I say public school teachers are just in it for the paycheck?

What's wrong with just being in it for the paycheck?  I doubt my grandfather spent his childish nights dreaming of someday owning an Exxon station.  I doubt yours thought:  shipping manager at UPS!  They did those things for a paycheck.  And they were good, solid citizens who contributed a lot to their communities and their families.  (Well, I can't speak for your grandfather.  But I'm guessing.) 

There are many fine teachers who have a real calling to teach.  But we can't build a school system that depends on everyone being a gifted natural teacher with a fire in the belly for imposing civilization on thirty godless savages every term.  We need a system that produces good results even when the teachers are just there to do a job.

Microsoft does not depend on every salesman being passionate about the XBox, every payroll clerk having dreamt from an early age about giving something back through the power of the healthcare deduction.  Institutions work because they create systems--situations--where the easiest thing for employees to do is to further the institution's goals.  These systems are more than a little imperfect.  But they work better than a system where employees can't get fired, get no reward for improvement, and have some aspect of every moment of their day scripted by a bureaucrat who isn't even in the building.  If we'd wanted our schools to do a poor job of educating students, we could hardly have hit upon a better model.

Should we pay teachers more?

Almost certainly.  As Dennis Miller once said, the people in charge of our children's futures should not be worried about whether they can afford genuine Ho-Ho's or only stale generic knock-offs.

But while higher teacher pay will undoubtedly be necessary in my fantasy school-world, until there are major institutional reforms, it won't do any good.  Teacher pay is, like foreign aid, a necessary but not sufficient condition. The world will not eradicate polio without spending a lot of money on the task.  But that doesn't mean that the first order of business is to raise a bunch of money, and then hand it to doctors to figure out what to do with.  The first thing you have to do is build an organization that is capable of using the money to good effect.  Otherwise, you'll just get what you get out of most foreign aid efforts:  richer government employees.

I have no problem with richer government employees.  But I do not think that the primary job of government is to enrich them.  The government's job is to obtain we, the taxpayers, good value for money.

The school system is dysfunctional on all sides.  On one side, you've got a bureaucracy so terrified that a teacher will make a mistake that it sets up "everything not compulsory is forbidden" rules.  I'm not talking about forcing people to do things that they may not want to do, but which actually further the institution's goals, like implementing Direct Instruction.  I'm talking about detailed rules specifying how many bathroom breaks a teacher can take.  And the fact that each school is complying with so many state, federal, and local regulations that it's a wonder they can ever take a break from filling out forms to teach a class.  We're treating educated professionals like they're would-be criminals who need to be watched every second lest they steal the chalk.

On the other side, you have an equally bureaucratic union, and a set of job protection rules that make it virtually impossible to fire anyone for poor performance, or reward them for good.  I don't think anyone who has actually gone through the school system thinks that length of service is a good measure of teaching effectiveness, but that's how they're paid--seniority, and accumulation of usually thoroughly worthless educational credentials.  And unless they start molesting their charges, it's basically impossible to fire them.

We need to start treating teachers like professionals.  We need to start paying them like professionals.  And we need to start holding them accountable like professionals.  Doing one or two out of three won't improve anything, except perhaps some teacher bank accounts.

Vouchers and education: do the kids make the school or do the schools make the kids

My beloved Freddie, who unfortunately unlisted me from his RSS reader the other day and will probably never see this, once argued that all of the benefit of "good" schools actually comes from the fact that the kids are high-IQ/SES, none of it from the school itself.  Somewhat less extremes of this argument frequently pop up in arguments against vouchers, arguing that private schools won't really do any better because private schools just skim the cream.

I think that this is rather extreme, but there's an element of truth in it.  Kids from high income homes are easier to teach.  They are less likely to come from broken or truly dysfunctional homes, given that at least one parent is together enough to keep a job.  Their parents are more likely to be highly verbal with them, and to read to them.  They aren't hungry or cold, haven't been up all night babysitting while Mom works, and a doctor regularly checks on their health.  They have higher IQs, some of which is probably genetic--as I recently heard one scientist say, it's hard to see how intelligence could have evolved if it weren't heritable--some of which is environment, and some of which is the excellent care their mother took of herself when she was pregnant.  Whatever you saw on that ABC After School Special, they are much less likely to be abused.  And their parents, who themselves are almost certainly college educated, place a very high value on things like homework and test scores.

But just as it's unlikely that IQ is either all heritibility or all environment, so with education.  Much of the educational benefit comes from the fact that the kids are easy to educate.  But to say that the school itself doesn't matter at all is to posit that one could get exactly the same results by parking the kids in a school library for twelve years.  There may be diminishing returns, but clearly there is some area within which improving educational techniques improves outcomes.  Are US schools really all above the red line?

Doubtful.  Anecdotally, I was better educated--at least in English literature--than college peers from very competitive suburban school districts, and not because I was noticeably better raw material or they were distracted by the gang wars in AP English. Nor were my classmates--lawyers kids are lawyers' kids whether they're in Bronxville High or Horace Mann.  My school had the resources to higher better teachers, have smaller class sizes, and expect more from its students.  Most of the people I know who went to private school say the same.

Now to the data.  What about those hard to educate kids?  We know that there are methods that work better than others, because in the 1970s the government commissioned a gigantic study of educational methods called Project Follow Through.   One method, Direct Instruction, consistently produced better methods, a result that has since been repeatedly replicated.  Educational approach does make a difference.  Unfortunately, this educational approach is hated by teachers, so even though we know it works better than almost anything else, adoption has been slow.

Of course, kids in the worst off schools often have a train wreck of problems--familial abuse, drug use, language barriers, poor diet--that schools also need to address.  Just jamming in direct instruction isn't going to solve those, and the social service infrastructure schools now provide won't and shouldn't go away, though perhaps it should be outsourced or transferred to family services.  Some of the problems will not be solved, at least not in the perfect way we fantasize about where no kid has to deal with problems that kids really shouldn't have to deal with.  I have no good heuristic, for example, that will ensure that no kid gets abused without removing some kids from their families unnecessarily.

More broadly, this kind of despair over composition effects makes me more likely to support vouchers, not less.  If the school really can't make any difference, then why not pay less and get higher levels of parental satisfaction, with at least no worse education for the kids?

Vouchers: what to do about special ed?

One commenter asks what to do about the kids who are harder to teach?  This is a very good question, to which the obvious answer is "subsidize them".  We already do quite a bit of this; a friend with an autistic son has the city of New York paying for his schooling because the city can't provide adequate services.

A diagnosable disorder should bring a bonus on your voucher.  Of course, this means that you'll need a vast special ed bureaucracy to set standards and diagnose.  But we already have it, because school districts get extra money for special ed.  I'm not sure how much new administrative overhead this would entail.

Hypocrisy, or hyperbole?

Karl Weber responds to my voucher post:

Where I now live, I pay a water bill. In my previous home, water was covered by city taxes. It varies from place to place.

You could come up with almost any comparison you want. Almost any public service (paid for by taxes) can be supplemented with a private version (paid for by individuals). My point is that individuals who choose the private version should pay for it themselves rather than expect public support.

The public pays for roads; if you want to use a private toll road, you don't get a voucher for that.

The public pays for parks; if you want to visit a private park, you don't get a voucher for it.

The public pays for police officers; if you want private security, you don't get a voucher to pay for it.

I don't see why education should be any different. AND THIS DOESN'T MAKE ME A HYPOCRITE.

I don't think this quite works.  Parks are nice, but I don't think they're an entitlement--I could deliver a stirring paean to the joys of public parks, but a UN campaign to provide more playgrounds in the third world wouldn't move me the way that a plea for education or malaria eradication would.

Police and roads, on the other hand, generally are viewed as public goods.  (Yes, yes, anarchocapitalists--I know.  You may excuse yourself to study hall for the rest of the period with a copy of Anarchy, State and Utopia and two cans of Red Bull.)

But they are public goods that the affluent actually use.  There are no wealthy people, even ones living in gated communities, who never share highways with the hoi polloi.  No matter how wealthy you are, you still rely on the police to ensure that you don't get mugged walking into a restaurant, or smashed by a drunk driver as you motor out to the Hamptons.  That's because they are true public goods, as economists use the term:  something from which it is impossible (or in the case of public streets, impractical) to exclude others.  Once they exist, everyone, including the affluent and the powerful, benefits from them, and benefits from improving them.

On the other hand, wealthy people can and do send their kids through sixteen or so years of private education.  One can make a good argument that in the long run, education is a public good--that the network effects of a highly educated populace benefit everyone, including the affluent.  But protecting people from muggers is a tangible benefit in a way that protecting them from a 0.0001% fall in GDP thirty years hence is not.

Politically, education is less of a public good than a positive right.  (A positive right I endorse, by the way).  And that positive right is to a minimum standard of decency, which America's largest school districts are not providing.  If the government is unable to provide that service, then the poor should have the same right as the rich:  the right to look for a better option.  I find myself struggling to understand why so many people think that exercising school choice through a tax-subsidized real estate purchase is "supporting the public schools", while exercising it through a voucher is horrible and destructive.

Will it be perfect?  No it will not.  And if it does work, it will take a long time for the system to adjust to competition.  But we've been doubling down on the current system for 30 years with no result.

Unfair advantages

Many readers responded to my post on coastal contempt by saying, in essence, "They do it too!"  There are two answers to that.  The first is that if you understand there is a difference between black and white racial resentments, then you should understand that there is a difference between comments by a powerful elite, and comments by a less powerful group, even a majority.  (See, say, the Malay/Chinese disputes).

The second is that here's an area where controlling the media hurts us.  When they make cracks, they make them in private, where we can't hear them.  When we do it, we often do it in public, right there on the television or in national print media.  So they are more aware of, and resentful of, coastal condescension than vice versa.  I mean, I know there are people out there who think I'm a pitiful childless, soulless atheist latte-sipping liberal spinster.  Occasionally they wander into my comments.  But mostly, their contempt is a cottage industry.  We're exporting on an industrial scale.

This asymmetry gives us a lot of power to set agendas--but it's also why urban liberals are, in my experience, more politically parochial than their rural counterparts.  At least the rural regionalist bigots are aware that there is another point of view--it's on the news every night.  A good Manhattan liberal, unless they hail from the hinterlands, never needs listen to anyone he disagrees with.

The hypocrisy of Democratic politicians

Sandra Tsing-Loh is shocked and hurt that Obama sends his daughters to an expensive private school rather than the local public schools. 

In Obama's defense, the public schools in Chicago are terrible.  My parents struggled with the same decision--my father worked for a Democratic city administration at the time, and they had both ideological and political reasons to want me to go to public school.  But the catastrophic condition of New York's public schools at the time was too much for them, and at considerable personal sacrifice they ended up putting me in private school.

What is intolerable to me is when parents who have exercised school choice for themselves then oppose it for everyone else.  Of course, Obama has little choice; the teacher's unions have far too firm a grip on the Democratic party for any of their politicians to buck its wishes.

It is true, to be sure, that vouchers will not ensure that everyone gets to attend the kind of ridiculous private school that I attended, tuition $38,000 and counting.  On the other hand, 22% of the kids in that school are on some form of financial aid; a $5,000 voucher for each of those students would let the school admit more financial aid students, which they ardently wish to do.

The worries about taking money away from the public schools are more valid:  as I heard from many administrators whom I interviewed for my story about demography, shrinking school districts do not see their expenses decline as fast as their student numbers.  Buildings still have to be heated, yards cleaned, and so forth.  Because the student numbers decline across grades, they have to lose a lot of students before they can get rid of one teaching slot.

Still, if the voucher is for less than the current full funding of the children, I see no problem.  And there's no question that public school budgets are bloated:  top-heavy with administration, for starters.  Too many city governments look at the schools first as a jobs program, second as a means for educating kids.  Why shouldn't they?  The mostly poor citizenry they serve aren't going to buy a house in the suburbs, and if they did, it would probably be a net fiscal plus for a city providing expensive services on a very thin tax base.

Vouchers, Democrats say, are no substitute for fixing the schools.  This would be true if anyone had anything other than nice-sounding phrases with which to fix them.  Giving money to failing urban school districts is like giving money to failing third-world economies; the entrenched interests siphon it off for their own uses.  Teacher salaries go up, janitorial pensions get fatter, more administrators are hired.  But the kids don't get any smarter.

Obama's plan to fix the schools:  more money.  More money for teachers, more teachers, more after school programs.  Absent are any specifics about what the new teachers will do that is any different from what the current teachers are doing that isn't working.  John McCain doesn't either, but at least he's planning to shake up the educational architecture that gets worse every year.

One of the central insights of economics is that exit matters.  Markets don't do better, over the long run, because people in the private sector are smarter or well meaning.  They do better because they can be fired.  What's more, they frequently are:  firms that don't satisfy their customers go away.  Look at the businesses that people in America complain most about:  cell phones, utilities, cable companies, health care.  What they have in common is that the end consumers do not have meaningful right of exit--those companies have at least a temporary monopoly on their customers.  Private sector firms can fail spectacularly, as many financial firms just did.  But the important thing is that they fail.   Schools that do to education what Bear Stearns did to mortgage bonds maybe get a stern talking to from the mayor, and in extraordinary circumstances, the principal may be fired.  (Though this takes year).  But the school itself keeps going no matter how bad a job it is doing.

Middle-class parents instinctively know this, because they move to places where the right of exit keeps school quality high.  Scarsdale knows that if it doesn't keep the schools successful, middle class parents will leave, taking their lavish tax dollars with them.  Riverdale, too, knows that it needs to keep parents happy and test scores high.  The New York City public school system, on the other hand, mostly has to get butts in seats, because that's how they get their money.  It's not that the teachers don't want to teach kids; it's that they don't have to.  And as anyone who's ever tried to write a novel in their spare time knows, anything onerous that you don't have to do generally runs afoul of other priorities.

Scandalous!

In general, I'm going to try to avoid covering either the latest tempest in a teapot being pushed by the news networks, or the more substantive complaints like this:

So it turns out that there is a "culture of ethical failure" in the Interior Department's Minerals Management Service. The Inspector General's reports "portray a dysfunctional organization that has been riddled with conflicts of interest, unprofessional behavior and a free-for-all atmosphere for much of the Bush administration's watch." It's all there: sex, drugs, cash--just the sort of thing that makes a good scandal. Wow--just the sort of thing that would have called for vigorous Senate oversight during this time. If, say, the chair of one of the committees with jurisdiction over all this didn't uncover it, then you might say that such a person would be unfit for national office. You certainly wouldn't call him a candidate for change. If he was also getting millions from energy companies, you might suspect that any claim to be a change candidate might stink like fish in a newspaper--or even look like lipstick on a pig. And who was the chair of the Senate Commerce Committee during most of this time, which has jurisdiction over (among other things) pipelines, interstate commerce, and coastal zone management? You peeked, didn't you? PS Commerce obviously isn't the only committee with jurisdiction, but the MMS sells oil and gas on the open market. That's an interstate commerce issue if there ever was one. And last I checked, oil goes through pipelines.

If you're in office for long enough, it is a mathematical certainty that some scandal will occur in an institution that you are at least partially responsible for.  I frankly cannot believe that the people pushing these sorts of stories care about them, or that they would experience the slightest worry about them had Barack Obama been chairing Commerce.  Conversely, if McCain had referred to Hillary's health care plan as attempting to put lipstick on a pig, I doubt any Republicans would feel a twinge of outrage.  The hysterical flinging of everything to hand in the hope that it will stick is, to be sure, a staple of politics.  But I don't need to be the conduit for it.

To Lehman's Credit

The storm that has shaken Lehman Brothers in recent weeks

As Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. stock teetered in recent weeks, Chairman and Chief Executive Richard Fuld Jr. called Wall Street executives to make sure they were still trading with his embattled firm and offering it credit. Rumors about the firm's health kept popping up, he groused to other executives.


"I feel like I'm playing whack-a-mole every day," Mr. Fuld said, according to people familiar with the calls.

It's hard to read the article and not picture Mr. Fuld at home, hiding behind the bannister while his 8-year old talks to a debt collecter and whispering:  "Tell them I'm not home".


Lipstick on a pig

Obviously, he didn't mean it that way.  The outrage is ridiculous.  But . . .  oh, Obama, why, why did you have to say something so stupid now?

September 10, 2008

Tyler Cowen, brilliant as always on the government bailout:

In essence we already agreed to the bail out some time ago.  Have you ever spent $17,000 on a car and asked the dealer what the warranty for the car "really meant"?  Well, the Chinese spent $340 billion on agency debt and probably asked the same question at least once or twice.  They live in a world of secret agreements with leaders, not transparent democratic arrangements.  So when it comes to the U.S government decision, we're not just starting from scratch here.  How many phone calls do you think Hank Paulson has received from the Chinese central bank since August 2007?

"Are you *sure* that paper is safe enough for us to keep on buying?"

We'll never know exactly what kind of verbal dance Paulson concocted in response, but just look at the resulting flow of purchases and the relatively slight mark-up over Treasuries over that period of time.  The Chinese (among others) thought we were standing behind the securities, at least in any world-state short of federal government quasi-bankruptcy.  (In fact Paulson is in a total bind once that phone call comes in.  He doesn't have much incentive to just say "tough luck" and precipitate a crisis when otherwise no crisis is on the horizon.)

So should we try this: "Oh, is that what you thought?  Guaranteed?  Did we use that word? Sorry, try reading our signals better next time.  We love you.  Great job with those Olympics.  And when it comes to those Treasury Bills, we really do still mean it."

The libertarian critique of the mortgage agencies is, in my view, very much on the mark.  But still the error has been made and we must pay up.  As Steve Chapman points out, the bailout is a necessary evil, but with emphasis on the word "evil."

Hard libertarians often give short shrift to both the moral and practical consequences of just letting things fall apart with a bang.  Yes, we all concede that Social Security and Medicare are bad programs that should, at the very least, be structured very differently than they are.  But that doesn't mean we can just try shock therapy.  For one thing, a lot of old people would starve because they believed their government--a valuable object lesson in the problem with relying on government programs, to be sure, but it is perhaps a mite rough to let millions of old people die pour encourager les autres.  For another, there is no political possibility of enacting a law that causes millions of old people to starve.

Likewise, it might be fun to let the financial markets collapse catastrophically in order to teach people that they oughtn't to speculate, either on securities or government bailouts.  On the other hand, the Great Depression sort of sucked, and not just for people who took a flyer on AT&T at 87. 

Going forward, of course, we should take pains to make sure this sort of thing doesn't happen again, first among them ensuring that the shareholders and managers suffer for the mistakes made by their firms---and of course, by refusing to make those sorts of implied guarantees for ostensibly private companies.  Perhaps we should even pass a law forbidding the government to bail out insolvent banks.  But we already lost this round.


Matt Zeitlin has a very smart post on inequality:

We know from Larry Bartels that inequality tends to go up under Republican presidents, and down during Democratic presidents. If Obama is elected, when can certainly expect some increase in inequality. He'll raise taxes on the wealthy, and if the Employee Free Choice Act is passed, wages in the middle should go up some. Tack on the traditional Democratic focus on unemployment as opposed to inflation, along with the possibility of minimum wage increases, and some decrease in inequality is certain.

But it will be a modest decrease, and it won't satisfy those who's major objection to inequality is that the tippity-top of the income distribution having vastly more money than everyone else is necessarily bad. That's because there are two different types of income inequality, and your standard Democratic policy solutions, or an increased investment in human capital as suggested by Ed Glaeser, only affects one. Robert Gordon and Ian Dew-Becker wrote a paper explaining these two types of inequality. One type of inequality is "90-10″ inequality. This is the standard, skills based technological change explanation of inequality. Basically, managers got more money and benefited the most from productivity gains, which were unchained from median wages in the late 1970s. There's also the unbounded increase in the college wage premium, which is no longer cyclical. This is the 90th percentile, and above, running away from everyone else - or, everyone else staying behind, while the 90th percentile's income inequality shoots up.

But that's not the entire inequality story, the other is inequality within the top decile. This is the inequality that liberals and progressives find so objectionable. This inequality that isn't driven so much by technological change, lagging minimum wage, or decreased unionization, but instead by the "superstar effect" (JK Rowling can sell more books than any other author in history) or the institutional failures behind skyrocketing CEO pay. And the only way to address that inequality is massively increasing marginal income rates. 

Take a simple thought experiment.  Family A makes 50,000 a year.  Family B makes 100,000 a year.  Family C makes 500,000 a year.  Further imagine that they are taxed as follows:  Family A at 10%, Family B at 20%, and Family C at 30%.

That means that Family A takes home 40,000, Family B takes home 80,000, and family C takes home 350,000.  You've got a roughly 9X difference between Family A and Family C after tax, and a roughly 10X difference pre-tax.

Now say that Family A's income goes up by 20%, Family B's income goes up by 100%, and Family C's goes up by 1000%.  

Now family A has 55,000 pretax, and 49,500 post-tax.  Family B has 120,000 pretax, and 96,000 after tax.  And Family C has 5,000,000 pre-tax, and 3,500,000 after tax.  So now Family C makes roughly 100 times as much as Family A pretax, and about 70 times as much as them post tax. 

To get back to the original ratio, you'd have to raise Family C's tax rate to roughly 90%.  If you merely wanted to let inequality double, we'd still have to take away $4 million worth of income, an effective tax rate of 80%--which implies a marginal rate even higher than 80%.

We can't do that, either politically or economically.  For all that I despise the way that supply-siders have abuse the Laffer Curve, at those kinds of rates, the deadweight loss is enormous.  We'd be costing everyone else economic growth just to punish the rich.  I know, I know--some bright young thing is going to claim that since the rich get all the growth anyway, this doesn't matter.  That is, not to put too fine a point on it, USDA Prime hogwash.  Compare the consumption basket of any demographic group you'd care to between 1970 or now.  There's no question that even poor families are better off materially (the War on Drugs is a different matter).  And I'm not talking about iPods; I'm talking about housing, health care, automobiles, telephones, and other things that we think of as basic accoutrements for a decent life.

That is not to argue that the poor are really rich and therefore don't need any help; that's an argument for a different day.  I merely point out that the poor would indisputibly be worse off if the economy hadn't grown any since 1970.

Lehman loses its shirt

Lehman just declared the largest loss in its 160 year history.  Even analysts who had been expecting a big bath were shocked.  The stock value nearly halved in trading this morning.  (Side note:  if you doubt insider trading takes place, look at what happened yesterday.  Clearly a number of people got a hint of those numbers in advance.)  The company announced that its spinning off art of its operations to raise cash.  Nonetheless, don't be surprised if they turn up at treasury's door soon, asking for a handout to stave off a liquidity crisis.

September 9, 2008

Future perfect

I read stuff like this and I think, no wonder we're getting nowhere selling lower carbon initiatives. Too much writing and blogging on the topic of global warming seems to consist of urban dwellers saying to everyone else "You're just going to have to accept the fact that your life is going to suck" in their best third-grade dragon-teacher voice, and then getting surprised and angry when the people they're talking to call them selfish, elitist loons.

Of course, a large portion of my blogging on the topic also consists of saying, "Well, I'm afraid your life is going to suck", and I should strive harder to avoid sounding like I'm happy as a clam that the rest of America has to lean into the strike zone and take one for the team.  I'm not.  I think that if the planet is warming up, you're going to have to give up driving so much, and I'm going to have to give up flying, and this is not fun.  I like driving as much as you do.  I . . . well, I hate flying, and would happily never do it again.  But I like being places that aren't Washington DC. 

I understand that people's desires for large houses in leafy suburbs are every bit as valid as my ardent desire to live near the peaceful hum of traffic.  Unfortunately, there is no such thing as a policy that effects everyone equally, and the painful job of being an adult is doing things we don't like because they're the morally right thing to do.  Assuming arguendo that global warming is happening, and is anthropogenic, the right thing for our society to do is try to make our economy more efficient.  Unless we can figure out a better way.  But it isn't enough to say, "we ought to figure out a better way" and go back to making the icecaps melt, as so many libertarian think tanks do; until we actually do so, we should be striving for greater efficiency.

But having said all that, if I lived somewhere where long drives were mandatory, I'd be pretty hopping mad if a lot of city dwellers not only came along and told me I was going to have to use less gas, but did so without a trace of sympathy--indeed, spoke to me as if I really deserved to suffer for some unnamed environmental sins.  It sucks.  I feel your pain, as much as an urban dweller can, anyway.  If I seem to be saying otherwise, it's not because I am gleefully wishing for your destruction, but rather because I'm trying to show you that the changes won't be quite as dreadful as you perhaps imagine--it is possible to live a happy and fulfilling life at higher densities.  But I'm sorry you can't have your druthers.

Housing: put it down

Arnold Kling, meanwhile, makes a plea for the return of the 30 year amortizing mortgage:

If I were the czar of the mortgage market, I would attempt to bring back the 30-year amortizing fixed-rate mortgage with a 20 percent down payment. As recently as fifteen years ago, this was the workhorse of the housing market.

I think that a housing market that is based on mortgages with low down payments is inherently unstable. The buyer's equity comes almost entirely from house price appreciation. That means that in a rising market, everybody can buy a home. In a flat or falling market, nobody can buy a home. [note: Bob Shiller wants mortgages that are indexed to home prices. Such mortgages might adapt to this problem, but I would rather avoid the problem in the first place.]

I don't think the fixed rate is what matters.  In fact, though I'm not sure that I've seen this reported anywhere, fixed rate mortgages make the housing market more unstable, because house prices vary more sharply with interest rates.

Of course, the lurid stories we're hearing now are all about people locked into houses with rates they can't afford.  But that's because their downpayments were so miniscule.  In a normal market, they could sell and walk away, taking perhaps a small loss.  But with little or no downpayment, even a small movement in the value of their home wipes out all their equity, leaving them with no way out except foreclosure or bankruptcy.  If you can't come up with the cash for your mortgage payments, you certainly can't come up with a big check to hand over at closing to make up the difference between the mortgage and the sale price.

Liberals are blaming the banks, and conservatives the government, for the push into no money down housing purchases.  But the fact is, we're all at fault.  Everyone in the country--buyers, sellers, financial advisors, bankers, regulators--became convinced that owning a home was a surefire ticket to wealth, and that therefore everyone could and should buy one.  Now we're surprised that we've gotten into exactly the same trouble as everyone else who thinks they've got a way to make money without working.

Coastal privilege

Over the last week, I've been hearing a lot of things like this:

Some of it, of course, is driven by cultural and religious conflict: fundamentalist Christians are sincerely dismayed by Roe v. Wade and evolution in the curriculum. What struck me as I watched the convention speeches, however, is how much of the anger on the right is based not on the claim that Democrats have done bad things, but on the perception -- generally based on no evidence whatsoever -- that Democrats look down their noses at regular people.

I'm surprised--though I shouldn't be, of course--that any number of liberals who are (presumably) comfortable with concepts like unconscious discrimination and privilege when it comes to race, have not even stopped to consider that the same sort of thing might be operating here.

Let's be honest, coastal folks:  when you meet someone with a thick southern accent who likes NASCAR and attends a bible church, do you think, "hey, maybe this is a cool person"?  And when you encounter someone who went to Eastern Iowa State, do you accord them the same respect you give your friends from Williams?  It's okay--there's no one here but us chickens.  You don't.

Maybe you don't know you're doing it.  But I have quite brilliant friends who grew up in rural areas and went to state schools--not Michigan or UT, but ordinary state schools--who say that, indeed, when they mention where they went to school, there's often a droop in the eyelids, a certain forced quality to the smile.  Oh, Arizona State.  Great weather out there.  Don't I need a drink or something? This person couldn't possibly interest me.

People from a handful of schools, most of them hailing from a handful of major metropolitan areas, dominate academia, journalism, and the entertainment industry.  Our subtle (or not-so-subtle) distaste for everything from their entertainment to their decorating choices to the vast swathes of the country in which they choose to live permeate almost everything they read, watch, or hear.  Of course we don't hear it--to us, that's simply the way the world is. 

In the 1980s, I played on possibly the worst girl's basketball team in the state of New York.  Every time another Catholic school kicked our asses (I believe one memorable game ended at 48 to 2) we consoled ourselves by making fun of their big, sprayed, permed hair, and the lavish eye makeup that ran down their faces when they sweated.  We didn't know that what divided us from those girls was economic class--they were the children of plumbers and bodega owners, while we were the children of bankers and lawyers and lobbyists.  We genuinely believed that we had simply been gifted with a better fashion sense.

But I bet those girls knew exactly what we were saying as we got on the bus.  And I'm pretty sure they knew what we were really talking about.

Red America exaggerates the contempt, of course.  It's also true that if you're expecting racism and sexism, you'll probably end up misinterpreting perfectly innocent remarks.  But the fact that they aren't right in every particular does not mean that, in general, they've got it wrong.  For one thing, in both DC and New York I've spent a fair amount of time listening to liberals make jokes about red states that would horrify them if they were told about blacks.  But even if that weren't true, I wouldn't be the best person to assess whether there is prejudice or not.  I'm so close to it that I can't see it. 

Socialized mortgages

So, the government has taken over Fannie and Freddie.  Not much surprise there.

My thoughts:

  • This is better than nothing.  I would have preferred an outright breakup and privatisation--which may still happen, someday down the road.  But the government providing an implicit guarantee meant that Uncle Sam was taking on the risk without taking on the benefits.
  • As usual, the regulators are locking the barn after the horse has been stolen.  This should have happened months ago.
  • There wasn't that much new information in the market to trigger the takeover--it's not as if capital requirements have plummeted.  Rather, the existing regulatory requirements were found to provide inadequate capital in a broadly sinking market.  We knew a long time ago that the current real estate market had made traditional capital adequacy requirements absurdly inadequate.
  • Fannie and Freddie are the reason that the US has 30 year fixed mortgages; they can borrow capital at government rates.  The ability to borrow money on these terms is probably not worth the distortion in the markets, and the constant regulatory tsuris of managing these behemoths.  Better to borrow money on variable rates, like the rest of the world, than to have the mortgage market dominated by either the government, or two quasi-private companies.
  • The claim that this represents the failure of markets is more than a tad silly.  Fannie and Freddie weren't truly private companies, didn't act like truly private companies, and wouldn't have been allowed to so dominate the market if they had been.  This is yet another failure of a government program.

September 8, 2008

Media matters

Economics of Contempt makes the obvious, common sense argument for why liberal media bias almost has to exist:

[N]eurological studies have shown that people's feelings toward a political party dramaticallyThe Political Brain, Drew Weston described a great study he and two colleagues conducted during the 2004 election. Westen and his colleagues studied the brains of 15 self-identified Democrats and 15 self-identified Republicans as they were presented with a series of slides that showed undeniably inconsistent statements by John Kerry. The partisans were asked to consider whether Kerry's two statements were inconsistent, and were then asked to rate the extent to which Kerry's statements were contradictory, from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree). They then repeated the process with undeniably inconsistent statements by George W. Bush, and again with inconsistent statements by politically neutral males. Here's how Westen described the results:
They had no trouble seeing the contradictions for the opposition candidate, rating his inconsistencies close to 4 on the four-point rating scale. For their own candidate, however, ratings averaged closer to 2, indicating minimal contradiction. Democrats responded to Kerry as Republicans responded to Bush. And as predicted, Democrats and Republicans showed no differences in their response to contradictions for the politically neutral figures.
...
The results showed that when partisans face threatening information, not only are they likely to "reason" to emotionally biased conclusions, but we can trace their neutral footprints as they do it.

When confronted with potentially troubling political information, a network of neurons becomes active that produces distress. ... The brain registers the conflict between the data and desire and begins to search for ways to turn off the spigot of unpleasant emotion. We know that the brain largely succeeded in this effort, as partisans mostly denied that they had perceived any conflict between their candidate's words and deeds.

Not only did the brain manage to shut down distress through faulty reasoning, but it did so quickly -- as best we could tell, usually before subjects even made it to the third slide [which asked them to consider whether the statements were inconsistent]. The neural circuits charged with regulation of emotional states seemed to recruit beliefs that eliminated the distress and conflict partisans had experienced when they confronted unpleasant realities. And this all seemed to happen with little involvement of the circuits normally involved in reasoning.

But the political brain also did something we didn't predict. Once partisans had found a way to reason to false conclusions, not only did neural circuits involved in negative emotions turn off, but circuits involved in positive emotions turned on. The partisan brain didn't seem satisfied in just feeling better. It worked overtime to feel good, activating reward circuits that give partisans a jolt of positive reinforcement for their biased reasoning.
This is basically the root of the well-known "confirmation bias."

So given that (1) journalists are overwhelmingly Democrats, and (2) party affiliation dramatically affects the way our brains interpret political news, is it really possible that there isn't a liberal media bias?

No empirical study of newspaper stories or talking heads on TV is ever going to be able to objectively determine whether there's a liberal media bias, because what people think constitutes "liberal bias" depends on their party affiliation also. I don't perceive a liberal media bias, but then again, I'm a Democrat, so my brain would presumably interpret political news the same way a biased liberal media would.

But if we know that the inputs are heavily biased, it's very likely that the output is biased as well.
affect the way their brains interpret political news. In his book
One of the more interesting results of current neuropsychological research is that some scientists think that, at least for hot-button issues, we reason backwards:  we decide what we believe based on our emotional needs, and then figure out a reason that we should believe it.  Regardless, I think EofC makes an excellent point:  based on what we know about journalists and political cognition, it's very unlikely that there isn't substantial bias in both academia and the media.  I also think there's no way to develop any direct test of media bias that will satisfy people who want to disbelieve in it.


Bittersweet moments

I am triumphantly vindicated in my opinion that the Obama campaign's in trouble.  This is not adequate to still my deep regret that John McCain might actually be our next president. 

Of course, this is just a post-convention bump.  But it's a big damn bump.

September 5, 2008

Absence makes the heart grow fonder

I'm visiting my old high school today as part of a story I'm writing for The Atlantic, so blogging may be light-to-nonexistant.  Play nice while I'm away.

September 4, 2008

McCain's acceptance speech

Again, scattered thoughts:

  • The words "I fought corruption" should never pass the lips of a charter member of the Keating Five.
  • "I fight for you" is a clever tag line, and I presume the image that the McCain campaign has settled upon.  This will allow them--just barely--to keep making the ridiculous claim that John McCain doesn't like to bring up the fact that he was a POW.  If John McCain didn't want to bring it up, he would have instructed his staff not to mention it to every single person they talk to, including the barista at Caribou Coffee.
  • Ack!  The dreaded "Free America from Dependence on Foreign Oil" meme rears its ugly head.  This is high definition hogwash.  Drilling isn't going to save us from Demon Oil any more than windmills will.  It might make us some money.  But we'll still be part of a world economy that will be pigheaded about buying their oil from funny people who don't even speak English.
  • John McCain does not seem particularly comfortable talking about God.  The lines are there, but they're mechanical, clearly recited by rote.
  • McCain claims he'll cut government spending.  I'll believe it when I see it.
  • Boy, the folks at the RNC really hate national health care.
  • Just as with Obama, the actual policy/issues content could have been taken straight from the RNC! Greatest Hits 1980-2004 compilation album.  McCain's main contribution is the shocking revelation that--you probably didn't realize this--he was a POW.  I'm more impressed by his delivery than I was by Obama's, but that's because my expectations were lower than they were for Obama--objectively, Obama's delivery was still probably better.  Frankly, the Fog of War has erased the thing from my mind.  It's probably PTSD from all the blinking things on the convention stages.
  • The other major change isn't really a change--it's a relative shift to emphasizing the martial virtues.  This, I think, is why Kerry seemed so ridiculous "reporting for duty"--his political persona was about as far as you could get from the warrior ethos.  McCain is the real thing.  Too much of the real thing, for my taste--he seems to think that the values that guide a brigade should also guide the nation at large.  This is a bad idea for the same reason that we should not be run by the codes of the Bar Association or the Hippocratic Oath.

The John McCain video

. . . is much better than the one about either Sarah Palin or Cindy McCain.  And yet . . . do we need the tribute videos?  There's something of the whiff of creepy totalitarian propaganda films about them.

More on Sarah Palin

I mean that literally--after a speech by Lindsay Graham so boring and anodyne that I nearly slipped into a coma, the RNC is playing the biographic video that was supposed to go on last night, before Rudy Giuliani preempted it with . . . whatever it was he said.  I was busy pawing through the medicine cabinet for my inhaler.

This is having the effect of elevating Palin to a more central place than most VP's get in a campaign--her speech last night apparently pulled nearly as many viewers as Obama's last week.  I wonder if that is a feature or a bug for McCain.  Polling The Swing Voter (aka my mother) confirms my sense that she did well last night, although The Swing Voter would like to see her talk about something a little more substantive than how awesome her kids are.  And I remain convinced that she's very hard for the Obama campaign to attack without dealing itself considerable damage.

Of course, it doesn't look very good for McCain to be upstaged by his VP.  On the other hand, there is, I think, a certain subtle confirmation to a cultural role we're comfortable with:  the strong husband/wife team.  I'm not saying that there is some romantic aspect to their candidacy, but rather that I think there's a way to build on that partnership image that gives her a central role without making McCain look weak. Maybe.  I'll have to see how things develop.

More on comments

I'm stopping the sock puppeting.  The impersonations of MLJ are occasionally amusing, but they're more often distracting.  Note to MLJ:  I can't ban the people who are using your alias, because I don't know which one of you is you, so to speak.  What I am going to do is ban anyone who is repeatedly uncivil, so if you tone it down, you'll survive the winnowing process and they won't.

Further note:  terms like "Rethuglican" and "Dimocrat" are automatic grounds not merely for deletion, but for banning.  If you are very, very nice, I may unban you after one slip . . . but not two.

More media me

Mark Kleiman and I did a Bloggingheads on Palin and other hot topics.

Okay, I lied

I'm policing the comments now.  I've already deleted a bunch and banned several IPs, and it's amazing how much more civil the arguments are already. But apologies to any trolls who thought they had a safe harbor to troll, and wasted their precious time writing comments I deleted.  There's no safe harbor.  As of now, if I don't like your comment, I'll delete it.

Announcement on comments

Starting tomorrow, comments are going to be policed and deleted.  With the election coming on, the signal to noise ratio has gone from about 50/50 to about 10/90.  My old commenters miss the civil discussion that used to take place at my old website, and so do I.  So with the help of an intern, we're going to start removing comments that don't lead to productive discussion.

I could lay out all sorts of rules, but the rule I'll mainly be using is really fairly simple:  if you wouldn't say it to my face, or the face of the commenter you're addressing, don't say it here.  Imagine you're at a debate tournament, or a cocktail party.  If what you're about to say would get you thrown out of either, can it or I will.  And repeat offenders will be banned.

I'm also going to delete/ban commenters--you know who you are (and if you don't, you're about to find out) who drive things in circles by getting into long pointless arguments about trivia where they refuse to concede any ground.

For the first time, the comments that simply communicate the commenter's deep hatred and/or contempt of me are also going.  I am sure I will be accused of stifling debate, of suppressing criticism of me.  So be it.  A significant fraction of the comments now consists of some variation on "You stupid, ignorant bitch, why aren't you writing what I want you to write?"  I am now fully conversant with two facts:

1.  Many lefty commenters think that I am a stupid, ignorant bitch.
2.  I am not writing things they want to read.

Still not clear on why they're reading the things they don't like to read, but hey, to each his own.  Anyway, I don't think there is any further value to be gleaned by repetition of these sentiments.  And they destroy the thread when other commenters respond.

I am also going to delete flame comments from my supporters, even if they are merely responding to the trolls.  Dealing with trolls is my job.

I'm not trying to wring the spirit from the debate--you can be as vicious as you like about peoples' ideas.  But the minute you say anything that even smacks of rudeness about the commenters themselves, I'm going to delete it if I see it.  (And if you think I've missed one, please point it out).  I also reserve the right to delete comments for any other reason.  I am going entirely on my judgement, and there is no appeal.  I encourage those who cannot live with this to start their own blog, where they can spout bile to their heart's content.

Update (Liberal) commenter Brad L asks me why I accuse my trolls of being lefties.  Well, because I know what blogs they came here via, and the most persistent ones clearly have a left political agenda.  I get a lot of crap from the right, but with a few exceptions (there are a few), it has nowhere near the level of obnoxious vitriol I get from the left.  But of course, many of my best commenters are also liberals.  I don't think they're trolls because they're liberals; rather, I think I attract liberal trolls.  Presumably the conservative trolls are out on some left-libertarian blog make life unpleasant for its owner.

Rural identity politics

I have a phone call into my mother, aka The Swing Voter*, but I'm willing to bet that she loved the speech.  Will Wilkinson, who comes from the same background:  rural, Midwestern, now a city dweller, liked her:

Palin exudes sexual confidence and maternal authority, which in a relatively conservative culture like ours is the most recognizable and viscerally comprehensible form of female power. It makes a lot of men uncomfortable, but that's because it's the kind of female power they are most often subject to, and most often fail to successfully resist. I spent much of my life taking orders from women a lot like Sarah Palin -- women like my mother and my Iowa public school teachers. Indeed, it makes a lot more emotional sense for me to feel led by by a woman like that than by some hotshot Air Force pilot. When a guy with a buzzcut says "jump," I say "screw you." When a woman like Sarah Palin says "jump," I am inclined to deferentially inquire into the requirements of this jump.

Palin's speech, I think, set in stark relief what Hillary was/is lacking. Again, I think O'Rourke gets it right when she says,

Ironically, [Palin] may have an easier time bringing what CNN called "toughness and femininity" together precisely because she never assumed at the outset of her adult life that she'd end up in a role like this.

I have very mixed feelings about this. I do not think politics is noble, and I deplore career politicians like Barack Obama, John McCain, Joe Biden, and, yes, Hillary Clinton. I would in fact rather be ruled by competent small-town mayors than accomplished professional rent-seekers. (Palin, being very smart, made great strides in this regard during her short time as Governor, because opportunistic predation is what politics is.) But I feel that Hillary's struggle to connect as a strong leadership-worthy woman was part of an attempt to forge a sense of feminine authority not founded an maternality and female sexual power. That she almost succeeded in this is astounding, and I think hugely to her credit.

But we all know that politics is a primate sport. We're used to marveling over the fact that the taller man usually wins, that a commanding, alpha-male jock toughness is de rigeur for successful presidential candidates. Palin's gut appeal drives home the perhaps inevitable but nevertheless regrettable fact that female political success is at some level going to be grounded in primate appeal, too. And, as a female primate, Palin is evidently "a force to be reckoned with" -- as the pundits kept saying.

But I don't want to push too hard on the biopsychology of this. Biology is heavily strained through through the filter of contingent culture and identity. That Palin reminded my of my school teachers is a matter of her acquired manner and the assumptions beneath them, a matter of her Upper-Midwest-sounding accent. I'm from a small town. She's from a small town! And damn straight: people who study at the University of Idaho (which is, in fact, where my sister is currently studying law) are every bit as smart as all you snide elitist Ivy League cosmoplitans!

The overwhelmed Republican delegates interviewed after the speech were at a total loss when asked to pin down specifically what they had liked about Palin's address. What they liked is that they saw a feminine yet powerful conservative Christian mother -- someone they understand, someone they would like to have as a friend, someone they are or would like to be. What they liked was the thrill of such direct cultural identification, of being on that stage and commanding attention and respect. I do not doubt that conservative Christian moms all over the country were brought to tears by the power of this. There are a lot of conservative Christian moms.

Palin made my gut want John McCain to win and then suffer a fatal heart attack. But I am a studied skeptic of my gut, and no wordly force could deliver my vote to him.

Another libertarian friend, an atheist who grew up in rural Wisconsin, voices similar sentiments:

My favorite line: "Contra my Democratic friends, I'm not sure that voters will see "But McCain really might die in office!" as a bug, rather than a feature."

In terms of political psychology, I loved the bait of Palin comparing herself to Obama. If people get itching for a Palin-Obama debate, Obama is in trouble. You're right to say that the Democrats should ignore her.  The problem is, if she continues to be successful, rural America will flock to her anyways.  I'm not a huge fan of McCain's nor of Palin's reported social conservativism, but my rural symptathies involutarily switched on during her speech and I couldn't help but root for her.  You can love and live the life of the elite, and I'm certainly living it, and still appreciate the cultural world that people build for themselves when they can't afford Whole Foods, and moreover wouldn't shop there even if they could.  I'm not sure the Democrats are there yet (geez, I'm still channeling my roots this morning).

Yes, the culture war is in full swing.  It's an evolutionarily deep tendency that kicks when people are given either-or choices.  I'm afraid reason doesn't and won't ever trump that as long as we're human.

I heard basically the same thing last night from a friend who grew up in the small-town south.  They're all libertarian.  They're all male.  They all liked her.  She speaks to the sense of people who didn't go to Ivy League schools that Harvard grads think they're not quite bright, and definitely not competent to run their own lives without a Yale man supervising things.  And they're entirely right that a lot of Ivy League grads do think this way, consciously or unconsciously.

Sarah Palin just delivered that vote, in Wisconsin and Iowa and Ohio and Western New York.  She just reinvigorated the base, and yes, in this election turnout will matter.  She did a really good job.  I may not like what she stands for, but I have to acknowledge its power--and yes, that frequently, the coastal elites earn the revulsion of Middle America.  They don't, to coin a phrase, hate us for our freedoms--our homosexual coddling, abortion loving ways.  They hate us because we act like we think we deserve to rule them.

* Mom's vote has correctly predicted the outcome of every presidential election since Nixon.

How can I say Obama's in trouble when he's leading in the polls?

Because he's falling, and the campaign hasn't managed to find a successful new line against McCain in two months.  Look at the InTrade graph:

Price for 2008 Presidential Election Winner (Individual) at intrade.com

Obama got very little bounce from his convention despite an astouding television and live viewership for his acceptance speech.  The McCain contract, on the other hand, got a 1.3 bounce this morning before he even spoke.

When I say that the Obama campaign is in trouble, I don't mean by any means that a McCain victory just became inevitable, or even probable.  But Obama is no longer going to have the walk everyone was expecting three months ago.  They need to find a more successful means of attacking McCain than they have so far come up with, because the overall trend of their polls is downward, and I'm told that many internal polls, which project likely voters, already show McCain with at least a 50/50 chance of winning. Obama's got a fight on his hands.

Lipstick on a pit bull

Laura McKenna explains better than I could why us coastal elites had better fear the soccer mom.

Thoughts on Sarah Palin

They're a little scattered, since I spent the speech lying in bed and wheezing.  So, bullet points.

  • This woman is an Obama-level political natural.  She is a ferociously good speaker, and almost preternaturally composed.  
  • Sarah Palin is what the McCain camp has badly needed:  an attack dog who can be deployed against Obama.  She slides the stiletto in without either losing her femininity or coming across as catty, and given that she's married to an eskimo, it's going to be hard to fit her into the narrative of conservative closet racists trying to perpetuate white domination.
  • She's going to be a hard act for McCain to follow tonight
  • The Democrats are, as my colleague Clive Crooks notes, in trouble.  Whatever you think of her as a potential president,  she is a politically brilliant choice, and Democrats are going to have a very hard time finding traction to attack her.
Well, the Democrats have a problem. They had a few days of calling her a clueless redneck, a stewardess, a nonentity, and she has hurled that back in their bleeding gums. (If I were Joe Biden, I'd start practising for October 2nd right now.) Even before tonight's speech, they had backed off the "no experience" strategy, because (as the Republicans intended) that was sending shrapnel in Obama's direction. Their line right now is their default mode, that McCain-Palin is four more years of George Bush. But this too is a completely untenable strategy, since the Republican ticket now looks stunningly fresh to voters, as fresh in fact as Obama-Biden. Where they will have to end up is obvious: McCain-Palin is an extreme right-wing ticket. It is a team that will prosecute the culture war against all that is decent and civilized in the United States: that must be the line.

  • Many Democratic bloggers are itching to go after this woman for all of her perceived flaws.  I understand why, but if they do so, they are very likely to get McCain elected.  If I were a Democratic strategist right now, I would be telling the campaign to pretend she doesn't exist.  There is simply no way to attack her without alienating the swing voters they need by sending the message:  "People like you are idiots who can't be trusted to make important decisions", and also, triggering the social opprobrium that falls on men who say nasty things about women.  What can I say?  Sometimes sexism works in womens' favor.
  • The McCain/Palin ticket represents something that I think is fairly troubling:  a sort of parody of traditional gender roles.  McCain is, and is running as, a hyper-macho flyboy, one whom I personally find disappointingly adolescent.  Palin's speech seemed to imply that her main qualification for office is having five kids and a great husband.  What man would have characterized himself as a "hockey Dad" when introducing himself as a candidate for the second highest office in the land?  Being a parent is hard and important, but it is no more a good qualification for higher office than is being a journalist, which is also hard and important.  Palin's entire persona seems crafted to be the anti-Hillary: no man will find her a challenge to his masculine ego.  I do not like the fact that this seems to be more successful than running on, say, actual policy positions.
  • I have no reason to think that she would be a particularly bad president.  Obama hasn't any more relevant experience than she has; he's simply been coaching for the thing longer.  If he can get up to speed to be president in 18 months, presumably so can she, and I think its reasonable to expect McCain to live that long.  We do not elect presidents because they are experts on everything that will come up during their presidency--they couldn't possibly be.  We elect them because we think they have good judgement and values that match our own.  Contra my Democratic friends, I'm not sure that voters will see "But McCain really might die in office!" as a bug, rather than a feature.
  • The "hockey Mom" schtick is a political lie.  You could not possibly be a hockey Mom and the vice president of the United States, or for that matter, governor of Alaska.  Todd is a hockey Mom.  Sarah Palin, whatever she has done in the past, is now exactly like male politicians:  someone else is doing the main work of raising her kids.  I don't think there's anything wrong with that, of cours, and as political hogwash goes, it's pretty low-grade.
  • She really is more like ordinary voters than the other politicians here.  Wail all you want about how she's super-pro-life, has five kids, and lives in a tiny town.  Sarah Palin is not a member of an upper-middle-class elite that has been groomed all its life to seize the power they've been told they're entitled to.  She doesn't vacation in Europe or go to the opera.  Neither do most of the voters she's trying to attract.
  • I'll be surprised if McCain doesn't get a sizeable convention bump.  Democrats are in denial about the trouble--which I too find inexplicable--that the Obama campaign is in.
  • As a person I like her.  Politically, I dislike what she represents:  populism, culture warmongering, and especially, the notion that if a woman is to hold power, she has to make herself non-threatening by emphasizing her domesticity and fertility.  I don't blame her for doing these things, since they seem to work. But I don't like living in a society where this works.
  • Obama is already having HUGE trouble with the union rank and file in the old guard unions.  I don't know what's happening in up-and-coming unions like the SEIU, but in traditional unions like the Laborers, leadership endorsement has failed to translate into support from the membership.  The fact that Todd Palin was a steelworker is probably going to pull more of those people into the Republican camp, though of course, McCain's stance on trade will continue to cost him a lot of votes with the Steel and Auto workers.
  • We might as well not bother to talk about policy issues in this campaign; we're now in all out culture war, with the coasts and the heartland fighting for control of Ohio.

September 3, 2008

Attack of the asthma

Something, probably the speeches, has triggered an asthma attack.  If I can get the wheezing under control, I'll blog Palin's speech.  If not, it's safe to assume that I hated it.

Mollycoddling terrorists and ruining America

Mitt Romney seems to use the word "liberal" in a randomly perjorative fashion.  I half expect him to say "I was eating breakfast this morning, and my hash browns were all liberal.  I sent them back and told the waitress to bring me some good, conservative hash browns.

He also seems to think that giving American citizens habeas corpus rights is some sort of crazy scheme dreamed up by liberal justices intent on destroying America's proud tradition of secret trials and warrantless arrests.  Jim Henley seems sort of prescient:

John McCain is, and as Larison says, John McCain would be everything anyone hated about the Bush years minus the occasional bouts of temperance. Eve and Nat Hentoff (whom she links) wonder if Palin would be "as flip-flopping as Mr. McCain on the Bush torture policy," which is an odd way to put it. There's no evidence that Palin has a preexisting torture policy to flip away from, let alone what it would be. What there is evidence of is: Sarah Palin is John McCain's running mate, not the other way around. Sarah Palin and John McCain are running under the aegis of the Republican Party, which has made support for torture a litmus-test issue.

Free fall

Ford sales continue to decline:

U.S. auto sales continued their slide in August despite stepped-up incentives to buyers, with Ford Motor Co. posting a 27% drop from a year earlier as sport-utility-vehicle sales plunged 53%.

Ford also lowered its second-half North American production forecast and revised its overall industry forecast to the low end of its range.

"We expect the second half of 2008 will be more challenging than the first half, as weak economic conditions and the consumer credit crunch continues," said Jim Farley, group vice president of marketing and communications.

Just as car purchases lagged oil prices on the way up, I'd expect them to lag on the way down.

REALLY random bleg

A friend has a freezer that ices up nearly instantly (it's a modern fridge, not one that SHOULD require defrosting).  The refrigerator repairman checked the seal, confessed himself stumped, and wandered off.  My guess, based solely on a long history with broken refrigerators and a hazy understanding of how the things work, is a problem with the compressor, presumably a hairline crack somewhere.  But since I am an English major and don't really understand how that pretty electricity stuff works, I'm anxious to check my judgment against my vast engineering readership.

Pro-choice?

Last post on Bristol Palin, I promise, but . . .

There's a subtext to the criticism here that I find very uncomfortable.  Any number of commenters seem to be implying that what a GOOD parent would have done is encouraged her daughter to get an abortion.

I call myself pro-choice.  Not pro-abortion.  Pro-choice.  A choice that I think should be made as rarely as possible.  I applaud girls and women who are willing to do the difficult thing and carry the child to term at considerable personal cost. 

I realize that many pro-choicers view abortion, as I do not, as a morally neutral act.  But this is supposed to be about women doing what is right for them.  What is right for you includes your moral beliefs about when a fetus becomes a full human life.  There are a whole bunch of really bad beliefs bundled here:  that you KNOW when life begins, and Bristol Palin does not; that you know that motherhood is wrong for her; that the most important thing in the entire world is having the same four years of carefree quasi-adulthood at a good college that I (and presumably you) did; that you, in short, are far better positioned to know what is right for Bristol Palin, whom you have never met and who lives several thousand miles from you, than do Bristol Palin and her family.

This is everything the pro-lifers tar us with:  arrogant, elitist, anti-motherhood, pro-abortion rather than pro-choice.  Liberal values are supposed to be about giving people space to make their own moral decisions, not forcing your own on them.  I thought that's what we were supposed to hate about conservatives . . .

More turnabout is fair play

John McCain made unkind remarks about Chelsea Clinton.  My opinion of the kind of man who makes jokes about a young girl unfortunate enough to go through puberty on the public stage is unprintable.  That, and his appalling treatment of his first wife--and his apparent belief that admitting he's behaved like a first-class *@%! is the same thing as atoning for it--would make me disinclined to vote for the man even if I weren't already opposed to his political persona.    I am happy to join anyone in complaining that John McCain doesn't seem to have outgrown an especially brutish adolescent character until at least the age when many people retire.  This does not make me any more fond of the talk about Bristol Palin.

Blog of the week

When you care enough to send the very worst . . . 

If something can't go on forever, it won't

Oil slides back towards $100 a barrel despite strong economic growth in the US.  It looks like the hedge funds who rode the wave on the way up are taking a hit on the way down:

The commodities reversal is beginning to punish some large investors. Ospraie Management, one of the largest players in commodities, said it is shutting down its biggest fund following significant losses. The fund declined 27% in August alone on bets on oil, natural gas and structured products. Formerly high-flying commodities-related stocks have also taken a beating in recent sessions, hurting stock investors who had hoped to ride the commodities wave.

Like Grandma always said, the wheel goes round and round, and sooner or later the fly on top gets to be the fly on the bottom.

Turnabout fair play?

I've seen a couple of commenters on various blogs defending going after Bristol Palin because if it were one of Obama's daughters, the right would be running with this 24/7.  This is not quite right--I'm sure most of the right would be honorably declaring this story off limits, as most of the left has.  But would Rush Limbaugh be making obnoxious jokes?  Would stupid televangelists be claiming that this was the result of bad family values?  Undoubtedly.

If I thought that Rush Limbaugh was the moral compass for our society, I would kill myself.

September 2, 2008

Minnesota arrests

Commenters are peppering me with demands to cover the arrests of protesters in Minneapolis.  Frankly, I don't know what to think.

Glenn Greenwald, predictibly, views these as fascist attempts to stifle dissent.  But the Strib, a very liberal paper, presents a slightly different picture:

Bolstered by emergency help from the Minnesota National Guard, police in St. Paul arrested 284 people Monday after outbreaks of violence and road obstructions linked to rogue bands of demonstrators among an otherwise peaceful throng estimated at 10,000 people.

The demonstrations, on a steamy first day of the Republican National Convention, began with block after block of marchers -- far fewer than the 50,000 some had predicted -- chanting and peacefully waving signs on downtown St. Paul's narrow streets. As the day wore on, the carnival atmosphere turned ugly.

Before most of the demonstrators had finished their march, a few hundred protesters splintered off and became confrontational and sometimes violent. Some smashed windows at Macy's and a downtown bank building. Others challenged police by blocking roads.

Police are arresting journalists, which is generally an indication that they're in full-on flip-out mode.  And in my own experience as a protest kid, the police are generally way too willing to use force on protesters, particularly ones they find politically distasteful.  This is a small minority, but once they start something, the other officers generally have to follow them in or stand silent witness to a riot. So my natural assumption with these kinds of arrests is that the police were somehow at fault.

On the other hand, Minneapolis is not a very Republican kind of town.  And the offenses cited by the Strib are the kinds of things people should be arrested for.  You don't protest Republican policies by smashing windows and blocking roads.  If you want the road to yourself, get a parade permit just like the VFW.  Also in my experience as a protest kid, there's an obnoxious element that's looking for a fight and thinks they're entitled to smash things to show they're  VEEEEWWWWWY MAAAAAAD!!!!!  This number is also always numerically very small, but a few people can do a lot of damage.  They can also get the police adrenaline running, at which point the pepper spray and the night sticks start flying.

So as best I can tell, there were some adolescent, violent protesters who ruined things for everyone, and fault should be apportioned about equally between them, and the hotheaded police who reacted to their nonsense by spraying tear gas at everyone.

I'd say that this makes a very good argument for eschewing public protest at these things.  It's about the most ineffective form of political expression possible--the last really effective protest movement was the Civil Rights marches, which were effective precisely because they presented middle class folks in their Sunday best getting attacked by the police.  The black churches ruthlessly policed out the troublemakers and the weird-looking ones.

Protest marches are fun, of course, in the way that extremely mild suffering in any cause is fun--it makes you feel good, and you get to spend time with your friends, usually outside in fairly nice weather.  Anyone who gave blood after 9/11 knows exactly what I mean.  But political theater should be practiced only if it appeals to the audience, which protests rarely do these days.  No one polices the troublemakers, so they bait the police into overreacting.  Nor do they bar the puppet kids, who get all the media attention, because, well, puppets are funny.  As far as I can tell, the inevitable reaction is public disgust, not least because even quiet and well run protests inconvenience a lot of people who are not politically aware.  Those people do not think "I bet these people have a legitimate grievance"; they think "What jerks!"  The only time I've ever heard genuinely anti-Catholic sentiment is when I've been in a city when a papal visit is disrupting traffic.

I have no doubt that I will now incur vituperation from commenters convinced that by decrying the tactic, I am secretly trying to tear down the cause.  Au contraire.  As I learned from Stephen Gale, who taught a class at Penn on terrorism, goals and tactics are very different things, and their effectiveness is not all that well correlated.  I don't think libertarian protests work any better than any other kind; I wouldn't go to an NRA protest or an eminent domain rally for just that reason.  I do think that people have the right to stage protests free from state harassment.  But just because I think you have a perfect right to do something does not imply that I believe you should.

Those crazy kids

A little more on sex ed, and reasons why it might not work.  Do you believe that drug education reduces drug use?  If you're reading this web site, I bet you don't, and you're right--the most famous program, D.A.R.E., has consistently failed to show any positive effects, something which is disguised by the program producers by constantly changing the curriculum so that whatever program just flunked a reality check isn't the same as the awesome new program they're using now.

Do you think that driver's education reduces risky driving?  If you do, it's because you were home schooled and never met any teenagers.  Teen fatalities have declined thanks to other laws, but not because we told 'em they might be killed.  The future beyond next month is not very real to teenagers, which is surprising, since they're immortal.

Indeed, as the proponents of comprehensive birth control education often readily comprehend in other contexts, such as smoking education and high drinking ages, telling kids that something is risky often makes them enjoy it more.

Of course, you could argue that preventing pregnancy is easy and attractive, while eschewing marijuana is not.  But this is not quite true.  Condoms reduce sexual pleasure.  The pill can make you sick, has to be taken at the same time every day, and is likely to be found by your snoopy mother.  The depo-provera shots suppress your libido, can make your periods heavier, and make you gain weight, a major drawback in fat-obsessed America.  All three cost money that could be spent on other things, like the marijuana you're smoking despite the best efforts of your parents and teachers.

Abstinence only education: no better, no worse

How can I say that birth control education doesn't work?  my critics cry.  Where's the data?

Here.  The gold standard study of abstinence-only education is a longitudinal study begun in 2001.  There was no significant difference between the students receiving abstinence education and the students receiving the ordinary programs in their school district.  At least half of those programs had comprehensive contraception education.

It doesn't matter what you measure:  STD awareness, assessment of birth control effectiveness, number of partners, age of first sexual intercourse, medical outcomes--there was simply no difference between the two groups.  That indicates that children are not getting useful information either from abstinence-only programs or those focused on birth control.

You can find a more comprehensive list of the lack of contraceptive education effectiveness here.  The upshot:  some programs seem effective, but when you do metanalysis, you find that they're within the expected random variance.

This is less surprising than it sounds.  In the 1950s, such programs undoubtedly would have been very effective.  But these days, a kid who wants to get hold of birth control is very, very unlikely to be unaware where babies come from, or where they keep the birth control.  Anyone who wants to know more can get on the web and Google it.  Also, students pay as little attention to their teachers as possible.  I remember in my extremely affluent high school being shocked by how little my classmates appeared to have retained from literally years of birth control-focused eduction.

Kids get pregnant because they have poor impulse control, hazy conceptions about the future, and possibly, parents who they are afraid will find birth control.  None of these are problems that sex ed helps with.  Moreover, as anyone who's ever been a Big Sister or similar can tell you, poor girls who have babies unfortunately too often do so because there's little reason not to, and they mistakenly believe that this will help them hold onto the baby's father.  What they need is not more education about The Pill, but a better future to look forward to.

Why vaccinate for HPV?

A reader emails me this article pointing to a relatively high rate of allergic reactions to the HPV vaccines:

But some experts remain unconvinced, saying policy makers rushed into a pricey immunization program when there is no epidemic of cervical cancer, which can already be screened through regular Pap smears.

In a Canadian Medical Association Journal article last year, four researchers led by epidemiologist Abby Lippman of McGill University urged a more prudent course.

The New England Journal of Medicine echoed similar feelings in an editorial two weeks ago. "With so many essential questions still unanswered, there is good reason to be cautious about introducing large-scale vaccination programs," it said.

Says the reader:

This study on its own won't change your mind, but maybe the drip, drip of these findings will eventually give you pause.

Let's think about this.  Effect of allergic reactions:

The allergic reactions included nausea, itchy red rash, difficulty breathing and other symptoms.

Now let's talk about what happens when you get an abnormal pap.  First, they test for HPV.  If that comes back positive, they microscopically examine your cervix for cancer.  If they decide you're in danger, here are your treatment options:

The LEEP procedure is the nicest of your options.  It impairs your fertility, is painful, and prevents you from having sex for six weeks or so.  Its used only on early stage cancer.  All the others are worse.

If they don't do any of these procedures, what they do is watch you, with an eye to doing one of them in the future if there are any changes.


Nausea and/or a rash, or hysterectomy?  We report, you decide.




Sarah Palin: the importance of being earnest

So this is what this race has come down to?  Arguing about the fecundity of Sarah Palin's daughter?  This is news because . . . ?

Because Sarah Palin lied about sex?  So let me get this straight.  Bill Clinton using a White House intern like a cheap whore in the Oval Office and lying about same under oath:  not a problem.  Sarah Palin relieving her sixteen year old of the burden of raising a special needs child:  a huge character issue.  This sounds like a parody of the ridiculous beliefs that social conservatives attribute to liberals.

Because Sarah Palin is a bad mother?  Because only bad mothers have children who do unwise, risky, and even immoral things?  Apparently every single person in my high school class had bad parents, 100% of whom were liberals.

One might also comment on the belief that a woman cannot be a good leader unless and until she is a good mother.  If one of Barack Obama's girls gets caught shoplifting, do we impeach him?

Because Sarah Palin is a social conservative and therefore a hypocrite?  About what?  Which social conservatives guarantee that raising your children with good values will prevent them from getting pregnant?  Indeed, I believe that's why they want to make the rest of us watch G movies--because they think society has effects on people.

Because Sarah Palin made the decision to keep the Down's baby a selling point?  I'm sorry, did I miss the press release where she gave Trig away now that the secret is out?  I'd think it's rather more admirable to take on a special needs baby that you didn't give birth to.  No hormones flooding you with a nesting instinct, no oxytocin rush to bond you to the baby; just a firm committment to do the right thing by a baby who's going to take a lot of care.

Because Sarah Palin should have encouraged her daughter to get an abortion?  When did pro-choice become pro-abortion?

Because social conservatives are against sex education emphasizing birth control?  This would be vastly more compelling if there were any good evidence that sex education emphasizing birth control works any better than sex education emphasizing abstinence.  Unfortunately, neither seems to work very well--something that is bizarrely missed by liberals every time a study comes out on the benefits of abstinence-only education.  Abstinence-only doesn't reduce teen pregnancies! they trumpet gleefully, somehow failing to notice what this implies about the effectiveness of birth-control education.

I'm very sure that an upper-middle class governor's daughter was not unaware of what causes babies, or how the babies might be prevented, or what aisle on the drugstore contains the means of prevention.  She got pregnant either because she chose to ignore that knowledge, or because something went wrong.  How many of the sniffily self-righteous commentators have never missed a pill, or had the condom break, or simply not had them to hand and thought, well, just this once . . . ?

Because all the hyperventilating Obama supporters pretending that they are genuinely morally outraged are willing to say anything to get him elected, even if if means prying into the personal life of a seventeen year old girl who has just been thrust into adulthood in a humiliatingly public way?  Oh, right . . .

Sorry, I must have been confused.  I thought I lived in a civilized society.

This is news, of course.  But it is not particularly interesting news.  It's hardly the first shotgun wedding the world has ever witnessed, not even of a prominent politician's daughter.  It has basically nothing to do with her fitness to be the vice president.  The people acting as if this matters deeply should be as ashamed of themselves as they claim to be of Sarah Palin's behavior.

The conspiracy theorizing about Trig is more deeply worrying.  They require that, on the one hand, Sarah Palin masterminded an elaborate conspiracy that fooled the media; and that on the other hand, she didn't bother to obtain a pregnancy girdle, which are readily available at theatrical supply shops without showing ID, and fairly comfortable.  She also had a doctor willing to falsify a birth certificate . . . but not the date.  She knew her daughter had a high-risk pregnancy, but chose to travel to somewhere it would be difficult to fake the birth, even though her (faked) condition would have given her a perfectly reasonable excuse not to. 

All this, mind you, to conceal something that hasn't been a dark and shameful secret for thirty years or so, in a Republican state that isn't particularly socially conservative.  So why are all these allegedly intelligent adults pretending that they find this at all likely?

On Sarah Palin as a VP I have no particular opinion, except that she doesn't make me any more interested in voting for John McCain.  But the people criticizing her are making me considerably less interested in voting for Obama.  If this sort of deranged logic produces unwavering support for Obama, I have to question my own judgement.